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Abstract 
 
Shipping transports between 80-90% of world trade (Smith et al. 2015). In 2012 the 
industry accounted for around 3% of global emissions with a predicted increase of 
between 50 and 250% by 2050 (Scott et al, 2017). As such, the question of how to 
regulate Shipping’s CO2 emissions in line with international climate change agreements 
(e.g. the Paris Agreement) is of major concern.  
 
Current CO2 regulations have been criticized as ineffective (Devanney 2010) with 
growing calls for new regulations (Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Wan et al. 2018). 
Existing literature on the regulation of Shipping tends towards impact assessments, 
scientific critiques and general overviews. This thesis contributes an ethnography of the 
development of new regulations. Ontologically constructionist, the research is guided 
by Actor-Network Theory, chosen for its applicability in scientific and technical 
communities, appreciation of non-human agency and its conceptualization of control 
through networked heterogeneity. The thesis follows development of new regulations in 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). Directed by two questions ‘What actors constitute the MEPC?’ 
and ‘How does it create regulations?’ the thesis offers an account of the actors and 
processes that enable the construction of control over Shipping emissions. This account 
is produced from observational, interview, documentary and photographic data.  
 
The study contributes to the limited literature on Shipping regulation in three ways: (i) 
examining actor-roles in the network; (ii) illustrating network convergence informed by 
sociological framings of translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & Lee 2013); 
and (iii) tracing the agential qualities of concepts and principles enacted and acting in 
the MEPC. Their shared characteristics are distilled to create the typology: Meta-actor 
which strengthens the descriptive capabilities of ANT, extends the core principle of 
symmetry, facilitates new identifications of networked power, and illustrates a link 
between influence and vulnerability. Overall the thesis shows how a heterogeneous 
network of actors converges to produce regulation for the reduction of CO2 emissions 
from Shipping. 
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Clarifications & Key Definitions 
 
• IMO and Organization are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the 
International Maritime Organization. 
• COP21 and Paris COP are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the 21st 
Session of the Conference of Parties held in Paris, France. 
• Treason refers to the Sociology of Treason (Galis & Lee 2013) and not to the act 
of Treason as the betrayal of one’s Country or Government. 
 
 
International shipping: ‘shipping between ports of different countries…International 
shipping excludes military and fishing vessels’. Definition from (Smith et al. 2015, p 
xv). 
 
Domestic shipping: ‘shipping between ports of the same country…Domestic shipping 
excludes military and fishing vessels. By this definition, the same ship may frequently 
be engaged in both international and domestic shipping operations’. Definition from 
(Smith et al. 2015, p xv). 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis introduces and explores a complex issue in a global industry. It concerns 
control over CO2 emissions from the international shipping industry. The sea is the 
lifeblood of our world connecting lands, providing a vital food source and housing 
unique ecosystems. Upon the seas the maritime industry has been moving goods for 
millennia (George 2013; Draffin 2014). Some historians suggest that at the height of the 
Roman Empire, its trade with India amounted to more than 300,000 tonnes per year, 
while others have traced maritime insurance as far back as 3000-2000BC (Draffin 
2014). Over the centuries, sea trade has grown exponentially. In an era of international 
interdependence Shipping is more vital than ever before (George 2013). Despite its 
major impact on our society, the shipping industry sails out of sight and out of mind and 
is consequently referred to as the invisible industry (Cheng & Choy 2007; George 
2013). Nevertheless, Shipping is indispensable to our globalised world. It is a keystone 
industry (Osterblom et al. 2015), transporting between 80-90% of global trade by 
volume (UNCTAD 2017b; Smith et al. 2015). It is the most efficient form of 
international transport for which we have no substitute (International Chamber of 
Shipping 2014). In the words of the Secretary General of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) which regulates the industry: 
 
‘Without international shipping, half the world would freeze and the other half would 
starve. Shipping makes the world go round and, so, let us be in no doubt about the 
broader significance of shipping and the very connection it has to the lives of just about 
everyone on the planet’ Efthimios Mitropoulos, Secretary-General of the IMO, London, 
6th October 2005 (Mitropoulos 2005). 
  
Recognizing the importance of Shipping, there is also a need to understand the 
environmental impacts of this invisible industry. One of the major environmental 
concerns is rising CO2 emissions, an issue which is the focus of this thesis and is 
introduced in the following section. 
 2 
1.1 Identifying the Issue: Rising CO2 Emissions 
In 2015 at the Paris Conference of Parties, world nations charted ‘a new course in the 
global climate effort’ in the form of the Paris Agreement (UNCC 2018). The aim of this 
Agreement is to respond to the threat of anthropogenic climate change by keeping 
temperature rise ‘well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius’ (ibid).  
 
While the world nations chart a course for control over temperature rise, the shipping 
industry is adrift in a sea of uncertainty. Despite being a more efficient form of transport 
than road, rail or airfreight (Coady & Lister 2013; IMO 2017d; International Chamber 
of Shipping 2014; Smith et al. 2015), the shipping industry predominantly relies on 
Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO), a residual substance from the distillation process of crude oil 
(Bomin 2015). Laden with contaminants, this fuel is a direct cause of exhaust pollution 
from ships (Lindstad et al. 2015). Figures suggest that the shipping industry emits 
around 3% of global CO2 (Cames et al. 2015; Scott et al. 2017). Furthermore, these 
emissions are on the rise with projections forecasting that under ‘business as usual’ 
scenarios, CO2 emissions from Shipping could rise by 250% by the year 2050 (Smith et 
al. 2015). Emissions from ships have been shown to cause premature deaths in areas 
near busy shipping lanes and ports (Bloor et al. 2000; Bailey & Solomon 2004; Corbett 
et al. 2008; Eyring et al. 2010).Yet, despite these worrying assessments, the shipping 
industry sits largely outside of current global environmental frameworks such as the 
Kyoto Protol (Oberthür 2003), the Paris Agreement (Burleson 2016; UNCTAD 2016; 
Larkin et al. 2017) and regional regulations such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(Kågeson 2007; Kremlis 2010). There are no market-based measures for controlling 
CO2 emissions in Shipping (World Shipping Council 2015; Shi 2016; Traut et al. 2018) 
and regulation in this industry has been characterized as reactive (Veiga 2002), slow 
and uncertain (Strong 2018; Wan et al. 2018).  
 
The safety and environmental impacts of Shipping are regulated by a network of Flag 
State Registries (DeSombre 2006). Each ship requires a registration to trade and the flag 
confers nationality onto the ship (ibid). The ship is subject to the rules of the flag to 
which it is registered. However, this system, described as ‘managed anarchy’ (George 
 3 
20131 ), has been heavily criticized (DeSombre 2006), suffers compliance issues 
(Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Chen et al. 2017) and is incredibly complex. Ships are 
able to join open registries which have no link to the nationality of the owner or owning 
company, managing company, the Captain, crew, route or cargo (George 2013). 
Essentially, ship owners can choose the legal framework they wish to work under. Thus, 
it is of the utmost importance that regulations to control safety and environmental 
impacts from ships are unilaterally adopted. However, Shipping is largely ignored by 
global policy research (Lister 2015), and considered the modern ‘wild-west’ in terms of 
regulation and governance (Langewiesche 2004). 
 
Against the backdrop of concern over rising emissions the international regulatory 
organisation for Shipping has been attempting to address the issue.  The organisation 
responsible for regulating this complex area is the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), which is a specialized agency of the U.N. The IMO has a Committee Structure 
with the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) responsible for 
developing regulations aimed at preventing, controlling and reducing pollution from 
ships. Through Committee meetings and Intercessional Working Groups, 174 Member 
States come together with Consulting Organisations to negotiate and agree on new 
regulations in the form of Conventions, Amendments and Guidelines.  
 
Thus far, there are two regulations aimed at controlling CO2 emissions from ships; the 
Energy Efficiency Design Index and the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan 
(discussed in depth in Chapter 3). The key problem is that these regulations are not yet 
proving effective enough at reducing CO2 resulting in calls for amendments to current 
regulations (Anderson & Bows 2012; Attah & Bucknall 2015; Transport & 
Environment 2017) and new regulations to reduce CO2 emissions (Devanney 2010; 
Longva et al. 2010; Bazari & Longva 2011; Devanney 2011; Anderson & Bows 2012; 
Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Johnson et al. 2013; Ančić & Šestan 2015; Transport & 
Environment 2017; Traut et al. 2018; Wan et al. 2018). As a result of concerns over 
                                                
1 Location 146 on kindle edition. 
2 93,161ships in 2017.  
3 Using the UNCTAD STAT database with ‘number of ships’ selected. 
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current regulations and in response to the Paris COP, the IMO has undertaken 
discussions on new directions for the control and reduction of CO2 emissions.  
 
1.2 Research Questions, Theory and Methodology 
Three facets of a serious and unresolved issue have been addressed and discussed here; 
(i) Shipping is vital to our society for trade, fuel and food, (ii) the problem of rising CO2 
emissions from ships and, (iii) the lack of effective control through existing regulations. 
These facets combine to constitute the rationale for undertaking research into the 
development of new regulations in the IMO’s MEPC aimed at controlling and reducing 
CO2 emissions. 
 
The extant literature on the IMO consists of broad overviews (e.g. Tan 2006; Karim 
2015) and studies which background the IMO (e.g. van Leeuwen 2010; Gulbrandsen 
2013). There is a general lack of detail and observational data about the innermost 
processes of this lynchpin organisation. In response to the lack of detail in the literature 
this study is positioned as an exploratory ethnography of the MEPC and the process of 
creating new regulations. Two core questions guided the research: 
 
(i) What is the IMO MEPC? In other words, what actors and associations constitute and 
perform this network? 
(ii) How does the IMO MEPC work? Or, by what processes does this network develop 
regulatory control? 
 
Actor-Network Theory was mobilized to guide the research. The MEPC has been black-
boxed in current literatures and in order to open up and unpack this organisation ANT 
was used as both a theoretical framing and a methodological orientation (Jóhannesson 
2005; Lukka & Vinnari 2017). In applying ANT, the MEPC was understood as a socio-
technical network of actors and accordingly it was disassembled into its constituent 
actors and associations.  
 
Much of ANT work is dedicated to explaining science and knowledge (Latour & 
Woolgar 1979; Latour 1983; Latour 1987), controversy (Latour 2004a; Venturini 2009; 
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Venturini 2012), medicine (Mol 1999; Prout 1996; McDougall et al. 2016), education 
(Fenwick & Edwards 2010) and markets (Callon 1998; Callon et al. 2007) using the key 
principles of symmetry, relationality and heterogeneity. However as Chapter 3 will 
show ANT has been applied sparingly in studies of regulation and shipping. As such, 
the terminological repertoire of ANT (Mol 2010; Callon 1986a) was employed to 
produce an ethnography of regulation. Additionally, one of the original aims of ANT 
was to demystify power (Law 1992) and control (Law 1986b). Despite this, 
contemporary studies making use of ANT conceptualizations of power are scarce. 
Undertaking an ethnography of regulation in the MEPC offered an opportunity to re-
launch ANT enquiries of power and control in a contemporary organisation and answer 
the question of how control can be constructed over an industry that operates as a 
watery ‘wild west’ (Langewiesche 2004), beyond the rule of any one state yet depended 
on by all.  
 
In order to carry out an ANT-guided ethnography of regulation, fieldwork was 
undertaken for a period of 15 months from September 2015 to December 2016. Four 
data types; observation, photographic, interview and documentary were assembled 
together and analysed in order to produce an account of regulation as the product of a 
heterogeneous network.  
 
1.3 Thesis Outline and Contributions 
The following chapter will expand on the three facets of the issue laid out in section 1.1 
by more thoroughly introducing the shipping industry and the literature on emissions, 
governance in Shipping, the IMO and current regulations. Chapter 3 discusses Actor-
Network Theory, why it was chosen for this project and how it was applied to the 
research. From there Chapter 4 begins with ontological and epistemological positioning 
of the research before detailing the process of data collection, reflecting on the data 
generated and the difficulties in the process.  
 
Chapter 5 is the first of three data chapters. It responds predominantly to the first 
research question: ‘What is the IMO MEPC?’ by disassembling the IMO MEPC into 
the constituent actors and associations. This is done by organising the network into the 
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categories, spaces, people and things and then exploring the actors within each 
category. By disassembling the network at an individual level, appreciating the nuanced 
roles of each actor, it is possible to better understand the collective. Chapter 6, the 
second data chapter, responds predominantly to the second research question: ‘How 
does the IMO MEPC work?’ In response, the processes of submission, discussion, and 
agreement are unpacked with the aid of the sociological vocabularies: Translation 
(Callon 1986a) and Treason (Galis & Lee 2013). These framings are combined to 
follow the negotiations and to understand how a network of divergent interests are 
brought into alignment thus expanding on understandings of network practices. Chapter 
7, the final data chapter, identifies new sources of agency, distils from these a set of 
characteristics to form a new actor-category; Meta-Actors which is offered as a 
contribution to the repertoire of ANT (Mol 2010) and to the conceptualizations of 
networked control making. Thus Chapter 7 offers a response to both research questions 
by presenting the missing masses (Latour 1992) that bring the network together as a 
durable whole (Latour 1990; Latour 2005). These three chapters work to assemble 
spaces, people, things, processes and others into an explanation of the MEPC network. 
 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the data chapters, tying the stories together and 
examining the empirical and theoretical contributions made by the thesis. These 
contributions are put in the context of existing literatures before the limitations of the 
study are reflected upon and suggestions for future research opportunities are presented. 
The thesis finalizes with a short section of concluding thoughts.  
 
Overall the study expands the conceptualization of long distance control as a product of 
a heterogeneous network (Law 1986b) by suggesting that international regulatory 
control is the product of two symbiotic networks, one of construction and one of 
implementation. Within the process of construction, the study also highlights collective 
enactment and relational agency as a way to understand power as a balance of influence 
and dependence.  
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2. The Shipping Industry: Scale, Economics and 
Environmental Impact 
 
Shipping faces a serious issue in the form of rising CO2 emissions, a major cause of 
climate change. These rising emissions threaten to undermine national commitments 
made in the Paris Agreement. This chapter will demonstrate that, as of yet, there is a 
lack of effective regulatory control over this issue. In doing so the chapter provides the 
rationale for undertaking a study of the development of new CO2 reduction regulations. 
 
This chapter offers background information on the shipping industry, its function, 
features and economics. It then moves on to environmental issues faced by the industry 
before focusing on rising CO2 levels and attempts to regulate and control CO2 emissions 
from ships. This chapter is written specifically to integrate background contextual detail 
with a review of the relevant literatures. The chapter illustrates the study of the 
development of new regulations as an important and necessary contribution to the 
literature focused on the regulation of Shipping as well as an opportunity to enhance 
scholarly understanding of contemporary international control.  
 
2.1. Introducing the International Shipping Industry  
The international shipping industry is immensely important transporting 10.3 billion 
tons in 2016 (UNCTAD 2017b), equating to between 80-90% of world trade by volume 
(Smith et al. 2015). Furthermore, demand for shipping is expected to increase for the 
foreseeable future (UNCTAD 2017b). There are over 90,000 ships in the merchant 
trading fleet2 (UNCTAD 2017a3) with a Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT)4 of nearly 2 
billion tons (UNCTAD 2017a 5 ). Estimates suggest that in 2013 the amount of 
containers in the container-shipping sector would be equivalent to 34.5 million twenty 
                                                
2 93,161ships in 2017.  
3 Using the UNCTAD STAT database with ‘number of ships’ selected. 
4 Dead weight tons (DWT) is a weight based measure of a ships carrying capacity. 
5 Using the UNCTAD STAT database with ‘DWT’ selected. 
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foot equivalent units (World Shipping Council 2018a). Figure 2.1 shows a map of 
vessel activity, giving a visual representation of shipping routes, choke points and the 
intensity of marine traffic: 
 
Figure 2.1: Intensity Map of the Shipping Industry (Source: Smith et al. 2015, p24) 
 
 
The shipping industry is essential for the world economy to function. However, despite 
its scale and importance, it is largely invisible, opaque, and underrepresented in global 
regulatory research (Lister et al. 2015; Cheng & Choy 2007; George 2013; Lister 2015). 
This is concerning considering that Shipping faces a number of serious economic and 
environmental issues.  
 
Due to an economic lag between land-based economies and the shipping industry, 
Shipping’s economy is still struggling from the effects of the 2008 economic recession 
(Barua & Mittal 2017). This lag is due to ship orders being placed in periods of 
economic growth and stability which then cause overcapacity in periods of economic 
decline. In difficult economic conditions it can even be more cost effective for ships to 
be ‘laid up’6. Understanding the economic conditions of the industry, particularly 
during the time period the research was undertaken, is important to contextualize the 
regulatory negotiations followed in this research. In the course of this research there 
                                                
6 The term ‘laid up’ applies to the process of removing a ship from service. Typically this choice is made 
when the freight rates are not high enough to cover the running costs (Deutsche Flagge 2018). 
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have been several indications of financial hardship. Firstly, despite being vital to global 
trade, the container sector suffered from a $3.5 billion dollar operating loss in 2016 
(UNCTAD 2017b). Secondly, Hanjin, once the 7th largest container ship company, was 
declared bankrupt in February 2017 (Sea Trade Maritime News 2017). Furthermore, 
estimates put the capital shortfall for the industry as a whole at $30 billion in 2017 (Saul 
2017). In the wake of these developments there has been a significant amount of 
industry consolidation. Indeed, it has been estimated that 9 of the top 20 shipping firms 
will disappear through consolidation by the end of 2018 (World Maritime News 2018). 
These economic conditions function as the backdrop against which environmental 
regulations are discussed and developed.  
 
Along with the economic conditions under which the shipping industry operates, the 
national economies within the shipping industry equally provide background to the 
regulatory process. While the largest global economies (by GDP) are the United States, 
China and Japan (International Monetary Fund 2018), the situation at sea is surprisingly 
different. The biggest ‘Sea-conomies’, measured by registered DWT, are Panama (343 
million DWT), Liberia (219 million DWT) and the Marshall Islands (216 million DWT) 
(UNCTAD 2017b). Figure 2.2 presents the top five ship registries in 2017. However, at 
the time of writing, the Marshall Islands (RMI) has now become the second largest 
registry in the world (The Marshall Islands Registry 2017). As this thesis is a study of 
constructing control through international negotiations, understanding that the majority 
of the world’s merchant fleet is registered with developing countries is key to 
contextualise the actors and arguments detailed in the data chapters.  
 
Figure 2.2: Largest Ship Registries in 2017 (Source: Marshall Islands Registry 
2017) 
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While the shipping industry is often referred to as a singular industry, in practice it is a 
collection of industries. The diversity of Shipping and its various sub-sectors is captured 
by ship types. The main ship types include general cargo ships, tankers, bulk carriers, 
container ships, passenger ships, service and offshore vessels and fishing vessels (see 
Table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: Ship Types (Amended from information in Draffin, 2014) 
Ship 
Type 
Description 
General 
cargo 
ships 
Historically the workhorses of the industry, they are fairly flexible in cargo 
and trading routes. Owners attempt to plan voyages to maximise profit and 
minimise ballast time.  
Tankers 
Tankers carry liquid cargo of all sorts including, but not limited to, oil, 
chemicals, liquid gas, and fruit juice.  
Bulk 
carriers 
Bulk carriers are designed to carry bulk materials and commodities such as 
coal, iron ore and bauxite, grain and timber products.  
Container 
ships 
Container shipping evolved from the advent of the container in the 1940s-
1950s. By the 1970s container ships were moving thousands of 20 foot-
long containers, known as Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) 7 . 
Nowadays, containerships move tens of thousands of containers. A 15,000 
TEU container ship can carry 746 million bananas, enough for every person 
in Europe (George 2013).  
Passenger 
ships 
Passenger ships include ferries, cruise ships and liners and are subject to 
some of the most stringent safety regulations. 
Other 
ships 
There are many other types of ship include car carriers, specialist dry cargo 
ships, semi-submersible heavy lifting ships, cable layers, offshore service 
ships, refrigerated ships (known in the industry as Reefer ships), ice 
breakers and research vessels.  
 
                                                
7 Although more recently there has been a move towards use of forty foot containers.  
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As regulations need to be both universally adopted and suitable across sectors (IMO 
2017d), the diversity of activity involved in Shipping presents a regulatory challenge in 
itself and makes this context an important area for questions of environmental control.  
 
This section has provided information on the logistical, economic and sectorial features 
of the shipping as well as the economic conditions faced by the industry during the 
research project. As such, it highlights part of the rationale for opting to explore the 
process of regulating environmental impacts: Shipping is vital, complex and facing 
challenges. The following section introduces the variety of environmental issues within 
the industry before moving on to focus on CO2 emissions and in doing so it builds on 
the rationale for exploring this context.  
 
2.2 Environmental Issues in Shipping  
Pollution of the marine environment has been defined by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as:  
 
‘…the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such 
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human 
health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the 
sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities’ 
(UNCLOS Part 1, Article 1.(4).) 
 
As Figure 2.3 below illustrates, Shipping is associated with a wide variety of 
environmental impacts, which are diverse, complex, interrelated and sometimes unique 
to the industry (for example the issue of invasive species carried in ballast water).   
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Figure 2.3: Environmental Issues in Shipping (Source: Author’s own with 
categories from World Shipping Council 2018b) 
 
 
 
The red ellipse in Figure 2.3 indicates the focus of this thesis however before discussing 
CO2 emissions, this section will discuss the issue of air emissions overall, introducing in 
particular Sulphur Oxides (SOx), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) and Particulate Matter (PM).  
 
The cause of SOx, NOx, PM and CO2 emissions from Shipping is the type of fuel 
burned. Ships carry bunker fuel, 80% of which is made of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)8 
(Notteboom & Vernimmen 2009). HFO is the sludgy residue of the distillation process 
(ibid) only one higher on the scale of distillate than tarmac. The fuel is so dense that it 
can be walked on at room temperature (Harrould-Kolieb 2008) and it requires very large 
engines to use, for example Emma Maersk’s engine weighs 2300 tons and is bigger than 
an average four-story building (ZME Science 2017). Due to the weight of the ships and 
the size of the engine needed to propel them, fuel consumption in this industry is 
relatively high and a major part of the cost of operations (Notteboom & Vernimmen 
                                                
8 Other bunker fuels include marine diesel oil (MDO) and marine gas oil (MGO). 
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2009). Indeed, energy costs represent 60-70% of operational costs (Rehmatulla & Smith 
2015b). Figure 2.4 illustrates the fuel consumption of ship types in 2012, which in turn 
serves to highlight the scale of use of HFO and emphasizes the problem of exhaust 
pollution. 
 
Figure 2.4: Summary Graph of Annual Fuel Consumption Broken Down by Ship 
Type and Machinery Component for the Year 2012 (Source: Smith et al. 2015, p7) 
 
 
 
When the issue of emissions is raised, Shipping is often lauded as the most efficient 
form of transport in that it produces lower emissions per unit carried than the airline or 
rail industries (Coady & Lister 2013; International Chamber of Shipping 2014; IMO 
2017d; Smith et al. 2015). However, due to the volume carried by sea and the fuel used 
by the majority of ships, air emissions have been a concern in the shipping industry for 
some time. Indeed, if the shipping industry were a country it would be the 6th largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases; higher than Germany (Harrould-Kolieb 2008). 
Furthermore, in 2009 it was reported that confidential data from industry experts 
suggested that the world’s biggest 15 ships emit as much pollution as all of the world’s 
cars (Vidal 2009). Thus, there is a clear need to control air pollution from ships.  
 
 14 
While this thesis focuses on CO2 emissions and associated regulation, it is helpful to 
review the approaches to control other air emissions, in particular Sulphur Oxide (SOx) 
emissions, in order to highlight disparity between the progress made on regulating both 
forms of air emissions from ships. SOx emissions, which are a cause of acid rain, were 
once projected to surpass all land based emissions by 2015 (Neef 2012). Along with the 
danger to the environment, air pollution negatively impacts human health. Research 
suggests those living near ports are at higher risk of developing respiratory problems 
and even premature death as a result of exposure to pollution (Bailey & Solomon 2004; 
Corbett et al. 2008); and the particulate matter contained in shipping emissions can 
cause approximately 60,000 cardiopulmonary and lung cancer deaths each year 
(Harrould-Kolieb 2008; Corbett et al. 2008).   
 
In response to rising concerns of SOx, NOx and PM, there has been a move towards the 
use of alternative fuels, especially in Emission Control Areas (ECAs).and some Ports 
(Notteboom & Vernimmen 2009). ECAs are specific regions where vessels must 
comply with mandatory measures for the reduction and control of Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx) and Sulphur Oxides (SOx). According to Annex VI of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)9, vessels have been 
required to consume fuel with less than 0.1% Sulphur content in ECAs from the 1st of 
January 2015, unless the vessel has been fitted with equipment to remove Sulphur from 
the exhaust, has a dispensation, or is using an alternative fuel such as LNG (Kirrane 
2018). 
 
There have been continued discussions regarding NOx, SOx and PM in the IMO MEPC 
for many years. The level of SOx emissions from ships has been regulated by a global 
cap since the establishment of MARPOL Annex VI in 1997 at which point the limit was 
4.5%m/m which has been reduced over the years to the new 2020 target of 0.5%m/m 
(0.1%m/m inside ECAs) (IMO 2018c; IMO 2018l). Furthermore, in 2016 Finland 
submitted a research report to the MEPC70 discussions on the entry into force date of 
the 2020 Sulphur cap. This report showed that delaying the implementation of the 
                                                
9 MARPOL will be explained in Section 2.7.1 as part of the current regulatory framework.  
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Sulphur Cap by just five years from 2020 to 2025 could contribute to more than 
570,000 additional premature deaths worldwide between 2020-2025 (Corbett et al. 
2016; IMO 2018d). The IMO has now set a limit of 0.5%m/m (mass by mass) in 
October 2016 that will come into effect from January 1st 2020 (IMO 2018k; IMO 
2018d).  
 
In response to the SOx limit prominent industry members have voiced concerns over 
issues with compliance particularly across different jurisdictions. For example Marc 
Refsoe Holm of Maersk Oil Trading, “We feel that the scrubber technology 10 
potentially allows for an open door for different operators to maybe opt not to run their 
scrubbers when outside the port limits. We think that there will be major issues when it 
comes to compliance and enforcement of the regulations”11 (World Maritime News 
2017) 
 
The technological and regulatory concerns raised regarding SOx emissions highlight 
two aspects of the shipping industry, which are part of the motivation for this study. 
One is the need for regulatory control over the environmental impacts of the shipping 
industry and the other is the complexity of creating regulations as a form of control for 
an industry that operates in international waters, an area outwith individual national 
control. Studying the development of international regulations for the shipping industry 
is an opportunity to understand contemporary approaches to control and governance, 
specifically in the context of CO2 emissions – one of the foremost drivers of climate 
change. The next section focuses on CO2 emissions from ships and lays out the rising 
levels as a problem that necessitates action.   
 
                                                
10 A SOx scrubber is used to clean the Sulphur Oxide from the exhaust in order to achieve the limits set 
out in the regulations.  
11 This quote was used for illustrative purposes. As the Sulphur cap is not yet applicable, there can be no 
academic conclusions on compliance.  
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2.3 CO2 Emissions from Ships 
Amidst concerns about the environmental and health impacts of shipping emissions and 
global concerns about climate change, this thesis will focus specifically on the issue of 
rising CO2 emissions. This section examines the problem of rising CO2 emissions from 
the industry as a central issue for the environmental regulation of Shipping and the 
rationale for focusing the research on CO2 regulations.  
 
CO2 emissions from ships represent around 2-4% of global emissions (Cames et al. 
2015). They vary by ship sector and have been broken down and presented in Figure 
2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5: CO2 Emissions by Ship Type for the Year 2012 (Source: Smith et al. 
2015, p6) 
 
 
Even more concerning are the predictions of rising CO2 emissions. Using a variety of 
possible scenarios (including ‘Business As Usual’), one study projected CO2 rise to 
anywhere between 50 and 250% by 2050 (Smith et al. 2015). Another suggested that by 
2050 Shipping will account for 17% of global CO2 emissions (Cames et al. 2015). 
Despite this, the regulation of CO2 emissions is limited. Currently there is no limit on 
CO2 emissions and no Market-Based Measures (explained in Section 2.8) in place to 
control the rising CO2 emissions from ships (World Shipping Council 2015; Shi 2016). 
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Equally, the shipping industry, though a type of global economy itself with more 
emissions than some nations (Harrould-Kolieb 2008), is not subject to or included in 
any internationally binding climate agreements (Pettit et al. 2018) such as the Kyoto 
Protocol (1997), the EU ETS12 (adopted in 2003, introduced in 2005), or the Paris 
Agreement (2016)13. 
 
Under the Paris Agreement nations have agreed to make efforts to limit climate change 
to below 2 degrees (UNCTAD 2016; UNCC 2017). Given that the shipping industry 
lies outside of national, regional and international regulatory frameworks for climate 
change, the IMO remains the central regulatory authority. Despite being left out of the 
Paris Agreement (2015), Shipping does have consequences for the attainment of the 
commitment to limit global temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius (UNCTAD 
2016; UNCC 2017). Shipping will be a likely contributor to the ‘Emissions Gap’, i.e. 
the gap between the commitment and the amount of current and projected future GHG 
emissions (Scott et al. 2017). Thus it is imperative for further regulation of CO2 
emissions (Devanney 2010; Longva et al. 2010; Bazari & Longva 2011; Devanney 
2011; Anderson & Bows 2012; Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Johnson et al. 2013; Ančić 
& Šestan 2015; Transport & Environment 2017; Wan et al. 2018). Also, it is vital to 
understand the regulation by the IMO and impact of the industry given its virtual 
invisibility in current climate change governance arrangements. Hence, this study’s 
examination into new regulations for shipping is both timely and significant. 
 
Prior to discussing the IMO and its CO2 regulations, the next section introduces forms 
of control in the industry, discussing the shape of these efforts and the literature 
associated with them.  
                                                
12 The EU ETS is aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases across Europe by limiting overall 
emissions (European Commission 2016). Within the limits, companies can buy and sell emission 
allowances (ibid). This is known as a ‘cap-and-trade’ approach. The limits are reduced each year and the 
system represents the cornerstone of EU emissions reduction efforts (ibid). The shipping industry, 
however, was not and is not covered by this system (Kågeson 2007; Kremlis 2010).  
13 In 2015, there was some discussion about including the shipping industry in the Paris Agreement text 
and it even appeared in draft text however it was not included in the final text of the Agreement. 
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2.4 Controlling Environmental Impacts in the Shipping Industry  
Controlling pollution from this industry is exceedingly technical and difficult (Karim 
2015). Contemporary efforts to control emissions from ships can be framed in two 
ways. The first, and the focus of this thesis, is to view control as state-led by national 
governments negotiating and drafting regulations in the IMO, which are then adopted 
and enter into force. The second possible framing of control is the self-governance 
efforts by industry organisations, non-governmental initiatives and shipping companies 
themselves. These framings are a deconstruction of the ‘hybrid’ governance which 
controls the industry through the combination of private standards and state/supra-state 
law (Scott et al. 2017). 
 
There is a small corpus of literature dedicated to non-state governance in shipping, in 
particular, to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), multi-stakeholder initiatives and 
private standards in the industry. Shipping-related Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) literature based is relatively limited and coalesces around the view that compared 
to land-based retail companies, shipping is a CSR laggard (Det Norske Veritas 2004; 
Fafaliou et al. 2006; Lu et al. 2009; Matthews 2010; Arat 2011; Skovgaard 2011; Neef 
2012) and has been uniquely slow in engaging with the idea of CSR (Det Norske 
Veritas 2004; Neef 2012). In terms of awareness of CSR as a concept, a 2009 case study 
of the shipping company Wilh. Wilhelmsen (WW) found that ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ and ‘Triple Bottom Line’ were essentially unknown for the majority of 
those interviewed throughout the organisational structure (Hargett & Williams 2009).  
 
Scholars suggest that further engagement with CSR in the shipping industry is required 
(Coady & Strandberg 2012; Coady & Lister 2013).  Others observe that CSR rhetoric 
and potentially practice is growing in the industry although it tends to only be in large 
multinational companies (Arat 2011; Fairplay 2012a). Moreover, motivations of 
environmental performance based on the top twenty container shipping companies have 
been found their environmental efforts to be, ‘purely driven by fuel saving and 
regulations’ (Fairplay 2012b). 
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Certain forms of collaborative activity are suggested as a possible way forward for the 
industry, particularly those focusing on transparency, legitimacy and enforcement 
(Coady & Strandberg 2012; Neef 2012; Coady et al. 2013; Parviainen et al. 2017). A 
number of multi-stakeholder organisations have been established in the shipping 
industry, including the Sustainable Shipping Initiative, the Cleaner Cargo Working 
Group and the Trident Alliance. Criticisms of this type of multi-stakeholder group offer 
important insights into the limitations of non-state governance mechanisms. For 
example, questions have been raised about the transparency, level of ambition and data 
reliability of standards set by such groups (Lister et al. 2015; Scott et al. 2017; Poulsen 
et al. 2018). Moreover, it is argued that the adoption of a cumulative emissions target by 
the IMO would be more influential which emphasises that state-led industry-wide 
regulations would be more effective than private standards (Scott et al. 2017). 
 
This emphasis on industry regulation aligns with findings of a 2011 study of CSR 
reporting in Danish Companies before and after the adoption of a legislative 
requirement to report on CSR or state that the company has no CSR policy (Skovgaard 
2011). The study found that prior to the legislation, only 20% of Danish Shipping 
companies provided reports on CSR activity and following it 90% of Danish Shipping 
companies engaged in CSR reporting (ibid). Although limited in scope, this illustrates 
the ability of formal regulation to effect change in the shipping industry. 
 
Combining the arguments of Scott et al (2017) with the findings of Skovgaard (2011) 
and calls for further regulation of CO2 emissions (Devanney 2010; Longva et al. 2010; 
Bazari & Longva 2011; Devanney 2011; Anderson & Bows 2012; Cullinane & 
Cullinane 2013; Johnson et al. 2013; Ančić & Šestan 2015; Transport & Environment 
2017; Wan et al. 2018), there is a continued need to study control through formal state-
led regulations, specifically those developed by the IMO. As such, the IMO will be 
introduced next before the current regulations for CO2 emissions from ships are 
reviewed and discussed. 
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2.5 The International Maritime Organization 
The IMO is a specialized agency of the UN tasked with the regulating the international 
shipping industry (IMO 2017d). In the words of the Organization14: 
 
‘IMO is the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental 
performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create a regulatory 
framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted and 
universally implemented.’ (IMO 2017d) 
 
At an international conference in Geneva in 1948 a Convention to establish the IMO 
was created. It entered into force ten years later in 1958 and the first IMO meeting 
occurred in 1959 (IMO 2017b; Karim 2015). Initially titled the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), it was re-named the International 
Maritime Organization in 1982 (ibid). The IMO is now responsible for more than 50 
international Conventions and Agreements and many protocols and amendments that 
regulate the shipping industry (IMO 2017a). The initial remit of the Organization was to 
improve the regulation of safety at sea (Karim 2015). The convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) was a landmark achievement by the Organization in 1960 (IMO 
2017b). Increasing safety at sea remains a priority of the IMO although the 
Organization now equally prioritises their environmental focus (IMO 2017d). 
 
The focus on regulating environmental impacts from ships began with the concern over 
oil pollution at sea, prompted by the Torrey Canyon oil spill in 1967 (IMO 2017b) and 
the ensuing clean-up operation (Wells 2017). The Torrey Canyon spill was the world’s 
first supertanker disaster, spilling 119,000 tonnes of crude oil in the English Channel 
and killing more than 25,000 seabirds (Wells 2017). This accident gathered public 
attention for months and stimulated scientific and regulatory activity at national and 
international levels (Wells 2017).  
 
                                                
14  As stated in the Clarifications for this thesis, the terms IMO and Organization are used 
interchangeably. Organization is capitalised and Americanized as this is the correct written form when 
referring to the IMO.  
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In reaction to the Torrey Canyon incident, the IMO set about introducing measures to 
prevent similar accidents and minimize fall-out (IMO 2017b). The International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships was introduced in 1973 and then 
subsequently modified by the 1978 Protocol becoming known as MARPOL 73/78 
(IMO 2017b) (see section 2.7.1 for detail on MARPOL). The IMO now deals with a 
number of environmental pollution issues including oil, chemical, garbage, sewage, air 
pollution, greenhouse gas emissions from vessels, waste dumping, ballast water 
management, anti-fouling systems and ship breaking and recycling (Karim 2015). This 
expansion into environmental problems has not been without issue. This evolution of 
scope has drawn debate about the Organization’s mandate and created friction points 
between its own regulatory approach and instruments and other international treaties 
such as the Kyoto Protocol (ibid). There has also been growing tensions between it and 
other international governance organisations such as the EU (ibid). Having introduced 
the IMO, sections 2.5.1-2.5.3 describe the membership, the Organizational structure, 
and the general stages of developing regulation in the IMO. 
 
2.5.1 Members States and Other Bodies 
At the time of writing the IMO has 174 Member States and three Associated Members15 
(IMO 2018h). To become a Member of the IMO, a state must ratify the ‘Convention on 
the International Maritime Organization’. The first to ratify this convention was the UK 
in 1949 and the most recent state to join is Armenia (2018). The Organization works on 
a majority rule basis and each Member State is entitled to one vote (IMO 2010)16. Due 
                                                
15 Associate Members to the IMO, ‘shall have the rights and obligations of a Member under the 
Convention except that it shall not have the right to vote or be eligible for membership on the Council’ 
(Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Article 9, p12). The three Associated Members 
are the Faroes, Hong Kong, and Macao China.  
16 ‘(a) Each Member shall have one vote.  
(b) Decisions shall be by a majority vote of the Members present and voting and, for decisions where a 
two-thirds majority vote is required, by a two-thirds majority vote of those present. 
(c) For the purpose of the Convention, the phrase Members present and voting means Members present 
and casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members which abstain from voting shall be considered as 
not voting.’ (IMO 2010 pp24-25: Convention on the IMO, Part XIV, Articles 62 (a),(b) and (c)) 
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to the international nature of the IMO, International Governance Organisations (IGOs) 
attend and participate in discussions, for example the European Commission have 
agreed to cooperate on matters of common interest with the IMO (IMO 2017f). There 
are 64 such organisations (ibid).  
 
Along with the Member States and IGOs, organisations which have gained ‘Consulting 
Status’ may attend IMO meetings (IMO 2010; IMO 2017f; Draffin 2014). Currently, 79 
organisations have Consulting Status with the IMO (IMO 2017f). These organisations 
consist of Industry Associations, for example the World Shipping Council (WSC), 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), International Association 
of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) etc; Research Groups for example Institute of Marine 
Engineering, Science and Technology (IMarEST) and Not for Profit Organisations like 
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC)(IMO 2017f). 
Organisations with consulting status also have the opportunity to contribute to the work 
of the IMO.  
 
2.5.2 IMO Structure  
Headquartered in London, United Kingdom, the Organisation consists of a Council, an 
Assembly, a Secretariat, five main Committees, and seven Sub-Committees (IMO 
2017g). Figure 2.6 shows the structure of the IMO with a red ellipse highlighting the 
focus of this thesis. 
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Figure 2.6: Structure of the IMO (Source: Class NK 2018) 
 
 
The Assembly, which consists of all Member States, is the highest governing level of 
the IMO. It meets once every two years and sets the work program and strategic plans, 
votes on the budget and elects the Council (ibid). The Council is the IMO’s executive 
organ and is responsible for supervising the work of the IMO between Assembly 
Sessions. The Secretariat refers to the Secretary General of the IMO and nearly 300 
members of staff based at the Headquarters in London responsible for facilitating the 
Organization’s work (IMO 2017g). The current Secretary General of the Organization is 
Mr. Kitack Lim from the Republic of Korea (ibid).  
 
The Marine Safety Committee (MSC) was the first Committee established and is tasked 
to consider and regulate issues of safety (IMO 2017g). The Legal Committee, 
established in 1967, deals with legal matters within the scope of the Organization (ibid). 
The Technical Cooperation Committee was established in 1969 as a subsidiary of the 
Council, later achieving Committee status in 1984. It is concerned with implementing 
technical cooperation projects (IMO 2018m).  The Facilitation Committee also began as 
a subsidiary of the Council in 1972 and achieved Committee status in 2008. Its work is 
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to facilitate a balance between maritime trade and security and eliminate unnecessary 
‘red tape’ in the industry (ibid). 
 
With a focus on CO2 regulation, this study centres on the work of the Marine 
Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC). The MEPC was first established as a 
subsidiary body of the Assembly and raised to full constitutional status in 1985 (ibid). It 
meets ‘at least once a year’ (IMO 2010) and is responsible for the adoption and 
amendment of conventions and other regulations to control and prevent pollution from 
ships and the creation of measures to ensure their enforcement (IMO 2017g). The MSC 
and the MEPC are assisted by Sub-Committees relating to their respective remits. 
Building on the focus of this thesis, the following section describes the regulatory 
process that contextualises this study.  
 
2.5.3 Overview of the Regulatory Process 
The process of creating regulation involves various stages from drafting Conventions 
and Amendments, Adoption and Enforcement. This section provides an overview of 
these stages.  
 
Conventions and Amendments 
Conventions are the international treaties by which the IMO frames the regulation of the 
international shipping industry. Since its inception, the IMO has created, updated and 
remains responsible for around 50 conventions (IMO 2017a). The majority of these 
conventions fall into three main categories: (i) safety, (ii) prevention of pollution, and 
(iii) liability and compensation (IMO 2017a).  
 
Drafting and Adopting Conventions lead into the process of Entry into Force (IMO 
2017a). When a convention enters into force it becomes legally binding upon the 
Governments that ratify it. Before it can enter into force it must be formally accepted by 
Governments (ibid). This is done though methods such as signature, ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession. There are possible combinations of these and the 
exact method by which the convention will enter into force depends upon the treaty 
itself (IMO 2017a).  
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Amendments are the mechanism by which the Organization updates current 
Conventions. Amendments allow the IMO to adapt its regulatory framework to suit the 
current issues of the shipping industry (IMO 2017a). ‘Tacit Acceptance’ was introduced 
into its regulatory procedure by the IMO in order to speed up entry into force of 
amendments (IMO 2017a). Previous to this procedure, amendments which were 
adopted had to receive acceptance from two thirds of the Parties (IMO 2017a). Under 
Tacit Acceptance an amendment will enter into force at a specified time unless 
objections to the amendment are received from a specified number of Parties before that 
date (IMO 2017a; Karim 2015). After the introduction of Tacit Acceptance the 
amendments now enter into force within 18-24 months generally (IMO 2017a). The 
application of Tacit Acceptance has not been without criticism, with some drawing 
attention to the pressure Least Developed States (LDS) are put under to keep up with 
the technical and regulatory innovation of Developed States (Adede 1977; Karim 2015).  
 
Enforcement  
The IMO is responsible for the creation and adoption of legislation. Member 
Governments formally bound to the Conventions are responsible for enforcing the 
provisions of the Convention in their own Flag Registries (Section 2.6 will provide an 
explanation of the Flag Registries). Governments also set the penalties for 
infringements where applicable (IMO 2017a). In essence, national governments create 
and agree to implement regulation under the auspices of the Organization however the 
Organization has no power to enforce regulation. Nevertheless, the IMO does have a 
Sub-Committee dedicated to the Implementation of IMO Instruments (III) with 
responsibilities to review rights and obligations of States under the IMO treaties, assess 
levels of implementation by States, identify implementation issues and review IMO 
standards concerned with safety and the marine environment (IMO 2017e).  
 
Although this section provides an overview of the regulatory process to orientate this 
thesis, it also serves to highlight the lack of detail about the inner-workings of the 
process. Empirical details about the initiation, negotiation and drafting of regulations 
are notably absent from key texts concerning the regulation of Shipping (e.g. Karim 
2015; Tan 2006). Instead these texts tend towards general overviews of the process with 
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specific comments on certain aspects e.g. North-South tensions in the IMO (Karim 
2015). This highlights the need for further detailed examination of the development of 
new regulations. The following section will explain the flag state system as the 
framework for the enforcement of the regulations developed in the IMO. In doing so, 
the complexity of creating regulation for this industry is emphasized.  
 
2.6 Regulatory Implementation: The Flag State System 
The shipping industry constitutes a highly technical and complex global network that 
facilitates international trade. Regulating this industry is a considerable challenge and 
more difficult to achieve than industries that can be covered by nation-state sovereignty:  
‘With ocean-going activities, a shipping company’s business environment typically 
takes on a cross-border character and the shipping industry is perhaps the most 
internationally oriented industry of all. For example, a Liberian listed Greek company 
may manage a Japanese constructed and Bahamian registered vessel, having recently 
undergone inspections in Rotterdam and Dubai, carrying cargo for a Russian owned 
Swiss company with British directors to Asia. Geography does not imply the same 
physical obstacles to business processes as for land-based industries.’ (Vilsted 2004, 
p11) 
As in Section 2.5.3, the IMO does not have an enforcing role in relation to regulating. 
The role of enforcement falls to a network of other organisations. Enforcement is 
carried out through the Flag State system. All ships must be registered with a flag state 
to trade internationally (DeSombre 2006). Registration to a Flag State confers a 
nationality upon the ship itself (ibid). Ships have had nationalities as far back as the 
1800s and in some cases even further (ibid). Flag rule became international law in 1905 
by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in the form of a decision that States 
should have the ability to decide which ships they will, ‘accord the rights to fly his flag 
and…to prescribe the rules governing such grants’ (ibid). It was later codified into the 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas (1958) (ibid).  
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The flag of a ship provides it with the right to travel and trade while signifying the 
national set of rules it operates under. This system imposes some clarity on an area that 
could otherwise be ungoverned anarchy (DeSombre 2006). Understanding that ships 
sail under flag rule is one part of the complex puzzle of regulatory implementation. The 
second facet is the relationship between the Flag State and the IMO. Nations must sign 
up to the IMO Convention in order to become Members. From there they adopt 
conventions and in so doing take responsibility for enforcement.  
 
A problematic feature of the system and one that has gathered criticism is the Open 
Registry or Flag of Convenience (FOCs). Flags of Convenience allow registration with 
little to no connection between themselves and the ships flying their flag; a ship flying a 
certain flag may never even visit that country (DeSombre 2006). Indeed, the rise of 
FOCs can in part be attributed to the Treaty of Versailles and a declaration signed at the 
Barcelona Conference on Communications and Transit in 1921, which gave landlocked 
countries the right to have Flag Registries (ibid). Throughout Shipping history there 
have been examples of strategic flag-flying however the practice became widespread 
from the 1920s onwards (ibid). The first Open Registry was Panama which is now the 
world’s biggest Registry (Piniella et al. 2017). In addition to a weaker connection 
between nation, ship owner and ship operation, FOCs are regarded as less rigorous in 
their adoption and enforcement of regulations (DeSombre 2006). Indeed, the acceptance 
and use of FOCs has been historically driven in part by ship owners looking to avoid or 
lessen the costs associated with more stringent regulation (ibid). Furthermore, a ship 
owning company can have a fleet of ships flying different flags and therefore sailing 
under different rules17.  
 
The Open Registry system has given rise to regulatory avoidance. An example of this 
was the change of registration by the Cunard Line in 2011. The Queen Elizabeth was 
the first of the historic and iconic British liners to switch registries on the 24th October 
2011, ending 171 years of British Registration for the Cunard Liners (Dake 2011). 
                                                
17 The Hapag-Lloyd website gives a list of their ships. Clicking on the ship certificate allows the Registry 
to be seen and they have ships in different Registries in their fleet. Website: https://www.hapag-
lloyd.com/en/products/fleet/vessel.html Accessed: 03.02.18 
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Queen Victoria and Queen Mary 2 followed shortly after and they now sail under a 
Bermudian Flag (ibid). Although the official reason given for the registration switch 
was that the Cunard Line wanted to offer weddings at sea, there has been speculation of 
regulatory avoidance (ibid). The registry switch was made as little as six weeks after the 
implementation of an Equality Act in the UK, which requires foreign European crew to 
be paid the same wages as UK nationals and which was projected to increase costs for 
UK registered ship owners (ibid). In addition to regulatory evasion, there are other 
anomalies in the flag registry system, for example the national Marshall Islands 
Registry is actually run out of an office in Virginia, USA18. This highlights the 
complexity of creating regulations for enforcement by Flag States that is faced by the 
IMO and emphasizes the Shipping Industry as a unique context in which to explore the 
construction of regulatory control. 
 
There has been criticism of the effectiveness of the Flag State System generally 
(DeSombre 2006) and specifically in the context of crew health risks (Bloor et al. 
2000), working conditions and seaworthiness (Alderton & Winchester 2002) and 
regulatory avoidance in the fishing industry (Gianni & Simpson 2005). Equally, there 
are suggestions that the system could, and should be otherwise, for example linked to 
the Captain’s nationality or to Port State Rule19 (DeSombre 2006). Although issues and 
controversies remain unsettled, this thesis chooses to accept the Flag State system as an 
imperfect arrangement and seeks instead to shed light on the role of the IMO, 
understanding it as a central part of a complex process of control making in a uniquely 
challenging context. As such, the chapter now moves to review and discuss current IMO 
regulations aimed at reducing CO2 emissions from ships.  
 
                                                
18 International Registries, Inc. Providing Support to The Marshall Islands Maritime and Corporate 
Administrators: https://www.register-iri.com/index.cfm?action=contact Accessed: 03.02.18 
19 By this, the ports would inspect and control the ships as they come through, however controlling ships 
on the high seas would be a flaw with such a system. 
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2.7 Current Regulations 
Despite being responsible for a significant amount of global CO2 emissions (Cames et 
al. 2015), the shipping industry has been largely omitted from global regulatory 
frameworks (see Section 2.3). While the focus of this thesis is the internationally 
binding regulations developed by the IMO, one of the current regulations aimed at 
reducing CO2 emissions is the EU Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (EU MRV), a 
regional measure adopted by the EU. The EU MRV entered into force on the 1st of July 
2015 and applies to all ship owners and operators of vessels above 5000GT on voyages 
to, from and between EU ports 20  (DNV GL 2017). The regulation requires the 
monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions from vessels. Furthermore, it 
requires development of a ship-specific monitoring plan and assessment by an 
accredited verifier (ibid). At the end of a reporting period a ship-specific Emission 
Report is created and is independently verified annually (ibid)21. Excepting the EU 
MRV, which is a recent and regional development, the current state of control over CO2 
emissions from ships can only be fully understood by examining the regulations created 
by the MEPC. The following section introduces the Convention that deals with 
environmental pollution.  
 
2.7.1 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL)  
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
covers prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from either 
operational or accidental causes (IMO 2018e). There are 156 signatories to MARPOL, 
representing 99.42% of world tonnage22 (IMO 2018j). MARPOL was first agreed in 
1973, however it did not achieve the number of signatories required and so was 
amended in 1978 by a special protocol (Draffin 2014). It entered into force on October 
2nd 1983 and subsumed the previous OILPOL convention of 1954 (IMO 2018e; Draffin 
                                                
20 For exemptions see (DNV GL 2017) 
21 For a discussion and assessment of the EU MRV see Fedi (2017). 
22 The adoption of the annexes within MARPOL differs between Members. 
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2014). It has six Annexes, each targeting a different facet of potential ship pollution 
(ibid) (see Figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7: List of MARPOL Annexes (Source: IMO 2018c) 
 
• Annex I Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil (entered into force 2 
October 1983) 
• Annex II Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances 
in Bulk  (entered into force 2 October 1983) 
• Annex III Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in 
Packaged Form (entered into force 1 July 1992) 
• Annex IV Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships  (entered into force 27 
September 2003) 
• Annex V Prevention of Pollution by Garbage from Ships (entered into force 31 
December 1988) 
• Annex VI Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships (entered into force 19 May 
2005) 
 
Annex VI is relevant to this study as it regulates air pollution by aiming to limit air 
pollutants from ships’ exhaust gas including NOx, SOx, PM and ozone depleting 
substances (IMO 2018i). It also regulates shipboard incineration and emissions of 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from tankers (ibid). With the addition of the EEDI 
and SEEMP regulations, MARPOL also covers the control and reduction GHG 
emissions from ships (IMO 2018e).  
 
The EEDI and SEEMP represent ‘energy-efficiency measures that are legally binding 
across an entire global industry, applying to all countries’ (IMO 2018f). The EEDI is a 
mandatory regulation applying to the construction of new ships over 400 Gross 
Tonnage (GT). The Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) is a mandatory 
regulation applying to the operation of all ships. Figure 2.8 below presents a timeline of 
development and adoption of the EEDI and SEEMP in the context of other GHG 
discussions in the IMO. Despite recognition of the impacts of CO2 emissions in the 
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shipping industry in 1997, the EEDI and SEEMP were only adopted in 2011 reflecting 
the complexity and speed of the regulatory discussions. 
 
Figure 2.8 – Timeline of the work on GHG Emissions in the MEPC (Source: 
Bazari 2016, p7) 
 
 
 
In order to fully understand the current state of regulatory control the next sections 
describe and discuss the EEDI and SEEMP regulations and the academic work that has 
been carried out in relation to them. Explaining the current regulations, particularly the 
shortcomings, emphasizes the need for further regulations and by extension supports the 
rationale of this thesis; to examine how regulations are developed. 
 
2.7.2 Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)  
The Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) was adopted at MEPC62 in July 2011 
along with the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). The EEDI applies 
to new ships23 with a gross tonnage of 400 and above, for which the building contract 
was placed on or after January 1st 2013 (Bazari 2016).  
                                                
23 Fishing vessels are not yet included in the EEDI requirement (Bazari 2016).  
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The EEDI is a calculated index that measures the energy efficiency of a ship in terms of 
amount of CO2 generated per tonne-mile of transport work (Devanney 2010; Bazari 
2016). The calculation24 itself can be shown simply as: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐼 = 𝐶𝑂2 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘 
 
And in more detail: 
 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐼 =  𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑥 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑥 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 (𝑔𝐶𝑂!/𝑡𝑜𝑛 −𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒) 
 
The EEDI equation is said to be representative of a ship’s cost to society in the form of 
CO2 emissions divided by the ship’s benefit to society in the form of transport work 
done (IRCLASS Indian Register of Shipping 2018; Bazari 2016). The equation in full is 
incredibly complex. In the words of one author: 
 
‘The formula takes seven dense pages to explain. It is rife with correction factors…The 
correction factors themselves are complex formulae. The formula gets more 
complicated on a monthly basis as more correction factors are proposed, with 
correction factors on correction factors.’ (Devanney 2010, p2) 
 
The EEDI was created as a goal-based standard, aimed at driving the market towards 
implementing energy efficient technologies over time. It is intended to contribute to the 
reduction of emissions from ships while at the same time allowing a flexibility for 
owners and designers to choose the technologies they wish to install to meet the 
requirements (Bazari 2016). In this way, it also accounts for the diverse ship types and 
activities. The EEDI regulation involves a phased approach with the targets tightening 
over time as illustrated in Table 2.2. 
 
                                                
24 Complete equations with reference factors can be found in Bazari (2016).  
 33 
Table 2.2: EEDI Reduction Factors, Cut Off Limits and Implementation Phases 
(Source: Bazari & Longva 2011: Table i, p2) 
 
 
 
The Flag Administration is responsible for carrying out the EEDI verification although 
in practice this is often done by Recognised Organisations (ROs) i.e. Class Societies 
(Bazari 2016). The IMO Guidelines, specifically Resolution MEPC.245(67) stipulate 
the stages of EEDI verification (see Figure 2.9).  
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Figure 2.9: EEDI Verification Process (Source: Bazari 2016: Figure 4.1) 
 
 
While the EEDI is central to the IMO’s efforts to regulate CO2 emissions, studies 
identify issues ranging from problematic application in practice to unchallenging 
requirements leading to over-compliance. Devanney (2010), criticizes the EEDI for its 
complexity, biases, assumption of linear relationships between CO2 emissions and 
installed power, unrealistic and misleading data collection from sea trials and the 
likelihood that it increases fuel consumption in ‘non-boom’ times. Furthermore, 
Devanney (2011) found that the EEDI caused CO2 emissions to increase slightly, 
relative to no regulation, in relation to Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) over the 
market cycle. 25 He suggests that a $50 per ton of CO2 bunker tax offers a more 
promising approach as it would reduce VLCC CO2 emissions by more than 6% over a 
market cycle (ibid). 
 
                                                
25 This increase was a consequence of the EEDI limiting installed power, inducing owners to install 
engines with a higher specific fuel consumption and that require smaller less efficient propellers. Thus, 
while a non-EEDI-compliant ship will sail using little or no more power than an EEDI-compliant ship for 
90% of the time, an EEDI-compliant ship will use more fuel 90% of the time (Devanney 2011). 
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Other studies have expressed concerns that the EEDI will not stimulate improvements 
in the design of ships, specifically Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers (Attah & 
Bucknall 2015), of which there are around 500 LNG carriers in the global fleet 
(Corkhill 2017). Furthermore, unburnt methane emissions caused a rise in the GHG 
emission index of up to 115% which points to EEDI being limited in its application to 
reduce global warming in this context (Attah & Bucknall 2015). The authors therefore 
suggest that to be effective, the EEDI must be amended, particularly to account for 
methane emissions.  
 
A study of bulk carriers suggests that the EEDI will lead to emissions reduction when 
compared to ‘no regulation’ scenarios, however, they concluded that, depending on ship 
type, EEDI reduction rates are either too lenient or too strict (Ančić & Šestan 2015). 
Furthermore, another study on the suitability of EEDI reduction factors found that much 
of the new build fleet were surpassing current and future EEDI targets. These works 
indicate a state of ‘over-compliance’ and pointing to the need to review the EEDI 
targets (Transport & Environment 2017). They found that 71% of containerships, 69% 
of general cargo ships, 26% of tankers and 13% of gas carriers were already in 
compliance with the (Phase 3) 2025 EEDI requirement, which is depicted in Figure 
2.10.  
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Figure 2.10: Share of Ships Already Complying with 2025 EEDI Requirements 
(Source: Transport & Environment 2017, p7) 
 
 
In summary the EEDI was projected to reduce shipping emissions over Business As 
Usual Scenarios (BAU) (Bazari & Longva 2011; Ančić & Šestan 2015), however its 
effectiveness remains unclear in the literature with some works showing that it is too 
lenient (Anderson & Bows 2012; Ančić & Šestan 2015; Transport & Environment 
2017) and one suggesting that it would increase CO2 emissions (Devanney 2011). 
Although the literature makes differing recommendations from a review of the EEDI 
requirements, an increase of self-governance to the creation and adoption of MBMs, the 
majority of research and scholars agree that there is a need for further regulation in 
order to reduce CO2 emissions (Devanney 2010; Longva et al. 2010; Bazari & Longva 
2011; Devanney 2011; Anderson & Bows 2012; Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Johnson 
et al. 2013; Ančić & Šestan 2015; Transport & Environment 2017; Traut et al. 2018; 
Wan et al. 2018). Having demonstrated the issues with the EEDI for controlling CO2, 
the next section turns its attention to the SEEMP.  
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2.7.3 Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP)  
The Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) was adopted at the same 
MEPC as the EEDI (MEPC62 in July 2011) and entered into force on 1st January 2013 
(Johnson et al. 2013). In contrast to the EEDI that seeks to reduce CO2 emissions 
though design and construction, the SEEMP aims to reduce CO2 emissions from ships 
through operational measures. The regulation requires all ships over 400GT to carry a 
SEEMP on-board (Bazari 2016). Under SEEMP, owner-operators are required to 
consider energy efficiency measures through cyclical processes of Planning, 
Implementation, Monitoring, Self-Evaluation and Improvement (Bazari 2016; Johnson 
et al. 2013). It is expected that each ship-specific SEEMP should be integrated into a 
wider corporate energy management approach taken by the company that owns/operates 
the ship (ibid). The SEEMP was also positioned as a way to increase ship efficiency 
over time (Bazari 2016), however the instrument does not detail specific energy 
reduction measures and does not set an overall limit of emissions in relation to 
individual ships or fleets.  
 
Little has been written about the effectiveness of SEEMP as a regulation. While it is 
aimed as a non-prescriptive regulation, there are questions over whether it will effect 
change in the industry and its implementation in practice (Strong 2018).  Although it is 
acknowledged as a method to promote energy efficiency a study commissioned by the 
IMO itself suggested other regulation remains necessary to stimulate true behaviour 
change in the industry (Bazari & Longva 2011).  
 
In questioning the SEEMP’s ability to reduce CO2 emissions, Johnston et al. compared 
it to the International Energy Management Standard ISO 50001 and the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code (2013). The ISO 50001 is a best practice standard 
suitable for use in any organisations to increase energy efficiency while the ISM Code 
is a mandatory requirement for all ships aimed, ‘to ensure safety at sea, prevention of 
human injury and loss of life and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular 
to the marine environment’ (Johnson et al. 2013, p181). This comparison highlighted 
the gaps in the SEEMP (shown in Table 2.3) which lead the authors to conclude that 
further regulation is required to reduce CO2 emissions effectively, with Market-Based 
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Measures (hereafter MBMs) being identified as necessary (Johnson et al. 2013). 
Additionally, the complexity of regulating emissions through energy efficiency was 
emphasized as the authors suggest that energy efficiency gains on an organisational 
level may be voided by the growth of the sector overall (ibid).  
 
Table 2.3: Comparison between the SEEMP, ISM Code and ISO 50001 (Source: 
Johnson et al. 2013, p185) 
 
 
 
In summary, the studies of the EEDI and the SEEMP have shown that the current forms 
of control over CO2 emissions are problematic. The literature calls for further official 
IMO-based regulation, which justifies the exploration of the process of creating new 
CO2 regulations in the IMO MEPC undertaken by this thesis. Furthermore, a 
contemporary study of the regulatory negotiations in the MEPC may address the lack of 
MBMs in Shipping, despite their identification as necessary in the literature.  
 
The following sections rounds out this chapter by providing a review of academic 
studies of regulation in shipping (in addition to those already discussed) and studies 
regarding the IMO in order to demarcate the current literature that frames and supports 
this study.   
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2.8 Shipping Governance Literature 
Individual regulatory instruments are but one component of governing Shipping. In 
order to frame this study of control making, this section reviews existing literature 
outlining the issues that arise in regulating this industry and the role of the IMO as a key 
regulatory authority.  
 
There is a relative and surprising lack of academic engagement with the regulation of 
this industry despite the importance of shipping to international trade and national 
economies (Lister et al. 2015). Many comment on the societal invisibility of the 
industry (Cheng & Choy 2007; George 2013) but there appears to be little integration of 
this industry into environmental, governance, organisation or supply chain literatures. 
There are some broader discussions on sovereignty at sea from legal literatures and 
issues of jurisdiction, for example Molenaar (2006) on port state jurisdiction, and 
Milligan (2012) on overlapping jurisdictional claims. As discussed in Section 2.6, the 
flag state system has been examined in depth by DeSombre (2006), while the state-
centric mode of governance has been criticized as a failing to effectively regulate both 
social and environmental issues (Roe 2013). There has been some discussion on 
compliance in response to regulation (Mitchell 1994; Bloor et al. 2013; Chen et al. 
2017) and an increasing level of scholarly attention centred on the issue of shipping 
activity in the Arctic as a social, environmental and legal concern (Borgerson 2008; 
Young 2009; Stokke 2013; Emmerson & Lahn 2014; Kürner et al. 2015). As the 
problem of CO2 emissions in this industry grows, there needs to be a complementary 
growth in research into the governance of these emissions.  
 
Scholars have noted that environmental regulation of the sector is ‘complex, and 
commercially and politically very sensitive’ (Poulsen et al. 2016, p58), particularly in 
the context of emissions (Eyring, Köhler, Lauer, et al. 2005; Eyring, Köhler, Van 
Aardenne, et al. 2005; Corbett et al. 2008; Eyring et al. 2010;) While CO2 emissions in 
the shipping industry are significant and rising (Smith et al. 2015) (see Section 2.3), 
CO2 is arguably under-regulated compared to other emissions (Oberthür 2003), 
especially when considering that SOx emissions have been controlled through industry-
wide regulatory limits for years (see Section 2.2). Moreover, as discussed in Section 
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2.7, the two main regulations that aim to increase energy efficiency, the EEDI and 
SEEMP, have been critically assessed by the literature with the scholarly consensus 
calling for amendments and further regulation. 
 
The problem of rising CO2 emissions has been captured by some scholars (Giziakis & 
Christodoulou 2012) with critical examinations of national responses to regulation (Shi 
2014), criticism of current private and state governance mechanisms (Pettit et al. 2018), 
identification of levels of implementation of CO2 reducing technologies (Rehmatulla, 
Calleya, et al. 2017) and barriers to uptake of efficiency increasing technologies (Smith 
et al. 2014; Rehmatulla & Smith 2015a; Rehmatulla, Parker, et al. 2017; Rehmatulla & 
Smith 2015b). These works predominantly find market failures, for example split 
incentives of ship owners and operators, and information barriers to be causing issues 
with the uptake of technologies to improve energy efficiency (and by extension reduce 
CO2 emissions). In addition, much literature is dedicated to promoting technological 
solutions for example wind technologies (Mander 2017; Smith et al. 2014; Rehmatulla, 
Parker, et al. 2017), carbon capture and storage (Zhou & Wang 2014; Neele et al. 2017), 
LNG and fuel cells (Smith et al. 2014), and other more general and combined proposals 
(Wang 2010; Anderson & Bows 2012; Lindstad et al. 2015; Larkin et al. 2017; Wan et 
al. 2018). Finally, a third strand of research suggests the development and 
implementation of MBMs to reduce CO2 emissions (Shi 2016; Wan et al. 2018). Within 
the context of Shipping regulation, the establishment of an industry-wide target or cap 
on CO2 and then the creation of mechanisms such as an Emissions Trading System, 
Incentive and Levy Schemes, Bunker Tax for International Offsetting Funds etc. by the 
IMO are referred to as MBMs (International Maritime Organisation 2010). On the other 
hand the EEDI and SEEMP are known as technical and operational measures and do not 
involve an industry-wide cap or limit on CO2 emissions (Shi 2016).  
 
The consensus from the literature is that without the development of official regulations 
as stimulation for the industry uptake of alternative technologies and mitigation efforts, 
these options remain marginalized. Additionally, as discussed in Section 2.4, the 
effectiveness of voluntary efforts, private standards and multi-stakeholder initiatives is 
low and likely to remain so without formal state-led measures.  
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Considering that the regulations and regulatory framework have been largely criticized 
with reference to effectiveness and implementation, this thesis aims to take a step 
upstream and start at the very beginning, the construction and production of regulation 
itself. It aims to understand the process of creating regulation from within the IMO 
MEPC. In order to provide a frame of reference for this undertaking, the following 
section introduces and discusses existing literature on the IMO as a regulatory 
organisation.   
 
2.9 IMO Literature  
Against this backdrop of market uncertainties, regulatory criticism and continued 
suggestions for improvement, little has been written focusing on the IMO itself and its 
process of constructing regulation aimed at contributing to global reductions of CO2 
(Lister et al. 2015). Instead, much of the work has focused on understanding the shape 
of maritime environmental governance (Van Leeuwen 2010) and the general operations 
of the IMO (Tan 2006; Karim 2015). Specifically, Van Leeuwen (2010) gives a broad 
stroke explanation of the multiple spheres of authority in global maritime governance, 
focusing on the shifting authority in offshore oil and gas production. She outlines a 
number of actors and levels that contribute to governing the maritime industry and 
suggests that the IMO’s position as a regulator may be under threat from organisations 
such as the EU (ibid). Karim (2015) goes somewhat further in his examination of the 
IMO to detail the North-South tensions that manifest in the discussions. While useful, 
these texts are fairly descriptive and lacking in ethnographic or theoretical depth. 
 
In understanding CO2 regulation from the IMO, Oberthür (2003) remains an important 
text fifteen years after publication. His discussion of the responses of the IMO and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)26 to international climate change 
found a slow speed and lack of political will to address climate change in both 
organisations. This comparative study offered some insights into the overall regulatory 
                                                
26 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN specialized agency, established to set 
international civil aviation Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) to support ‘a safe, efficient, 
secure, economically sustainable and environmentally responsible civil aviation sector.’ (ICAO 2018) 
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cultures of the organisations, including the difficulty of factoring climate change 
regulations into their work, which is historically technical and safety-focused, rather 
than political-environmental. His work culminated in suggestions that might catalyse 
action from these institutions for example; continued pressure from external climate 
change regimes and domestic and regional action to incentivize progress within IMO 
and ICAO. Now, 15 years later, criticism of the IMO continues (Pettit et al. 2018), as 
shown in Section 2.7, and the overall process is considered slow (Strong 2018; Wan et 
al. 2018). 
 
Drawing on Institutional Theory, Gulbrandsen (2013) examined the role of the EU 
Commission within the IMO to enhance understanding of institutional interactions and 
‘nesting’ (Hackmann 2012). Specifically, the EU Commission’s Permanent 
Representative was identified as ‘entrepreneurial’ in framing and negotiating EU 
coordination and involvement in the regulatory work of the IMO. This research was 
based on attending one MSC meeting (87th session) and conducting six interviews. In 
the work by Gulbrandsen (2013), the IMO is the background that allows the exploration 
of EU international coordination. 
 
Of the scarce literature concerned with the IMO, the aforementioned studies offer 
limited insights into the actual process of developing regulations within the IMO. This 
may in part be due to the aims of their respective studies which cast the IMO into the 
background or as part of a larger whole rather than the key focus.  
 
Moving to the regulation by the IMO, there is limited work on this topic and only one 
study was directly related to the regulation of air emissions. Svensson (2011) – a 
Masters thesis – examined regulations of Sulphur Oxide emissions with reference to 
historical debates in the IMO. Although his work provides some insight into the IMO 
process, the data collected was largely retrospective, based on analysis of documents 
and interviews with just one delegation (ibid). Furthermore, he traced the content of the 
debates rather than examining the process itself, i.e. what actors are involved in creating 
regulatory control in the MEPC and how progress is accomplished. 
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Other studies have examined the development of regulations through the IMO 
suggesting that the IMO should be using its authority in a more effective manner (Silber 
et al. 2012; Lister et al. 2015). Hackmann (2012) argues that a degree of regulatory 
fragmentation has led to lack of adoption of a binding MBM which could produce more 
effective CO2 reductions. In addition he raises the on-going issue of the realties of the 
shipping industry, which necessitate a non-discriminatory approach to regulating, and 
the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), which is applied 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Lister et 
al. (2015) take up and expand this issue of fragmentation. They suggest that the 
shipping industry is suffering multi-level regulatory fragmentation and that within the 
IMO discussions have become crippled by uncertainty and polarization. They argue that 
certain conditions, such as low visibility of environmental issues and poor interest 
alignment, are stalling regulatory progress. They further emphasize that enforcement 
levels vary and as regional regulation is brought in to pick up the regulatory slack from 
the IMO, control over the industry becomes further fragmented (ibid). 
 
A number of approaches have been used by IMO-focused studies and it is useful to 
elaborate on these to emphasize the choice of theory and methods of this project. Some 
scholars made use of document analysis without a conceptual framing in order to 
construct an explanation of a particular issue, e.g. interaction with the ICAO, SOx 
regulation or vessel threat to whales (Oberthür 2003; Svensson 2011; Silber et al. 2012). 
Lister et al. (2015) combined a framing of Transnational Governance Theory with thirty 
seven in-depth interviews with managers and executives. Thus, the study constitutes a 
collective of external commentaries on the issue of shipping emissions and the IMO as a 
regulator and contains no observational detail of the IMO itself.  
 
Hackmann drew on Regime Theory in combination with the framings of institutional 
interplay and fragmentation to understand the governance architecture of GHG 
emissions and to question the lack of MBMs for shipping (2012). With this approach he 
undertook interviews, attended IMO presentations 27  and analysed documents. He 
                                                
27 These presentations were not the official regulatory meetings of the IMO.  
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attributes influence predominantly to Member States and although he identified other 
aspects which affect the process of developing regulation, such as conflicting regulatory 
principles, these are not fully recognized as influential in the process and seem to be 
relegated to contextual elements. Further detail about the practice of creating 
regulations is required, with particular attention to explaining influential actors in the 
process. 
 
While valuable and congruent to this study, these works leave much room for further 
study of the IMO. The extant literature lacks detail on the inner workings of the IMO 
and the Committee responsible for creating environmental regulations, the MEPC, is 
largely neglected. Methodologically speaking, there is a lack of direct observation of the 
actors and practices that construct regulations with authors largely relying on documents 
and interviews (Svensson 2011; Hackmann 2012; Silber et al. 2012; Oberthür 2003; 
Lister et al. 2015). Therefore this thesis aims to undertake an in depth study of the 
regulatory process, focusing on the MEPC. In so doing it offers a study of control-
making over an international industry that suffers from complexity, uncertainty, 
questions of jurisdiction and issues of compliance, adoption and enforcement. In 
addition, it contributes a uniquely contemporary and focused window into the 
development of new regulations in the IMO. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated the concerning issue of current and rising CO2 emissions 
from the shipping industry, the marginalization of this industry from international 
climate change governance and the problematic application of current regulations. 
Various studies suggest that the current regulatory focus on energy efficiency needs to 
be supplemented with the development of MBMs in the IMO. Scholars have attempted 
to address this issue and examine the role of the IMO as a regulator, however, there has 
been no focus on the MEPC itself and very little detail on the actors and processes that 
develop regulation. This critical review underscores the need for (i) further exploratory 
research of the IMO, particularly of the MEPC (ii) a greater level of ethnographic detail 
(iii) a description of the actors and processes that develop regulation and (iv) 
engagement with theoretical perspectives which allow for actor identification and 
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constructionist explanations of control. The following chapter presents the theoretical 
framework chosen to fulfil these criteria and used in forming the research questions, 
data gathering and writing up.  
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3. Theoretical Framing: Actor-Network Theory 
 
This chapter opens with an account of the personal journey that, in part, led to the 
selection of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to frame and guide this study of the 
construction of control over shipping emissions through the development of regulations. 
It then moves on to introduce ANT, discuss relevant literatures and present the approach 
to using ANT in this research. Overall the chapter’s aim is to explain and justify this 
choice of theoretical framing.  
 
I first began to study the shipping industry during my Masters Degree in Technical Ship 
Management (2011-2012). I quickly became absorbed with the complexity of the 
regulatory structure of international shipping. The problem of how to orchestrate 
control over an industry that operates in such a remote and alien area fascinated me. 
As I began to learn about the regulatory framework for the industry, the legal 
complexities and the environmental issues facing Shipping, I also began to appreciate 
the importance of non-humans in the Shipping community.  For example, in the 
shipping industry it is the practice that the flag ‘flown’ by the ship confers and 
symbolizes the laws under which a ship operates. In the container sector, many 
attribute the invention of the ‘box’ (i.e. the standard container) as responsible for 
globalization (Levinson 2006). Furthermore the sea itself dictates certain rules (for 
example load lines based on different sea-states and temperatures) and the weather 
influences routes, choices and journey times. During my own studies I calculated freight 
rates and propagation of cracks, I modelled engine faults and compared environmental 
pollutant reducing devices (e.g. Ballast Water Treatment Systems), etc. I also 
encountered the rise of automation and the envisioning of crewless ships; giants gliding 
through the sea controlled remotely from land. Thus through my Masters I became 
sensitized to the marginalization of human agency. In lectures the ‘human factor’ was 
just one part of a greater collective and as such I came to understand the shipping 
industry and its community to be object-full and object-focused.   
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3.1 Introduction 
This thesis is an examination of firstly, what makes the IMO MEPC i.e. what actors and 
associations constitute the network and secondly, how this organisation constructs 
control over the international shipping industry through the development of regulations.  
 
Careful consideration was given to the framing of this study as an exploration of the 
union of regulatory power and international shipping. Chapter 2 illustrated the need for 
thorough observation and description and pointed towards a framing suitable for an 
ethnography of regulation. Equally, it was necessary to engage a theoretical perspective 
that would recognise the influence of non-humans in the shipping industry and that 
would allow the process of developing regulatory control to be deconstructed. Therefore 
Actor-Network Theory (hereafter ANT) was chosen to guide the research.  
 
More than a theory alone, ANT has also been presented as a methodology (Law 2004; 
Jóhannesson 2005; Law 2007a; Lukka & Vinnari 2017) and a rhetorical framework 
(Callon 1986a). It is known to be notoriously difficult to explain or pin down as it is 
rarely used as one single framework (Cowan & Carr 2008; Fenwick & Edwards 2010) 
and instead is often treated as a toolkit for inquiry (Law 2004) that is more easily 
performed than summarized (Law 1999b). Nevertheless, this chapter sets out to clarify 
both the choice of ANT and its specific application to the research. First the origin of 
ANT is explained before its use across different empirical contexts is traced. Following 
this, the application of ANT in areas key to this research (i.e. environmental research, 
regulatory research and shipping research) is discussed. The criticisms, tensions and 
limitations are presented before the chapter moves on to explain the particular set of 
ANT concepts adopted to guide this research.  
 
3.2 Origin of ANT 
The origin of ANT can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. It arose from the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) (Law 1992; Pickering 1992). Published 
in a time of increasing sociological interest in the field of science (Pickering 1992), 
‘Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts’ by Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar constitutes a seminal ANT text. Laboratory Life aimed to explore science 
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through a quasi-scientific observational process. In doing so the authors show that 
knowledge, (i.e. scientific facts) is the resulting construction of a heterogeneous 
assemblage (Latour & Woolgar 1979). The scientists themselves are discussed as a 
tribe, complete with their own practices and belief system. Laboratory Life was thus 
identified as an ethnography of science (Law 2004). 
 
Throughout Laboratory Life, the beginnings of ANT take shape. The authors’ emphasis 
on the material setting allows inclusion of non-human actors in the discussion. Samples, 
machines, texts and animals all formed part of the process of knowledge-making along 
with the scientists (Latour & Woolgar 1979). This introduced the ANT 
conceptualisation of agency. Additionally, inherent in the description of the process was 
the interconnectedness of the actors, which would later become the ‘network’ and 
‘relationality’ aspects of ANT (Law 2004).  
 
This book set the tone for ANT as a theory aimed at explaining moments of durability 
in the fluid and ever-changing social (Law 1986a; Law 1992; Law 2003; Law 2007a). 
Another concept, offered in the book, which would later become fundamental to ANT, 
is that by observing and describing micro activity, you can explain macro concepts, 
processes and phenomena (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Callon & Latour 1981; Latour 
1983). This contrasted with the sociological approaches at the time, which favoured 
explaining micro societal phenomena by assigning macro concepts (Callon & Latour 
1981). 
 
From then on three aims characterized ANT texts; (i) the aim to disassemble the 
production of scientific fact through the exploration of scientific and technical 
communities (Latour & Woolgar 1979, 1986; Latour 1983, 1988; Law & Williams 
1982), (ii) the aim to show the agency of non-humans (Johnson 1988; Latour 1990, 
1992; Callon 1986a) and (iii) the aim to understand knowledge and reality as relational 
constructions of actors in networks (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Law 2003; 2007a; Mol 
1999;).  
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Over the following years ANT became;  
‘…a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities and methods of analysis 
that treat everything in the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated effect 
of the webs of relations within which they are located. It assumes that nothing has 
reality or form outside the enactment of those relations.’ (Law 2007a, p2) 
 
As such, it was necessary to undertake a detailed review of ANT writings to discern the 
commonalities that amount to the fundamental principles of the theory in order to guide 
the use of ANT in this research. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the fundamental 
principles of ANT that were adopted to guide this research, from the data collection 
through analysis to the production of this thesis narrative.  
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Table 3.1: Principles of ANT: Key Works, Meaning and Application28 (Source: 
Author’s Own) 
Fundamental 
Principle 
Meaning Methodology Key Works 
Symmetry/ 
Heterogeneity 
 
Agency (i.e. acting) is 
not and should not be 
limited to humans and 
human-only activity 
Observe and account for 
everything that makes a 
difference and be 
consistent in description 
(Latour 1983; Callon 
1986a; Latour 1986; 
Law 1986b; Latour 
1992; Law 1992; Latour 
2005; Fox 2005; 
Fenwick & Edwards 
2010) 
Relationality 
 
Actors are connected; 
they enact each other 
and the relations 
amongst them define 
their existence 
Trace associations and 
connections between 
actors 
(Callon 1986a; Harman 
2007; Latour 1994; 
Latour 2005; Law 
1986b; Law 1991b; Law 
2003; Law 2004; Law 
2007a; Mol 1999)  
Multiplicity 
 
There are multiple, 
intertwining, 
overlapping realities 
which are defined by 
actors and associations 
Examine and explain 
the multiple 
constructions of realities 
and identities 
(Mol 1999; Law 2004; 
Law & Mol 2008; Law 
& Mol 2011; 
McDougall et al. 2016) 
Free 
association 
 
Rejection of a priori 
dualisms such as the 
natural/social, 
micro/macro 
By following all actors 
and tracing all 
associations the ‘messy’ 
heterogeneous 
collective can be 
appreciated 
(Callon & Latour 1981; 
Callon 1986a; Law 
1999a; Law 2003; 
Fenwick & Edwards 
2010)  
Agnosticism 
Impartiality towards 
who and what is acting 
No account should be 
favoured or censored 
according to the beliefs 
of the researcher 
(Callon 1986a; Law 
1986a; Sommer 1996; 
Callon 2009) 
Power 
 
Power is the 
constructed effect of a 
heterogeneous network 
Deconstruct moments of 
translation and treason 
to demystify power and 
control 
(Callon & Latour 1981; 
Callon 1986a; Latour 
1986; Law 1986a; Law 
1986b; Law 1991a; Law 
1991b; Law 1992; Galis 
& Lee 2013) 
 
                                                
28 The fundamentals are not presented in a particular order; they are all equally key to using the theory. 
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Building on this introduction of the origin and fundamentals of ANT research, the 
following section will review the adoption of ANT research into a wide variety of 
contexts.  
 
3.3 Development of ANT  
This section aims to give a brief overview of the development of ANT across different 
fields of research before discussing the most relevant ANT studies for this thesis. ANT 
promotes a fluidity of both methods (Law 2004; Law 2007b), and understanding of the 
social (Latour 1999; Law 2007). Its theoretical terminologies have been embraced and 
mobilized by academics across many different contexts and over the years it has 
developed many names (Law 2003; Cressman 2009).29  
 
ANT can be traced into different fields of literature. Latour continued his work on the 
production of knowledge through his studies of science30 and over the course of his 
work he showed how heterogeneity in microcosm can produce macro understandings of 
scientific facts (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 1983; Latour 1988), before moving to a 
more abstract level and commenting on the role of science and technology in the society 
(Latour 1987) and exploring controversy at the interface of science and politics (Latour 
2004a). 
 
While Latour’s focus remained predominantly on scientific and technical assemblages, 
the theme of power and control emerged as a focal discussion for ANT scholars from 
the 1980s to the early 1990s. Key studies aimed to deconstruct and demystify power 
and acts of control (Callon & Latour 1981; Law 1986b; Callon 1986a; Latour 1986; 
Law 1986a; Law 1991a; Law 1991b; Law 1992). Subsequently, the majority of later 
works moved away from discussions of power and control, however, explaining the 
                                                
29 Examples include inter alia, The Sociology of Associations (Latour 2005; Boelens 2010), Material 
Semiotics (Law 2007a), The Sociology of Translation (Callon 1980; Callon 1986a) and Actant-Rhizome 
Ontology (Latour 1999a). 
30 Though he also produced more generally positioned philosophical texts on ANT (e.g. Latour 1999b; 
Latour 2005). 
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development of regulatory control is a core part of this thesis. As such, power and 
control are discussed later in this Chapter with Section 3.11 providing the ANT 
definition of power and control and Section 3.12 explaining its construction.   
 
Callon began to use the fundamentals of ANT to study markets (Callon 1998; Callon 
1999). This opened up a stream of literature which adopts the conceptual underpinnings 
of ANT to understand the construction of markets (Garcia-Parpet 2007), the 
characteristics of markets (Mitchell 2007), the performativity of markets (Callon 2007) 
and the agency of market devices (Callon et al. 2007). The literature on market studies 
shares a commonality in that macro phenomena (markets) can be deconstructed into 
micro actors and actions, and so explained. This approach has been applied in this 
thesis; the study of control over a market (i.e. Shipping) will be explained by focusing 
specifically on the actors and actions in the MEPC.  
 
ANT also spread into management accounting literatures stimulating academics to 
follow the action of accounting calculations and their effects. These studies are noted to 
be a production of a particular reading of ANT, and a specifically Latourian 
understanding of translation as transformation, which largely disregards the element of 
power associated with Callon’s (1986a) translation (Justesen & Mouritsen 2011). 
Translation is a core element in this thesis and will be discussed more deeply in Section 
3.12. The application of ANT in management accounting shows that non-humans can 
have multiple and surprising consequences and once enacted, they assume a level of 
agency by shaping organisational practice (Justesen & Mouritsen 2011), a useful 
framing when studying the roles of actors in the development and shaping of regulation. 
 
In terms of less economic and calculative areas, ANT has been used in studies of art, 
health and education. Examinations of the construction of art, museums and fashion 
‘looks’ have been enabled through the application of the principle of symmetry (Star & 
Griesemer 1989; Yaneva 2003; Entwistle & Slater 2014). Additionally, ANT has 
developed quite a presence in studies of Education (Fenwick & Edwards 2010). Similar 
to the studies of construction of art and fashion, these works gathered traction by 
‘unsettling’ views of what knowledge and learning are by engaging with the principle of 
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symmetry to understand the agency of objects in education (Fenwick & Edwards 2010). 
Furthermore, ANT has repositioned learning as a networked affair (ibid) and has shown 
the evolution of learning as ‘the mutual dependence between human meanings and 
mundane technologies’ (Fox 2005). These literatures reproduce the focus of ANT on 
objects, and remind users to particularly explore the agency of the seemingly mundane 
and ‘taken for granted’ (Latour 1992; Fox 2005; Woolgar & Neyland 2013). 
 
In studies of health, ANT has been used to explore the multiplicity of patient care by 
tracing the different groups involved in the diagnosis and care of patients (Mol 1999; 
McDougall et al. 2016), the mutual construction of health through the associations of 
humans with medical devices (Prout 1996; Lupton 2012), and how new practices can be 
stabilized and produce unintended effects (Gherardi & Perrotta 2011). ANT has also 
been employed in a limited number of studies of animal health (Law & Mol 2008; Law 
& Mol 2011). These studies showed how the multi-level perspectives (i.e. 
governmental, farming, veterinary) during the foot and mouth outbreak in the UK, 
produced different realities with individual consequences for the sheep. Ultimately, they 
point out that reality is constructed through enactments (ibid). Thus, studying the 
construction of regulatory control is also the observation of the construction of future 
realities of practice for Shipping.  
 
This section has provided a general review of the applications of ANT in diverse 
contexts. Broadly speaking, ANT has been used to appreciate the work of (mundane) 
objects, the consequences of agency in different contexts and acts of construction, e.g. 
power, facts, realities and markets. Based on the above, this thesis frames development 
of regulation as the construction of control over the operations of the shipping industry. 
It will unpack the collective (macro) activity through the identification and study of 
individual (micro) actors, accounting for the seemingly taken-for-granted sources of 
agency in the process. The following section moves on to look specifically at the 
application of ANT in the key areas that link to this thesis i.e. environmental, regulatory 
and shipping contexts.  
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3.4 ANT Studies of Environmental Governance, Regulation and Shipping 
Due to the appreciation for the agency of non-humans, ANT lends itself to research 
concerning environmental impacts and governance because accounts of environmental 
governance become less anthropocentric when ANT is applied. This is evident in ANT 
studies of markets, particularly those concerning carbon markets (Callon 2009; 
MacKenzie 2009; Dalsgaard 2013). Such studies have discussed the commensurability 
of carbon following its displacement from the natural context into economic spheres 
(MacKenzie 2009; Dalsgaard 2013). While these studies contribute to our 
understanding of the economisation of nature they can be considered as downstream 
examinations of the consequences of emissions agreements and reduction approaches.  
Yet they also justify the application of ANT to follow CO2, not only as a substance of 
nature contributing to climate change, but as a matter of concern that stimulates 
political-scientific and regulatory activity (Latour 2004a). 
 
Other studies focus on an environmental actor in order to explore and explain the 
heterogeneous networks that gather around them. Eden (2009) unpacks the network of 
governance that lies behind the ‘tick-tree’ of the Forest Stewardship Council. In 
following the tick-tree symbol she finds it to be a boundary object circulating through, 
connecting and shaping a hybrid governance network. She ascribes the network’s 
continued success to the arrangement of hybrid and heterogeneous actors. Egan (2014) 
examined the attempts of a heterogeneous network to establish water conservation in a 
University during a drought. The network managed to enrol various actors however it 
had limited success. As drought conditions abated and the organisation returned to a 
cost focus the network disassociated having failed to achieve durability by linking its 
practices to accountability mechanisms. The difficulty in constructing a durable network 
around an environmental concern was expanded by Jollands et al. (2015) where the 
authors followed the influence of sustainability on the creation of a network to translate 
it into a core organisational value. Again the network failed to achieve durability, 
unravelling in the face of network leakage, external economic developments and cost 
concerns. These articles represent three stories of self-governance, one successful and 
two not. The commonality that connects them is the use of ANT to unpack and explain 
the heterogeneous assemblages that gathered around environmental concerns. By 
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examining CO2 as a political-scientific matter of concern for the MEPC (Latour 2004a),  
and following it into the regulatory network, this thesis explores how an environmental 
issue shapes the output of a durable network and builds on the application of ANT to 
environmental governance networks.  
 
As this thesis is a study of the development of regulation, existing applications of ANT 
to regulatory contexts are germane. When applying ANT to the study of regulation 
Cloatre and Dingwall (2013) suggest reimagining legal space as a socio-technico-legal 
network where legality is not tied to only humans or intentions. The authors followed 
pharmaceutical drugs from a developed and strictly regulated market into a less 
developed country with a low level of market regulation and found regulatory 
stringency towards the drugs did not differ between markets. As such they concluded 
that regulatory control can be unintentionally ‘…“black boxed” to the point of 
invisibility’ (Cloatre & Dingwall 2013, p365).  
 
The entangling of governance and control with mundane objects has similarly been 
explored by Woolgar & Neyland (2013). In their discussion of mundane governance 
Woolgar & Neyland show objects, not only as agential in an ANT sense, but as sources 
of politics. They find objects to have their own associated politics, while simultaneously 
being part of a larger heterogeneous network of governance. These works present the 
associations of objects with political and legal modes of governance, however, the 
question of the role that objects play in political governance processes remains. By 
researching the MEPC as a network responsible for environmental governance of 
Shipping, the role of mundane objects in a political-technico-legal process can be 
explored.  
 
In Section 2.9 of Chapter 2, it was observed that key works focusing on the IMO use a 
variety of different approaches, from Regime and Institutional Theory to the collection, 
presentation and analysis of data without a theoretical framing. None of the works 
focused on the IMO utilize ANT, however ANT has been applied in three studies of the 
Shipping Industry in general. These will be explained in order to delineate the work of 
this thesis. 
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Rodon et al (2008) applied ANT to understand inter-organizational information systems 
(IOIS) in the seaport of Barcelona. Implementation was found to be the result the 
entanglement of socio-technical actors and a fixed set of factors. Using ANT allowed 
the authors to follow a technology as the focal actor and to better understand the 
heterogeneity of practice and thus they created a specific empirical explanation of 
networked implementation. Chapter 2 illustrated the need for the study of regulatory 
development and building on Rodon, the heterogeneity of construction, rather than 
implementation, will be the focus of this research.  
 
Drawing on a core fundamental of ANT, the destruction of the social/natural dualism, 
Kürner et al. (2015) explored the socio-natural entanglements and shifting power 
relations interwoven in the development of Arctic Shipping Routes. Although not based 
on empirical evidence, the authors identify a series of social and natural 
interdependencies and offer this as a useful sensitisation for future policy work 
regarding the Arctic as a complex and changing area. Their discussion serves to 
highlight the need to understand more about the creation of regulation to control 
environmental impacts. This was similarly emphasised in a conference paper wherein 
ANT was applied in connection with the associated concept of market devices (Callon 
et al. 2007) to understand the market for Ballast Water Treatment Systems (BWTS) 
(Harrison 2014). By positioning BWTS as market devices-in-the-making and regulators 
as market designers, Harrison proceeded to explore the market’s reaction to regulatory 
uncertainty and in doing so highlighted the link between the reactionary behaviours of 
Shipping and the adoption of IMO regulations.  
 
The articles above deal with heterogeneous implementation, social and natural 
interdependences, environmental controversy and market activity in times of regulatory 
uncertainty. However, there remains a lack of understanding of networks of 
construction, power and agency interdependencies in this particular sector. Thus, this 
thesis will undertake an ethnographic study of the development of regulation as a 
creation of control over market activity. In doing so, the thesis aims to apply ANT to 
understand the network of construction (MEPC) and to engage with conceptualizations 
of control on a theoretical level.  
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Having traced the development of ANT into different contexts as part of the framing for 
this research, the following section focuses on the criticisms of ANT and how these are 
taken into account. 
 
3.5 Criticisms of ANT  
The most complete criticism of ANT was provided in a piece entitled ‘Epistemological 
Chicken’ by Collins & Yearley (1992) in which the authors discuss two ANT articles: 
Callon (1986a) and Latour (1992). The critique is essentially an outright rejection of 
everything ANT, from the agency of non-humans, the authority of the researchers, the 
lack of method and the overuse of imagination resulting in a ‘sociologically prosaic’ 
account (Collins & Yearley 1992, p321). Despite such a substantive critique, ANT has 
been well accepted by many scholars, as can be seen from the diversity of contexts it 
has been applied, illustrated in the previous section. However, a few limitations and 
difficulties can be identified.  
 
Whittle & Spicer (2008) argued that ANT provides a valuable framework for the 
empirical exploration of organisations, however they voice concern that ANT theorists 
may be defining the properties of objects themselves.  ANT theorists, however, see 
qualities as partly a construction of the researcher and acknowledge the performativity 
of the theory (Callon 1998; Law 2004), but more so as a result of the relational actions 
and effects of the interconnected network (Callon 1986a; Latour 1986). Furthermore, 
the work on multiplicity shows a multitude of realities defined by the actors (see Mol 
1999; Law & Mol 2008; McDougall et al. 2016). The job of an ANT study, therefore, is 
not to define qualities or properties but to listen to, follow the actors and describe in 
detail (Latour 2005; Venturini 2012).  
 
In his comparison of Activity Theory and ANT as approaches to studying innovations, 
Miettinen (1999) argues that the vocabulary of ANT loses the individual vocabularies of 
different fields and results in oversimplification. As this chapter shows, there are a lot of 
theoretical terms associated with Actor-Network Theory and so there is a danger of 
losing the language of the actors themselves. Furthermore, there exists an uneasy 
tension between following the actors and listening to them (Latour 2005; Venturini 
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2012) but at the same time, ‘not simply repeat the analysis suggested by the actors’ 
(Callon 1986a, p4). As demonstrated in Chapter 2 Shipping has a technical vocabulary. 
Thus, this study needs to strike a balance between presenting the actors’ own language 
and using the terminologies of ANT to elevate the account to a theoretical level. 
 
Although ANT has been spreading across different contexts, it remains most fully 
applied in the sciences, management accounting and financial markets (Justesen & 
Mouritsen 2011; Entwistle & Slater 2014). Using ANT to study fashion models, 
Entwistle and Slater note a limitation of ANT to be the paradoxical aim to illuminate the 
associations made between actors who construct their own world, and the exclusion of 
culture from this treatment, despite its frequent enactment as a part of actor-worlds 
(2014). Just as Latour (2005) sought to remove divisions between the social and 
technical and reassemble the social as technical and the technical as social, Entwistle 
and Slater (2014) attempt to reassemble culture as a technical and social production. 
They conclude that ANT relegated culture to an ‘ontological fiction’ despite empirical 
evidence of performative enactments (Entwistle & Slater 2014, p174). They suggest this 
has been a missed opportunity for deconstructing the effect of such actor 
conceptualisations and encourage further work to take on slippery concepts, 
approaching these with the same symmetry as ANT does for other actors.  
 
ANT has been criticized for the use of description and lack of critique (Amsterdamska 
1990; Whittle & Spicer 2008). However, in the context of control in the shipping 
industry, Chapter 2 argued that existing literature on shipping emissions and the IMO 
are largely critical. Hence, an ANT-informed study that adopts an exploratory and 
descriptive approach is appropriate to enrich understanding of the MEPC and offers a 
new perspective on the process of creating regulations.   
 
Taking account of these criticisms is central to the development of this study. Hence, 
actors shall be followed and described, the vocabulary of the actors and ANT will be 
combined in the narrative and the principle of symmetry will be used to sensitize this 
research to all sources of agency. 
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Additionally, scholars criticize ANT as being a non-unified collection of approaches 
(Miettinen 1999; Cowan & Carr 2008) that can be methodologically vague 
(Jóhannesson 2005). Taking account of these the rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
explaining the ANT concepts applied in this research, which is then followed by a 
detailed methodology in Chapter 4  
 
3.6 The ANT Toolkit  
In addition to adopting the fundamental principles of ANT, presented Table 3.1, a 
conceptual ANT toolkit has been constructed. This toolkit both formed and framed the 
narrative of this thesis and its contributions. As such, it is necessary to explain the ANT 
concepts used, fully and individually. Recognising that ANT does not support attempts 
to permanently stabilize the social, it follows that ANT itself retains a certain level of 
fluidity in its own translations through the literature (Fenwick & Edwards 2010). The 
attempt to define the terminologies of ANT here is not an attempt to stabilize them but 
rather present the manner in which they have been understood in this research. The 
concepts presented are: Actors, Networks, Associations and Boundary Objects as ways 
to explain; Black Boxes and Controversy as ways to explore; and Power, Control, 
Translation and Treason as the analytical framing for discussing the construction of 
regulation.  
 
3.7 Actors, Networks and Associations 
One of the most fundamental aspects of ANT was the re-imagining of what it meant to 
act. From the very earliest works of ANT, a major motivation of ANT studies was to 
ensure that explanations of society included non-humans (Latour 2005). In the words of 
Latour: ‘Without the nonhuman, humans would not last a minute.’ (Latour 2004, p91). 
 
In their early work, Callon and Latour offered a definition for an actor as ‘Any element 
which bends space around itself, makes other elements depend upon itself and 
translates their will into a language of its own…’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p286). In 
Reassembling the Social, Latour later expanded and simplified the definition of an actor 
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as ‘…any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor’ 
(Latour 2005, p71). 
 
Therefore, anything has the potential to be an actor in ANT. It does not need to have 
intentionality; it simply has to have an effect (Latour 2005).31 How actors are identified 
is clear but there remains the question of how they can be understood. How can we 
‘know’ any more about them other than the simple statement that they are actors? The 
answer is through the relationality between actors (Latour 1994).  
 
A network is an assembly of actors created by associations which, as a collective, can 
also be seen as an actor (Callon & Latour 1981). When deconstructing the powerful or 
‘macro actors’ as they term them, Callon and Latour designate actors as networks: ‘The 
best way to understand this is to consider actors as networks’ (ibid, p280). Therefore, 
we can say that when examining an actor, we are also examining a network, or 
assemblage, and vice versa (Law 1991b).  
 
Every actor in ANT should be understood, not a priori by an assumed inner essence, 
but by the associations that create and constitute it as a network (Harman 2009). 
‘Sociology is only lively and productive when it examines all associations with at least 
the same daring as the actors who make them.’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p292). A 
fundamental of ANT is the interconnectedness or relationality of actors (See Table 3.1). 
The ‘…social, for ANT, is the name of a type of momentary association which is 
characterized by the way it gathers together into new shapes’ (Latour 2005, p65). ANT 
argues the need to understand how actors associate together and in doing so, how they 
define each other (Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 2005). Indeed, when two actors 
associate they can be understood as a new entity: 
 
                                                
31 It is important to make a clarification about the terminology Actant. This term was developed later in 
ANT studies (for example, Latour 1996) and used to denote any non-human actors due to the human 
connotation for the word actor in English (Latour 1999b). They can be seen as largely interchangeable. 
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‘You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You 
are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has 
entered into a relationship with you.’ (Latour 1999, p179).  
 
In addition to this, associations can add to the durability of a network: the stronger the 
association, the stronger the network (Latour 1999b). In ANT, durability of associations 
can be achieved but equally network durability is a temporary state held only as long as 
the actors and associations are kept together (Callon 1986a; Latour 1986, 2005; 
Venturini 2009). Associations are the connections through which a researcher must 
travel in order to understand the social (Latour 2005). Associations, and the networks 
they create, can therefore be understood as a way to collect and explain data. One must 
follow the actors and trace the associations (Callon & Latour 1981; Latour 2005). 
 
This thesis takes the MEPC as a focal regulatory network and will trace the actors and 
associations in order to explain the functioning of the network itself. The concept of an 
actor, or actant, will be used to identify who and what are involved in creating 
regulations in the MEPC and to assist in describing their role. Additionally, the idea that 
actors can represent networks is germane to the exploration of the MEPC as a network 
constructed partly by smaller networks (i.e. delegations) that capture and represent 
interests. Equally, using the concept of networks as groups of associated actors allows 
sub-networks to be identified and the alignment of actors within the MEPC to be 
discussed.  
 
3.8 Boundary Objects 
A boundary object is a particular subcategory of object in ANT literature. It is one that 
exists in two (or more) networks and links or bridges them (Star & Griesemer 1989). 
More specifically, they can be described as: 
 
‘…objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of 
the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites…These objects may be abstract or concrete. They have different meanings 
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in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world 
to make them recognizable…’ (Star & Griesemer 1989, p393) 
 
Similar to Latour’s ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1987) and Callon’s ‘mediators’ 
(Callon 1995), boundary objects, although flexible to a certain extent, do not usually 
change when moving between networks. They do enable actors to work together by 
providing gateways between networks (Eden 2009) and they can link seemingly 
disjointed worlds, allowing them to peacefully co-exist, without ‘necessarily fusing 
them into one’ (Callon 1995, p59). In the literature, boundary objects have been seen to 
connect science and policy by bridging gaps, aligning interests and encouraging 
cooperation in aid of new approaches (Star & Griesemer 1989; Eden 2009; Fujimura 
1992; Gray et al. 2014). Boundary objects can tie together actors with diverse goals and 
connect them in an implementation process (Briers & Chua 2001). They have also been 
shown to provide a cohesive symbol around which to gather networks of governance 
(Eden 2009) and can be linked with attempts at translation (Fujimura 1992) and network 
growth (Callon 1995). 
 
Boundary objects themselves can be understood as actors. Their role is to connect actors 
and, despite Eden claiming that they are ‘not boundary markers’ (2009, p348), this 
thesis adopts the view that in their role as gateways between networks, they do indeed 
delineate network boundaries. In ANT, multiple networks can appear as an unruly mass, 
difficult to untangle therefore using the concept of boundary objects allows an observer 
to more easily process and map networks. Understanding this allows an observer to sort 
through a mess of connections and designate a border between the sub-networks 
functioning in the overall collective. As the MEPC is a hybrid forum (Venturini 2009) 
that brings together policy makers and practitioners to produce regulation, the concept 
of boundary objects will assist in following actors that move between networks and 
marking out nexus spaces within the Committee overall. 
 
3.9 Black Boxes 
‘A black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things 
whose contents have become a matter of indifference.’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p285) 
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A black box is an assemblage of associations or series of connections that have been 
made durable by heterogeneity and reached a point of stabilization (Callon & Latour 
1981; Rydin 2012). Black boxes can contain a silent network, hidden by the 
acceptability of it as mundane, normal, and even unquestionable (Johnson 1988; Fox 
2005; Rydin 2012). The concept of the black box is part of the exploratory ANT toolkit 
and examining black boxes is the aim of many studies that utilize ANT (Justesen & 
Mouritsen 2011).  
 
When considering black boxes in a given context, ANT suggests that a certain level of 
stability is provided by the heterogeneity of the connections that have been boxed up 
(Rydin 2012) but equally that this stability is temporary: ‘Of course, black boxes never 
remain fully closed or properly fastened…’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p285). As such a 
black boxed concept, system, practice or object can be unpacked, unravelled or 
deconstructed (Justesen & Mouritsen 2011; Rydin 2012). The concept of a black box 
therefore generates deconstructive studies that are able to open up taken-for-granted 
devices and practices. It is therefore both a theoretical framing and methodological tool 
for opening up socio-technical contexts.  
 
This thesis aims to tease apart the collective of actors and processes that constitute a 
regulatory body and that are black-boxed in regulation. This approach can be 
complemented by another stream of ANT writing, which positions controversy as 
moments where things are not-yet-settled (i.e. still unboxed). The next section will 
explain and describe controversy as another entry mode for deconstructive inquiry.  
 
3.10 Controversy  
In ANT, controversies are seen as generative of the social and ‘…are part and parcel of 
the very definition of the social bond’ (Latour 1986, p273). Latour uses controversy as a 
way to understand the interface of multiple realities between science and politics around 
ecological issues (Latour 2004a).  
 
The cartography of controversy is a sub-stream of ANT literature devoted to practical 
guidance for investigation of socio-technical debate (Venturini 2009; Venturini 2012). 
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Controversies mark a nexus between scientific and political realities (Latour 2004a; 
Venturini 2009; Venturini 2012), and are defined as: 
 
‘…situations where actors disagree (or better, agree on their 
disagreement)…controversies begin when actors discover that they cannot ignore each 
other and controversies end when actors manage to work out a solid compromise to live 
together. Anything between these two extremes can be called a controversy.’ (Venturini 
2009, p261) 
 
Furthermore, the term controversy is used to denote situations of destabilization where 
an issue has either yet to be black-boxed (as described above) or has been un-boxed 
(Venturini 2009). In his explanatory article Venturini (2009) lists the characteristics of 
controversies and recommends seeking out the most complex set of diverse actors, 
forming and detaching their associations in harsh conflict in order to find a ‘good 
controversy’ in contrast to past, boundless and underground controversies. Once a 
controversy has been chosen, observation and description is recommended (ibid.).   
 
As with the rest of ANT terminology, controversy has both theoretical and 
methodological implications: 
‘The task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not 
taken up by the analyst. This is why, to regain some sense of order, the best solution is 
to trace connections between the controversies themselves rather than try to decide how 
to settle any given controversy.’ (Latour 2005, p23) 
 
It is by following moments of controversy, as actors define the world around them that 
the analyst can begin the job of explaining, though of course it must be acknowledged 
that in explaining we also construct. The cartography of controversies is a helpful mode 
of inquiry considering the research aim is to understand a technical and political 
organisation as it constructs environmental regulations. Chapter 2 explained that 
Member States, IGOs, IAs and NGOs gather together to negotiate and develop new 
regulations. It is a space of unboxed negotiation where the controversies, if settled, are 
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replaced by new ones. Following CO2 discussions in the MEPC meets the definition of a 
‘good controversy’ as they are current, bounded and observable (Venturini 2009).  
 
In addition to the use of controversy as a guiding heuristic, moments of change are 
recognized for their potential to open up construction activities (Czarniawska & Sevón 
1996). Indeed organisations can be seen to be in a state of constant change 
(Czarniawska & Sevón 1996); a sort of dynamic ever-flux where the only constants are 
those which repeatedly re-performed. This line of thinking compliments the concept of 
controversy and can be used as a framing device for the study of organisations. Both of 
these streams of thought directed the research and analysis for this thesis.  
 
3.11 Power and Control 
Most recent ANT-based literature has moved away from issues of power, however the 
early studies were concerned with explaining and demystifying the mechanics of power 
(Law 1991a; Alcadipani & Hassard 2010; Egan 2014) spanning theoretical discussions 
of power (Callon & Latour 1981; Latour 1986; Law 1992), case studies (Callon 1986a; 
Law 1986a; Law 1986b) and a combination of both (Law 1991b). 
 
ANT has a specific understanding of power. No actor is assumed to be inherently 
powerful, instead power is seen as a result or an effect of a heterogeneous network of 
relations (Latour 1986; Law 1991b; Law 1992; Czarniawska & Sevón 1996). This 
thesis primarily draws on the work of Law (1986b) and Callon (1986a). In a historical 
study of control over distance based on examination of the Portuguese Navy, Law 
(1986b) offers a detailed exploration of power. Callon (1986a) offers an explanation of 
the construction of networked power by following a group of researchers as they tried to 
make themselves into an obligatory passage point (OPP) atop a network of mobilized 
scallops, scallop boxes, fishermen and colleagues. These studies are germane to the 
conceptualisation of regulatory control. Accordingly, this section details how ANT 
defines power and control drawing from Law (1986b) while the following section on 
translation discusses the work of Callon (1986a). Together these studies are taken as a 
framing to understand the development of regulation for the shipping industry as a 
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process of constructing control over distance through the actions of a heterogeneous 
network.  
 
In his deconstruction of the Portuguese Naval control, Law treats power and control as 
synonymous (Law 1986b). He questions how naval action can be controlled over vast 
distances and concludes that a heterogeneous assemblage of actors, when durably 
connected, can produce control over distance (ibid.). By understanding that non-humans 
are part of a network for control and deconstructing that network he was able to explain 
how a small number of people in Lisbon were able to purposefully influence events 
half-way around the world (ibid.). In-keeping with ANT fundamentals, he showed that 
not only are non-human elements essential to explaining phenomena, but they are an 
integral part of the production of power: 
 
‘The Portuguese mariner, on a vessel with a cannon, was indeed powerful. The same 
Mariner, shipwrecked on a beach, was pathetically weak’ (Law 1986b, p253)  
 
From this quote several aspects of power can be understood. Power is not inherent to 
the actor (in this instance the Mariner), it is a product of (temporary) heterogeneous 
associations. Additionally, in his own discussions of power Latour emphasises that 
power only exists when exerted (Latour 1986; Latour 1999b). This element is also 
present in Callon’s definition of a powerful position as the mobilization of other actors. 
Therefore to be truly powerful in the ANT sense the Mariner would have to be 
mobilizing the cannon and bending other actors to his will. Latour provides a helpful 
summary of this aspect of power: ‘Either you have it in practice…or you simply have it 
in theory and you do not have it. What makes the difference between power 'in potentia' 
and power 'in actu'? The actions of others.’ (Latour 1986, p265) 
 
Thus an actor is made powerful by their associations and those that they can 
successfully mobilize. In terms of using this concept methodologically, Latour suggests, 
‘By reconstructing networks…a full description of power and domination may be 
obtained’ (Latour 1990, p103). In other words, the fundamental work of ANT, 
following actors and tracing associations, will produce an account of control.  
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ANT has diverged into many branches, as discussed in Section 3.3, yet very few ANT 
works have taken up the early notions of power and applied these in contemporary 
settings. In his study of central-to-local government planning initiatives in Dublin, 
(McGuirk 2000) draws on the ANT conceptualization to destabilize the notion of power 
in the field of urban governance from the result of fixed social structures to power as 
dispersed and composite. His work therefore, is an example of how to locate power in 
multi-level government networks rather than a way to understand how networks control 
at distance.  
 
The literature on power deconstructs the ‘already-powerful’ and shows power and 
control as the produced effect of heterogeneous associations. However, if we understand 
a powerful position as a result of a network of actors then there is need to understand 
how such a position can be created, which is key to this study of regulation. The next 
section therefore, discusses the sociology of translation, as an analytical framing, which 
explains how networks build positions of power.   
 
3.12 The Sociology of Translation  
The sociology of translation is a stream of ANT that focuses on understanding network 
growth (Fox 2005). With its distinctive vocabulary, it explains the process of 
orchestrating a position of control though a series of negotiations. Previous literature 
surmised that power exists only in its use (Latour 1986) and that a position of power is 
one from which one actor may speak and act on behalf of many (Callon & Latour 1981; 
Fox 2005). The sociology of translation offers both a method for understanding, and a 
vocabulary for explaining how one can achieve a networked position of power (Callon 
1986a; Fox 2005). Such a position is achieved by creating an agenda, aligning interests 
of other actors and mobilizing the actors to the realisation of the agenda (Callon & Law 
1982; Callon 1986a; Latour 1999b).  
 
Although the concept has roots in the work of Serres (1974), Michel Callon refined and 
elucidated translation in his 1986 analysis of researcher attempting to re-populate the 
scallop colonies of St Brieuc Bay. This work further solidified some of the fundamental 
principles that already inform ANT. Callon sets out to tell a story of trials, tribulation 
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and representation. Before he begins the tale, he lays out three principles that guided his 
analysis: 
 
(i) Generalized agnosticism  
(ii) Generalized symmetry 
(iii) Free association  
 
While each of these is included in Table 3.1, as translation is a core framing for this 
thesis, it is useful to revisit them in the context of Callon’s work. Under the principle of 
general agnosticism, ‘No point of view is privileged and no interpretation is censored’ 
(Callon, 1986a, p4). Furthermore, the analyst must refrain from judging the positions of 
the actors or attempting to ‘reduce them to a particular ‘sociological’ interpretation’ 
(Callon, 1986a, p17).  
 
The second principle, generalized symmetry, advanced the ANT application of 
fundamental symmetry. Not only has Callon applied the same analytical approach 
across the research context, viewing humans, non-humans, social and technical with 
equal energy, he also applied the same vocabulary to explain the actors and actions in 
his narrative. Therefore, it is imperative not only to include non-humans in observations 
and analysis, but to write about them using the same vocabulary as used for humans. 
The vocabulary itself does not need to be that of Translation, as Callon states that it can 
be left to the discretion of the observer (Callon, 1986a, p4).   
 
The principle of free association directs the researcher to, ‘…abandon all a priori 
distinctions’ (Callon, 1986a, p4). This principle allowed Callon to follow the 
fluctuations of alliances, relationships and even identities of the actors and can similarly 
be used to explore agency in international negotiations that are part of developing 
regulation.  
 
Taking these principles together, Callon applied them to an examination of three 
researchers’ attempts to trial a scallop-farming device from Japan in a French bay in 
order to increase the population of scallops. The aim was to get the scallop larvae to 
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anchor to the collector and thereby protect them from predators and overfishing, 
allowing them to grow and mature. Against this backdrop, Callon introduces the 
vocabulary of translation: problematisation, interessment, enrolment and mobilization. 
It should be noted that in practice, not all moments of translation are as distinguishable 
as they appear once they are written (Callon 1986a).  
 
3.12.1 Problematization 
Problematization, the first stage of translation, defines an issue as seen by the 
problematizers. During this stage, an actor will envision a reality or make a claim as to 
how things should be. In doing so, they seek to create that reality, define the identities 
of others and become indispensible in a given context (Callon 1986a). Two examples 
include the researchers who sought to launch their experiment by binding together 
scallops, fishermen and colleagues behind one strategy (Callon 1986a) and Electricité 
de France (EDF) envisioning the electric car as the inevitable future (Callon & Latour 
1981; Callon 1986b). During problematization, problems are identified and an 
Obligatory Passage Point (OPP) is created, whereby the previously identified problems 
can be solved only if all actors travel through the Passage Point together. 
 
In the case of the researchers, they were able to translate their interpretation of the will 
and desire of the other actors into a plan that would benefit themselves. To be the OPP 
or to channel actors through an OPP by building a network of associations is to hold a 
position of power (Latour 1983). After problematization, the problematizers must set 
out to achieve the reality they envisioned (Callon 1986a). At this early stage, the 
problematization can be either accepted by the other actors or rejected (Callon 1986a). 
The transition from problematization to interessement is uncertain and can meet serious 
resistance from other actors.  
 
3.12.2 Interessement  
In order to ‘interesse’ other actors, the problematizers must align actors with their 
agenda and distance them from other possibilities: 
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‘For all the groups involved, the interessement helps corner the entities to be enrolled. 
In addition, it attempts to interrupt all potential competing associations and to 
construct a system of alliances.’ (Callon 1986a, p10)   
 
This presents one way for a problematizer to ‘interesse’ other actors, however this is 
predicated on the assumption that they must cut off alternative associations. Another 
possibility is that the problematizers make their own associations durable by black 
boxing connections they forge i.e. how much they can stabilize relations as taken for 
granted. Methods for interessement include force, seduction, or in some cases, the 
actors desires are already aligned and devices are often used to try to stabilize this 
statement (Callon 1986a). 
 
3.12.3 Enrolment  
Enrolment is the stage when the actors assume the roles assigned to them by the 
problematizer and become part of a network (Callon 1986a). Enrolment is achieved if 
interessement is successful (ibid). Indeed the conceptual distinctions between these 
stages appear to blur easily. ‘To describe enrolment is thus to describe the group of 
multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that accompany the 
interessements and enable them to succeed.’ (ibid, p10)  
 
3.12.4 Mobilization 
The final stage of translation is mobilization. This occurs when all of the allies are 
mobilized and the network moves as one towards the realization of the problematization 
(Callon 1986a). In ANT, it is also a time when one actor or a few may represent, speak 
and act for many (Callon & Latour 1981; Callon 1986a). One actor, or a small group, 
have problematized reality, aligned and enrolled actors and placed themselves atop a 
network of mobilized actors. Thus, the problematizers assume a position of control and 
see their ideal made real. They have silenced the many and instead control and represent 
them.  
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In summary, translation is a process of manufacturing a position of control through a 
series of moments (Callon 1986a), and can be used to explain how a micro actor 
becomes a macro actor, in other words, how the weak and individual become powerful 
networks (Callon & Latour 1981; Fox 2005). One actor or a group of actors create an 
ideal or highlight an issue, persuade other actors to align with their vision, build a 
network of connections by assigning roles, all the while distancing their chosen allies 
from alternatives before finally mobilizing the controlled network.  
 
The concept of translation has recently been supplemented by a shadow vocabulary of 
treason, which is also a major part of the toolkit of this thesis. The next section 
elaborates on this development.  
 
3.13 The Sociology of Treason  
The concept of treason manifests in the literature in two relatively distinct ways. This 
section will explain both the original application of the term, named treason by 
Dissidence (adopting terminology from Callon 1986a) and the later evolution of it into 
the Sociology of Treason (Galis & Lee 2013). As treason is an offshoot of translation, 
the principles introduced in Section 3.12 still apply. 
 
In Callon’s seminal article on translation (1986a), he viewed treason as a kind of 
network leakage. He names the scallops as treasonous and ‘dissidents’ when they do not 
anchor to the collectors. However, it could be said that this definition hinges on seeing a 
successful translation, which Callon admits there was not in that case. Therefore, if the 
scallops were never part of a mobilized (successfully translated) network, then the 
action of new larvae not anchoring should not be seen as betrayal (treason) as Callon 
terms it but instead as a failing of the researchers to make a durable network. The first 
scallops did anchor however the later scallops did not. This means that treason, 
according to Callon, is an actor falling out of the network and rejecting the 
problematization.  
 
Galis and Lee (2013) introduced the sociology of treason as a full shadow vocabulary to 
translation building on the notion of rejecting a problematization. In their historical case 
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study of attempts to add disability provisions into the construction of the Athens Metro 
system, the authors provide a narrative detailing the interplay and struggles between two 
networks, however they focus on the unsuccessful actors. Rather than deconstructing 
the process of achieving strength, the authors focus on explaining the construction of 
weakness (Galis & Lee 2013). The authors offer this vocabulary to bring further balance 
to the analysis of ‘power accumulation, network building and stabilization’ (ibid, p155). 
In doing so, they also extend the concept of power, or indeed powerlessness as a 
temporary state constructed by the actions of a heterogeneous network (ibid). Guided by 
their own vocabulary, the authors were able to explain the ‘disintegration of non 
experts’ (ibid, p156) from the construction of policy related to accessibility of the 
Athens metro system.  
  
Mirroring the sociology of translation, there are four moments of treason. These are 
distortion, estrangement, rejection and disruption. Each of these will now be taken in 
turn and explained.  
 
3.13.1 Distortion 
Distortion is the re-problematization of one network’s problematization by another 
network. The distorting network is attempting to reimagine their own ideal, one that 
makes the first problematizers and their network dispensable and irrelevant (ibid).  
 
3.13.2 Estrangement 
The next moment of treason is estrangement. In this context, the aim is to use devices to 
produce power asymmetries. ‘A successful estrangement falsifies a problematization, 
substantiates a distortion and continues the severance of associations’ (ibid p162). 
Estrangement is the process of breaking down the relations in the network. It is the 
process of unraveling a competing group and making it weaker.  
 
3.13.3 Rejection 
Rejection is achieved when estrangement is successful (Galis & Lee 2013). The 
‘severing of an association becomes a rejection’ (ibid, p165). The devices of 
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estrangement, those placed as obstacles in the relationships between actors in the 
network, are tested and found to be insurmountable (ibid). The process of breaking 
connections has, at the moment of rejection, rendered alliances disassociated.  
 
3.13.4 Disruption 
The final moment of treason is disruption. It occurs when ‘the disrupted actors are 
made into invisible Others by those few actors who succeed in mobilizing their agendas 
and making them dominant and representative’ (Galis & Lee 2013, p168). In their case 
study, this amounted to the group of disability advocates being locked out of the 
discussions and silenced. A successful process of treason, therefore, can be taken to 
explain how one network triumphs over and weakens another into silence and 
irrelevance through systematic connection breaking and barrier making.  
 
3.14 Translation, Treason and Networks  
In summary, translation is the process of an actor or group of actors building a network 
whereas treason by dissidence is when actors leave this network, i.e they fall out of the 
state of being mobilized. The sociology of treason, however, is when one network 
breaks down another network. It is important to note that this is not a simple process 
and the network being deconstructed may fight back, as Galis and Lee found (see p166-
168 Galis & Lee 2013).  
 
In connection with these studies three possible network states can be identified; network 
formation (translation), network leakage (treason by dissidence) and network power 
struggles (the sociology of treason). However, none of the translation and treason 
literature addresses network co-existence. Furthermore, translation represents the 
creation of a network and treason the disruption of one. Nothing is said about the 
existence in-between or indeed how interests of conflicting networks can be brought 
into a cooperative alignment. This thesis will apply these vocabularies to understand the 
MEPC as an existing network that has already achieved a level of durability beyond 
those studied in the literature (i.e. the networks in Callon 1986a; Galis & Lee 2013; 
Egan 2014; Jollands et al. 2015). Using these repertoires allows analysis of the 
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construction of power and influence and, if used in conjunction, the terminologies bring 
a balance to analysis and narrative. 
 
The conceptualization of control over distance (Law 1986b) and the construction of a 
networked positions of influence (Callon 1986a) or rejections (Galis & Lee 2013) are 
also taken as a base from which the thesis launches an extended exploration of 
contemporary regulatory control-making overall.  
 
3.15 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the origin, fundamentals and development of ANT and discussed 
some criticisms to sensitize the research approach. It has explained the core concepts as 
ways of explaining (actors, associations, networks, boundary objects), ways of 
exploring (black boxes, controversy) and ways of understanding (power and control, 
translation and treason).  
 
In summary: ANT ‘might be better considered as a sensibility to materiality, 
relationality, and process’ (Law 2004, p157). Its aim ‘…is simply to extend the list and 
modify the shapes and figures of those assembled as participants and to design a way to 
make them act as a durable whole.’ (Latour 2005, p72). It was selected to guide this 
research for the following reasons: 
 
(i) Its inclusion of non-human agency 
(ii) Its deconstructive approach to power, control and networks  
(iii) Its descriptive and exploratory capabilities  
(iv) Its suitability to application in scientific and technical communities 
(v) Its applicability in different contexts and particularly to controversies 
 
 
Chapter 2 showed that the existing literature addressing shipping regulations and 
specifically regarding the IMO lacks depth of detail on the process of developing 
regulation and neglects engagement with the MEPC as a network consisting of different 
actors. The aim of this study was to extend and modify understandings of the MEPC, 
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the actors and processes responsible for developing control and in doing so, to 
contribute to general conceptualizations of control. In conclusion, ANT appeared to be 
the most suitable theory for undertaking an ethnographic study of the MEPC since it 
would simultaneously account for the influence of non-humans in the socio-technico-
political community whilst allowing the construction of control to be explained. 
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4. Methodology 
   
Following on from Chapter 3, this chapter presents and discusses the methodology of 
the research project. As Actor-Network Theory is partly theoretical and partly 
methodological (Latour 1999a; Jóhannesson 2005; Lukka & Vinnari 2017), this chapter 
both offers an account of the methods for data collection and analysis but equally 
should be read as an extension of Chapter 3. 
 
ANT provides researchers with a conceptual toolkit for deconstructing and 
understanding the social. However, ‘there is no single actor-network theory, but a 
variety of approaches’ (Cowan & Carr 2008, p151) and as Jóhannesson (2005) points 
out, there is little guidance for researchers on the use of ANT. What is given is 
seemingly common sense advice such as such as follow the actors, trace associations 
(Latour 2005), ‘ “just look at controversies and tell what you see” ’ (Venturini 2009, p 
259)32 and a set of fundamental principles that should be naturalized by the researcher 
(see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). The simple advice above combined with the complex and 
nuanced principles make for tricky implementation in practice. ANT leaves data 
collection choices predominantly at the discretion of the researcher and provides little 
assessment of methods. The main focus of ANT authors is how well the principles of 
ANT are embraced during research. With particular reference for studying controversies 
Venturini provides seven recommendations (Venturini 2012). These are more of a 
consolidation of the advice and principles of ANT, rather than directives to collect 
certain forms and amounts of data in certain ways. As such, I will return to these 
recommendations in Section 4.13 as a way to reflect on the methodology presented in 
this chapter. 
 
The chapter opens with the research questions then goes on to explain the ontological 
and epistemological underpinnings of the research. The majority of the chapter is then 
dedicated to explaining the gathering of four types of data: observational, photographic, 
                                                
32 In his article, Venturini recounts this quote from Bruno Latour when he was asked for instructions on 
how to explore controversy. 
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interview and documentary. From there, the analysis and presentation of the data is 
described along with the ethical considerations of this study. The chapter concludes 
with some overall reflections on the methodology.   
 
4.1 Research Questions 
After undertaking a review of Shipping emissions, regulation and ANT literatures 
(Chapters 2 and 3), the aim of this research became to observe and explain the process 
of developing new regulations aimed at controlling and reducing CO2 emissions from 
the international shipping industry. In ANT terms, the research aim was to explore and 
disassemble the IMO MEPC as a network of actors and associations that attempt to 
construct control over distance and then reassemble them into an explanatory 
narrative. From there, this research aim was then translated into two core research 
questions:  
 
(i) What is the IMO MEPC? In other words, what actors and associations constitute and 
perform this network? 
(ii) How does the IMO MEPC work? Or, by what processes does this network develop 
regulatory control? 
 
Chapter 2 showed that while criticism for the existing regulations abounds, there is little 
understanding of the construction of environmental regulation or the actors and 
associations that make this possible. Arguably, the MEPC has been black boxed in 
current studies of maritime regulation and the questions above allowed the research to 
open it up for exploration through data collection. As such, this study aimed to provide 
an ethnography of regulation.  
 
Traditional ethnographies involve the researcher immersed in the field for periods of 
weeks, months or years (Van Maanen 2011; Corson et al. 2014; Campbell, Corson, et 
al. 2014). Given that MEPC only converges for a five days once or twice a year, issues 
arise regarding how to engage deeply enough with network to create an ethnographic 
account.  
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‘Event Ethnography’ has recently emerged as a way to resolve the tension between the 
need to study global governance meetings and the time constraints of these meetings 
(Campbell, Hagerman, et al. 2014; Campbell, Corson, et al. 2014). These works 
demonstrate that organisational ethnography is possible in short bursts and that 
international events provide sites to explore actors, networks, boundary objects, 
scientific and political assemblages and ultimately a way to understand international 
governance (Gray et al. 2014; Campbell, Corson, et al. 2014; Campbell, Hagerman, et 
al. 2014). Framing MEPC meetings as events in a regulatory cycle justifies the 
observation undertaken as part of an ethnography of the MEPC. 
 
Additionally, to achieve ethnographic depth, multiple data collection methods were 
used to assemble a heterogeneous collective from which to draw insight. I supplemented 
observation with interviews in order to fill gaps, make clarifications and to reconstruct 
parts of the process that could not be directly observed. Rather than just analysing their 
contents, I treated documents as actors in the network drawing on the work of Cooren 
(2004). I followed them during and in between meetings, understanding them as 
representational spokespersons (Latour 2004a). I took photographs during the short 
periods of observation with the initial intent to supplement the observation notes and 
insert into the thesis narrative. However, they also provided a way for me to revisit the 
environment in between meeting sessions, if only in a limited sense. 
 
The next section will explain the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this 
study, and in doing so will position this thesis as a constructed account of control 
created by the actions and associations of the researcher and the heterogeneous data 
(Law 2004).  
 
4.2 Ontology and Epistemology  
Each theoretical perspective is framed by an understanding of ontology, i.e. ‘what is’ 
and epistemology, i.e. ‘what it means to know’ (Crotty 1998, p10). The key ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of ANT are Symmetry, Heterogeneity, Relationality 
and Multiplicity, (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3).  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, the seminal text of ANT, Laboratory Life, reimagined 
epistemology. Through their examination of the production of facts Latour and Woolgar 
(1979) demonstrated that knowledge is a produced effect of a heterogeneous network. 
In doing so they demolished the barriers between the natural and the social that had 
previously been a key feature of sociological research (Law 1999a). Latour (2005) 
moved from scientific knowledge to reassemble his own definition of ‘social’ as 
heterogeneous, relational and one in which agency is the act of effecting, changing, 
shaping regardless of its source. We can therefore see that the explanation of knowledge 
as a production of heterogeneous relations moved to an explanation of reality as the 
same. ANT is relativistic (Latour 1996) and considered to be a relational ontology 
(Asdal et al. 2007; Harman 2007). ANT thinkers reject the assumption of inherent 
properties and a priori distinctions (Callon & Latour 1981; Latour 1996). Instead, they 
seek to understand actors and networks through their constituent relations i.e. 
associations (Harman 2007; Latour 2005). Under ANT, knowledge and reality are built 
and shaped by collective agency and socio-material associations.  
 
The great controversy of ANT is less about its constructivism and more the equal 
footing that objects are given with humans (Harman 2007). Some describe ANT as 
ontologically flat as it brings everything to the same level, human or not. However, it is 
more accurate to see ANT as ontologically symmetrical (Callon 1986a; Lukka & 
Vinnari 2017). ANT does not suggest that everything is the same, that there is no such 
thing as difference, instead it rejects the idea of inherent difference and encourages 
researchers to analyse all in the same terms (Law 1992). 
 
The ontological base of ANT was extended by the work of Annemarie Mol and John 
Law as they added the element of Multiplicity which is the acknowledgement that 
reality is multiplicitous and these multiple realities can overlap, coincide, conflict and 
depend on each other (Mol 1999). This was first shown by Mol in her case study of 
three productions of anaemia; clinical, statistical, pathophysiological. Mol showed that 
anaemia, rather than being plural, exists in multiple: 
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‘It is not as if there were separate entities each standing apart in a homogeneous field. 
So anaemia is multiple, but it is not plural. The various anaemias that are performed in 
medicine have many relations between them. They are not simply opposed to, or 
outside, one another. One may follow the other, stand in for the other, and, the most 
surprising image, one may include the other...Alternative realities don't simply coexist 
side by side, but are also found inside one another.’ (Mol 1999, p85) 
 
Multiplicity reinforces the relational ontology of ANT and allows us to see that 
seemingly individual realities are collectively created (McDougall et al. 2016; Mol 
1999; Law 2004; Law & Mol 2008; Law & Mol 2011). Power in ANT is also the 
production of collective heterogeneous associations (Latour 1986; Law 1986b). It is not 
considered inherent to the actor (Callon & Latour 1981). Neither is it an ethereal pool 
on which actors can draw, it is the result of a network of connections mobilized to the 
will of an actor (Callon 1986a; Latour 1986; Law 1986b).  
 
From the above we can see that ANT is a theory that conflates what is, what is known, 
what acts, and what influences into one nuanced approach based on the adoption of the 
fundamentals offerings of the theory and its proponents. Hence, this thesis can be seen 
as the knowledge construction of a heterogeneous assemblage of actors; field site, 
participants, research materials, and myself. The following section will now explain the 
initiation of the fieldwork.  
 
4.3 Overview of Data Collection 
Moving from reviewing literature to considering fieldwork involved some initial 
planning. With regards to qualitative research, planning in advance but avoiding the 
production of a blueprint is advised (Mason 2002). Additionally, ethnographies cannot 
be pre-scripted and must develop in the field (Neyland 2007). Instead a research 
strategy should be adapted and shaped over the course of the fieldwork (ibid). 
Furthermore, making specific decisions in advance of fieldwork, particularly in regards 
to data collection methods is not suitable for studies that are qualitative, exploratory and 
where rich description is the intent (Miles et al. 2014). Drawing on these insights, I 
decided to undertake observation, interviews, gather relevant documents and take 
 81 
photographs. However, I made no pre-determination of what exactly to observe at 
meetings, how many meetings to observe, who to interview, what photos to take, what 
documents to collect or when the fieldwork would end. It was more important to focus 
on following the actors and make choices that were guided by, ‘the practice, process 
and context of the research itself’ (Mason 2002, p24).  
 
Data was collected from September 2015 to December 2016. Although separated into 
distinct sections in this thesis for the sake of clarity, the different data collection 
methods were carried out concurrently. During this time, I attended three MEPC 
meetings: A full intercessional Working Group meeting held on the 9th-11th of 
September 2015, MEPC69 (in full) held from the 18th-22nd of April 2016 and finally 
three days of the five day MEPC70 meeting, held from the 24th-28th of October 2016. 
Photographic data was taken during the meetings. The first interview was conducted on 
the 12th November 2015 and the last interview was conducted 16th December 2016. 
Over the course of these months 36 participants were interviewed and documentary data 
was gathered starting from just before the Intercessional Working Group (IEEWG) to 
just after MEPC70. Transcribing, note writing and data analysis also took place during 
the gathering phase and then continued after the conclusion of the fieldwork. Figure 4.1 
visually represents the data collection during fieldwork and in connection to MEPC 
meetings.  
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Figure 4.1: Fieldwork Activity Timeline  
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that there were months between observable meetings. As such the data 
collection had to be spread out over 15 months in order to observe enough meeting days 
to create this ethnographic account. Interviews were carried out and documents were 
gathered and analysed between meetings. Although the data collection period started in 
September 2015, MEPC68, which occurred in 11th-15th of May 2015, has been included 
in this ethnographic account. This was accomplished by analysing MEPC68 
submissions and a transcript of the MEPC68 Plenary discussion. Therefore, while the 
data collection period was from September 2015 to December 2016 the data timeframe 
focused on in this thesis was the period from May 2015 to December 2016. In the 
following section I will explain how I gained access to the IMO MEPC.  
 
4.3.1 Gaining access: Opening the Black Box  
The research was heavily dependent gaining access to the IMO.  Gaining access can be 
one of the most difficult steps in ethnographic research (Bryman & Bell 2007). In this 
case, obtaining access to the research site was possible through a ‘gatekeeper’ (May 
2001, p60). As part of my background research and familiarization with the issue of 
shipping emissions I attended a conference concerned with the environmental impacts 
of current and future shipping activities in June 2014. I aimed to make connections with 
members of the shipping industry/community in preparation for undertaking fieldwork. 
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As a result of attending the conference, I met a representative from a Consulting 
Organisation (hereafter CO) to the IMO. This person offered to register me to attend an 
IMO meeting. When my project reached the fieldwork stage, I accepted this request and 
was registered for the IEEWG in the IMO in September 2015 with a CO delegation. 
Gaining access was therefore a combination of a strategic plan, good luck and 
opportunism. Indeed, while gaining access to the IMO meetings was largely facilitated 
by this key contact, I later found out that negotiating the meetings and making contacts 
for interviews during them was more of a challenge.   
  
From the first intercessional Working Group meeting, I went on to attend MEPC 69 and 
70 with the same consulting delegation in April 2016 and October 2016, respectively. 
While it is possible to attend the IMO as an individual observer, attending as a 
registered Delegate afforded specific advantages. Firstly, documents that are submitted 
to meetings (for example, proposals) are only publically available after the meeting has 
passed.33 Being registered as Delegate gave me full access to documents submitted in 
advance of the meetings. I was therefore able to download, read and familiarize myself 
with the main arguments of the submissions in preparation for observing the meetings. 
This made it easier to make sense of the complexity of the negotiations. Secondly, being 
registered with a delegation removed the possibility of observation being denied. The 
IMO meetings are held in private (IMO 2010). At the start of each meeting the 
Secretariat notifies the Committee of individual observers and then asks if the 
Committee has objections to the observers. In the three meetings attended, no observers 
were rejected but given the importance of this level of access to the research project, 
attending with a Delegation presented a privileged position. Additionally the other 
Delegates on the CO helped me make further contacts by making some initial 
introductions. 
 
Finally, by being registered for a meeting as a member of a Delegation, I had access to 
the official online audio recordings of Plenary discussions, which are made available 
after the meetings. Listening to these meant fieldwork notes for Plenary discussions 
                                                
33 They are accessible by registering an account with the online IMO document database (IMODOCS). 
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could be refined and enhanced. More importantly, during data collection a proposal 
submitted to MEPC68 emerged as a key part of the data. Despite my focus being 
MEPC69 and 70 I was able to analyse the proposal and then use the audio recordings 
from Plenary to follow the submission in the discussions at MEPC68. 
 
4.4 Observation at the MEPC meetings  
ANT is derived from an ethnographical approach involving observation to explore and 
assemble and account of the social (Latour & Woolgar 1986; Law 2004). Thus, the 
choice was made to undertake observation at the meetings in the IMO Headquarters. In 
total eleven days were spent observing the meetings.  
 
In the MEPC, there are three agenda items relevant to controlling and reducing 
emissions from ships:  
• ‘Air pollution and energy efficiency’ 
• ‘Further technical and operational measures for enhancing the energy efficiency 
of international shipping’ 
• ‘Reduction of GHG emissions from ships’ 
 
The Agenda Item on ‘Air pollution and energy efficiency’ pertains to the EEDI and 
SEEMP and given that these are established regulations that have been discussed in the 
literature (see Sections 2.7.2 and 2.7.3) I narrowed my focus to the other two agenda 
items. The dates, days and focus of my observation are presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Observation at IMO Meetings 
Meeting Type Meeting 
Dates 
Days 
Observed 
Agenda Item(s) Followed 
Intercessional 
Working Group 
(IEEWG) 
9th – 11th 
September 
2015 
3 of 3 6. Further Technical and 
Operational Measures for 
Enhancing Energy Efficiency of 
International Shipping 
 
MEPC69 18th – 22nd 
April 2016 
5 of 5 6. Further Technical and 
Operational Measures for 
Enhancing Energy Efficiency of 
International Shipping 
 
7.Reduction of GHG Emissions 
from Ships 
 
MEPC70 24th – 28th 
October 2016 
3 of 5 7.Reduction of GHG Emissions 
from Ships 
 
 
The IEEWG was focused only on discussing the Agenda Item: Further Technical and 
Operational Measures for Enhancing Energy Efficiency of International Shipping. At 
MEPC69, I observed the meeting in full (there were 21 agenda items) but particularly 
focused my attention on Agenda Items 6 and 7. By MEPC70 I focused on Agenda item 
7 only in both Plenary and the Working Group (hereafter WG). The MEPC discussions 
under Agenda Item 7 concerned new approaches to reduce CO2 emissions and were 
deemed the most pertinent to the exploration of the construction of control over 
Shipping emissions.  
 
I began my observation by attending the IEEWG held at the IMO Headquarters on the 
9th-11th of September 2015. Intercessional Working Group meetings differ to the MEPC 
sessions as they include only a sub-network of actors dedicated to the particular agenda 
item under discussion and take place in smaller Committee rooms than the Plenary 
Room. Nevertheless, this meeting provided me with a view of the actors and processes 
and allowed me to prepare more thoroughly for attending future MEPCs. During this 
intercessional, I focused mostly on observing rather than securing interviews, knowing 
that I would need to return to the field site for MEPC69 and would have a clearer focus 
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as to the content of interviews. Nevertheless, at this meeting I met four individuals who 
would later become interviewees and who would also help to arrange further interviews. 
At MEPC69 and MEPC70 I focused both on observing the process as well as securing 
further interviews. By this point, the interviews were necessary to expand on parts of 
the process that were not directly visible and for clarifications (see Section 4.7 for 
further discussion).  
 
During observation across all meetings, I followed the actors and the action. In line with 
ANT ontological and epistemological underpinnings, while I was observing, I was also 
constructing the account of the network through my note-taking, conversations with 
Delegates and contact-making activities. Essentially, I was building my own 
heterogeneous network of participants, research materials, documents etc. Thus the 
approach to observation was ‘participant-as-observer’ in more general scholarly terms 
(Fulcher & Scott 2011 p83; see also Burgess 1984 p81). Initially I had considered 
carrying out conversational interviews in the margin times of the meetings in addition to 
observing (Arnould & Wallendorf 1994), but decided against this upon attending a 
meeting. It was nearly impossible to simply observe during break times. If I approached 
Delegates and introduced myself they would begin to ask about my research rather than 
continuing their conversations. As I became more familiar with the meetings I began to 
appreciate that break times are still working times for Delegates. They use this time to 
make new contacts, discuss the negotiations, and share new ideas (see chapter 5 for 
further discussion). Being aware of these circumstances, I decided that it seemed most 
pragmatic to make contacts and ask for interviews with individuals outside of these 
intense meeting times.  
 
During the meeting discussions, I took continuous substantive handwritten notes 
(Burgess 1984; Law 2004). The notes were unstructured, largely freeform and in 
addition to capturing the content of the discussions they included short asides and raw 
reflections on the meetings. Discussions carried out in Plenary are recorded and the 
audio is made available to registered Delegates, however WG discussions are not 
recorded. It was therefore important to capture the discussions in WGs as fully as 
possible. 
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In his discussion of developing relationships during participant observation, Burgess 
states that ‘The participant observer needs to blend into the situation if observations are 
to be made of the participants in their natural settings’ (Burgess 1984, p92). Echoing 
this, during the first meeting, I made the decision not to attempt to take notes during 
breaks and meal times as it felt exceedingly conspicuous and somewhat impractical 
(coffee breaks were mostly spent standing). When the breaks ended I quickly wrote 
down any significant observations, thoughts or questions that had arisen.  
 
When taking notes I drew on the advice of Burgess (1984, Table 4.2, p96) and adapted 
his nine dimensions of data collection to reflect my application of ANT by aiming to 
capture Time, Space, Actors, Action, Questions and my own Reflections. These allowed 
me to take notes in alignment with the fundamental principles of heterogeneity (Law 
1992) and symmetry (Callon 1986a). Furthermore, a main focus was writing an account 
of the interventions34 during WG negotiations, which would allow me to analyse these 
discursive processes. I wrote my notes in three A5 sized notebooks, using a separate 
notebook for each meeting and I used my laptop for a few hours during one WG 
meeting at MEPC70. My notes totalled 309 A5 pages (handwritten) and 11 A4 typed 
pages (see Table 4.2 below). 
 
Table 4.2: Observation Data 
Meeting Days Notes (A5 Pages) 
IEEWG 3 95 
MEPC69 5 114 
MEPC70 3 100/11* 
Totals 11 309/11* 
* Additional 11 pages were A4 typed single line spaced. 
 
In addition to the observation notes, I was very kindly given copies of verbatim Plenary 
transcripts from MEPC68, 69 and 70 from some other researchers attending the MEPC 
                                                
34 Intervention is the term used in the IMO to denote the moment when a Delegate speaks for their 
Delegation during the discussions.  
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meetings in return for my notes on the Working Group at MEPC70. This meant that I 
was able to use audio recordings from Plenaries, transcripts and my notes to analyse the 
negotiations. The next section reflects on the method of observation and some 
limitations and difficulties I faced in the field.  
 
4.4.1 Reflections on Observation  
There were two main difficulties with observation and two notable limitations. The first 
difficulty concerns note taking. Attempting to follow a spoken negotiation for hours by 
taking handwritten notes was difficult and so naturally there were some gaps. The 
Plenary audio recordings and the transcripts from the researchers allowed me to enrich 
my notes of the Plenary discussions but as the WGs were not recorded I was reliant on 
my notes to write up the data. 
 
The second difficulty related to the act of observing itself. The discussion sessions 
lasted hours and required complete focus. For the sake of progress break times were 
often sacrificed by the Chairman, particularly in WGs. Equally, the start and end times 
of WGs were extended. Interventions can be vague, technical and complex. At certain 
times the discussion in WGs started to diverge into two simultaneous lines of argument. 
During these times Delegates had to make interventions to request clarifications. 
Combining these factors with the sheer length of the discussion made the act of 
observing and note-taking very intense. It is therefore important to consider that some 
of the action or nuances of the process may not have been recorded and accounted for. 
Indeed, in his own account of ethnography, Law discusses feeling overwhelmed by the 
intensity of the activity. He reconciles this by acknowledging that it is impossible to 
capture everything: ‘Too many realities – and representations of realities – were being 
enacted’ (Law 2004, p108) and suggesting that ethnographers must ‘tune in’ to the field 
and discriminate between what is captured and what is not (ibid). 
 
The third difficulty relates to time constraints. As discussed in Section 4.1 traditional 
ethnographies are deeply immersive (Van Maanen 2011; Corson et al. 2014), for 
example Latour spent two years observing in a laboratory, collecting the data with 
which he would produce Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar 1979). By undertaking an 
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ethnography of regulation, I aimed to collect a rich data and so decided that the best 
resolution to the time constraints of the meetings was to attend multiple meetings. The 
initial plan to observe IEEWG and MEPC69 was adapted and fieldwork was extended 
to attend MEPC70 in order to enrich my data to the point where a full description of the 
network was possible (Venturini 2009). At the same time, the limited contact with the 
field itself reduced the risk of ‘going native’ (Lukka & Vinnari 2017). 
 
A limitation of observation of the MEPC was that the Plenary discussion is held 
throughout the week however there can be up to five additional Working Group 
discussions being carried out simultaneously. This was an issue only in that it involved 
a prioritization of which Agenda Item to follow. As explained in Section 4.4 there are 
three agenda items that pertain to emissions from ships. During MEPC69 there was only 
one WG relevant for my focus and by MEPC70 when there were two simultaneous WG 
on relevant agenda items, I had narrowed my focus and attended the WG on Reduction 
of GHG Emissions from Ships.  
 
Nevertheless, the IMO MEPC raises the issue of simultaneous discussions for 
observation as a method. This issue has been faced by other researchers when trying to 
follow international governance events and a new approach titled Collaborative Event 
Ethnography (CCE), whereby a team of researchers undertake observation in 
collaboration, has arisen to deal with the issue of simultaneous events under a collective 
banner (Campbell, Corson, et al. 2014; Campbell, Hagerman, et al. 2014; Gray et al. 
2014). Although it was not possible within the context of this research, this approach 
may therefore be suitable for future studies of similar regulatory meetings.  
 
The second limitation was that some parts of the regulatory process were not observable 
as they occur beyond the parameters of the MEPC. The submissions to the MEPC 
emerged as one of the most important parts of the process. However these submissions 
are created and submitted weeks before a meeting. They are drafted by Delegations and 
groups of Delegations through the use of emails, conference calls, conversations at 
other international regulatory fora or events and in-person meetings. Since the 
submissions were emerging as key data for my narrative I chose to reconstruct what I 
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could not observe by using interviews with Delegates. By doing this I was able to 
capture and explain the process of creating submissions, which is presented in Section 
5.3.3 of Chapter 5. The process of interviewing will be discussed in section 4.7. The 
next section addresses the choice to take photographs in the field site.  
 
4.5 Photographs 
Taking photographs as part of ethnographic fieldwork is commonplace (Pink 2013). In 
ANT research photos are used as a visual aid to illustrate details of the network and 
actors being described (Latour & Woolgar 1979) or to guide the reader through the 
narrative (Latour, 1999b). Other ANT scholars make use of photographs to present the 
reader with a visual image of the object of focus (MacKenzie 2009; Rydin 2012; Law & 
Mol 2008). Echoing these approaches I took photos in the IMO Headquarters using an 
iPhone in order to use them in the narrative to guide the reader through the spaces of the 
IMO MEPC, the structure and layout of rooms and any particularly important objects. I 
sought permission to take photographs through email. In response I was told that being 
registered as a Delegate allowed me to take photographs and I was also sent a zip file of 
40 official IMO photographs. Over the course of the three meetings I took 17135 photos.  
 
4.5.1 Reflections on Photographic Data 
Photographs were not used as a completely separate data source in this research. Some 
scholars argue that photographs can capture and present detail that can, ‘elude even the 
most skilled wordsmiths’ (Prosser & Schwartz 2003, p116). As previously stated my 
initial plan was to use photographs to enhance detail and to aid the reader in the final 
narrative, however I found the photographs helpful when constructing description. 
MEPC meetings last only days and as it was not practical to visit the field site in 
between meetings, photographs provided me with a way to visually revisit the field site 
as often as necessary during analysis and write up. By reviewing the photographs in 
conjunction with my observation notes and other data forms when analysing data and 
writing up the thesis I was able to better recall the field site and observe details that 
                                                
35 Many of these photos were of the same object or room but from different angles or levels of zoom for 
detail. 
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were not possible to note down at the time (Fetterman 2010). Although I took many 
photos I have only presented a small illustrative sample in the thesis, however I did not 
experience any particular difficulty taking and using the photos.  
 
4.6 Documents 
Research of ‘literate societies’ (Atkinson & Coffey 1997) must take account of how 
texts feature (Silverman 1993) and in the case of ANT, the agency of the texts 
themselves in organisations (Cooren 2004). Documents were a vital source of data for 
this study. This section explains why and how documents were collected and analysed 
in this research.  
 
The IMO itself was brought into existence by a key document - the Convention on the 
International Maritime Organization (1948) and its Rules of Procedure are presented 
along with the Convention text in the Basic Documents of the Organization. In advance 
of every meeting submissions are uploaded to the IMO’s online database (IMODOCs).  
Exploration of this database revealed that there is a vast collection of documents 
including, submissions, reports, circulars, j-papers, resolutions, guidelines etc. 
Additionally, observing the meetings showed me that the negotiations are captured in 
the official reports which are reviewed, line by line, on the last day of meetings. Hence, 
these meeting reports highlight the importance of documents to the workings of the 
MEPC. After making these observations I began to understand the IMO, and by 
extension the MEPC as a ‘self-documenting’ community and made the decision to 
closely follow texts as part of my ethnography of regulation (Atkinson & Coffey 1997). 
Hence, I focused on analysing the content of the texts themselves, treating them as 
spokespersons (Latour 2004a) but I also began to analyse their role(s) in the overall 
process (Cooren 2004) and build up an appreciation of the collective infrastructure of 
documents. 
 
When collecting and analysing documents it became important to appreciate their 
‘intertextuality’, i.e. how texts are related to each other (Atkinson & Coffey 1997) and 
their relationality as a fundamental of ANT (See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). Moreover, 
following texts became a process of understanding how they link to and build on each 
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other and how they associate with other actors in the network. Intertextuality was 
accounted for by the IMO’s coding system for documents, which links them all together 
in an informative and traceable web (see Section 5.3.5). Awareness of this enabled me 
to explore translation attempts across meetings by following the essence of a proposal 
as it appeared in submissions to each meeting with new layers of argument and support 
(see Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of texts). Over the course of the fieldwork and 
analysis, relationality of texts in the process was explored through observation of their 
role, analysis of the texts themselves and discussions about texts in interviews. 
 
Selection of documentary data was similar to the choice to observe at meetings in that it 
was purposeful and in line with both answering the research questions and the 
application of ANT. Initially I downloaded hundreds of documents from IMODOCs and 
began sorting through them. I then narrowed my reading by relevancy. There were two 
main elements that made a document relevant, firstly its connection to the overall 
process of developing regulation and the IMO as an organisation and secondly, its 
specific connection to the evolving network description and narrative themes.  
 
Once the most relevant documents were identified (130 documents) I read though them 
and distilled them to 57 key documents with the help of my observation notes and my 
increasing clarity on the themes and theoretical terminologies I was using for in-depth 
analysis. This process was carried out throughout the data collection period.  
 
The IMO has six official languages; Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish. Its working languages are English, French and Spanish (IMO 2017d). Almost 
all of the documents analysed were written in English, however during the meetings 
some of the Delegations requested their statements to be annexed to the report. Three 
statements were annexed in Spanish and although the statement had been spoken in 
English, a member of the University fluent in Spanish kindly translated these written 
statements. Having explained the choice and approach to gathering documentary data 
the following section reflects on the use of this data. 
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4.6.1 Reflections on Documentary Data 
There were limitations to the use of documents in this study. The establishing 
Convention of the IMO and rules of procedure for the MEPC were key documents for 
understanding the Organization, however these documents did not provide deep insight 
into the actual processes and practices involved of developing a regulation. In their 
discussion of using texts in research Atkinson and Coffey state:  
‘We should not use documentary sources as surrogates for other kinds of data. We 
cannot…learn through records alone how an organization actually operates day-by-
day’ (Atkinson & Coffey 1997, p47).  
 
This quote captures my experience of the using documentary data. While the documents 
were key to the explanation of the network and its process, analysis of documents 
essentially re-emphasized the need for other forms of data to be collected, i.e. the 
observation and the interview data. The limitations of documents, rather than being a 
disadvantage, confirmed the choice to collect multiple data types. The following section 
introduces my approach to conducting interviews.  
 
4.7 Interviews  
Interviews are one of the most used data collection methods for qualitative researchers 
(Bryman 2012; Burgess 1984). They have become ubiquitous in the social sciences and 
are often used in conjunction with ethnographic approaches (Arnould & Wallendorf 
1994). Indeed, we are now living in an ‘interview society’ (Silverman 2007; Roulston 
2010; Alvesson & Ashcraft 2012). As a result, questions have been raised about the use 
of interviews by social researchers in methodological literature (Roulston 2010). 
Silverman (2007, p46) goes as far as to consider researchers ‘blinkered’ if they choose 
to use interviews as a method without reflecting on their rationale. It is therefore 
important to justify the choice to use interviews. 
 
Although carrying out interviews was part of my initial research plan, I had envisaged 
conversational interviews in the field. However, the need for in-depth interviews 
emerged from process of observation. There were three reasons why I needed to carry 
out interviews. Firstly, the actors and processes under observation were extremely 
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complex and as such I needed clarifications on my own observations. Secondly, as 
explained in Section 4.7.3, interviews with delegates provided opportunities to 
reconstruct the process of creating submissions through their accounts in order to 
understand the key part of the regulatory process which occurs outwith the MEPC 
meetings. Thirdly, interviews provided greater insight into the roles of the Delegates, 
Secretariat and the Chairmen. Thus, I adapted my research plan, focusing on observing 
and sourcing participants at meetings and carrying out in-depth interviews between 
meetings.  
 
4.7.1 Selecting Participants 
Just as ANT values the exploration of micro heterogeneous relations to explain macro 
level social phenomenon (Callon & Latour 1981), interviews were an opportunity to 
reconstruct the collective regulatory network through conversations with individual 
actors. In this research, selection of participants was theory driven, and evolved during 
fieldwork (Miles et al. 2014).  
 
It is perhaps helpful to note that in utilizing ANT as a theory and a methodology (Latour 
1999a; Jóhannesson 2005; Lukka & Vinnari 2017), the researcher must maintain a 
comprehensive ontological and epistemological position. As such, interviewees were 
selected in order to produce a rich description of the network (Latour 2005; Venturini 
2009). In other words, ‘…choice of research participants should be determined by the 
focus of our research, thereby enabling us to meet our research aim and answer our 
research question’ (Saunders 2012, p36). Furthermore, the methods of selection were 
kept in line with the fundamental prescription of ANT to follow the actors and trace 
associations (Latour 2005).  
 
A combination of approaches was used to satisfy the aforementioned principles. At the 
meetings with hundreds of delegates, I took an opportunistic approach (Buchanan et al. 
1988) and made contacts with delegates during break times, introduced my research and 
asked if they would mind taking part in an interview. I continued to make contacts and 
request interviews throughout the three meetings (see Figure 4.1) until I felt I had 
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enough data to supplement my other data types and produce thick description (Geertz 
1973; Arnould & Wallendorf 1994; Tracy 2010; Corson et al. 2014). 
  
In addition to this, I asked interviewees if they could put me in touch with their 
contacts. Known as snowball sampling36 by wider methodological texts, in ANT this 
can be seen as tracing the network. In addition to snowballing and opportunism, some 
participants were simply approached due to their perceived relevance for the study. In 
snowballing the network, I found trust was an important factor in this tight-knit 
community. In my experience, if an interviewee introduced me at a meeting or put me 
in touch with other contacts, I was more likely to get an interview than when I 
approached people myself. Snowballing, or network tracing, did not turn out to be as 
simple as it is often presented. Some participants would offer up three or four 
connections while many offered one or none. A further issue with snowballing a tightly 
knit community was maintaining confidentiality when asking participants to put me in 
touch with their contexts. This issue is detailed Section 4.9: Ethical Considerations.  
 
In summary, through direct approach, opportunism and snowballing I assembled a 
collective of participants to interview that supplemented other data types and enriched 
the construction of this account of the MEPC network, its actors and processes. The 
following section explains how the interviews were conducted. 
 
4.7.2 Conducting Interviews  
During fieldwork 36 interviews were completed (See Table 4.3 below). Figure 4.2 
shows that the methods of selecting participants lead to a heterogeneous representation 
of the human actors in the data. In addition to a variety of positions and experience 
being captured, the interviewees’ roles were regionally diverse. While specific nations 
cannot be stated due to confidentiality reasons, the participants in this study work in 
North America, Europe, Asia and Oceania. 
 
                                                
36 Snowball sampling involves asking one or a small group of participants to nominate and perhaps 
connect the researcher with other potential participants (May 2001; Bryman 2012). 
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Table 4.3: Interview Data Collected Between November 2015 and December 2016 
Total number of 
participants 
Total number of 
interviews Total hours recorded 
Average interview 
length  
36 39 37:51:04 01:03:05 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Interviewee Roles 
 
 
Interviews do not commence ‘when the first question is asked’ (May 2001, p132). 
Instead, preparation is part of the practice of interviews (ibid.) and involved compilation 
of a small amount of background information on participants and their organisations. 
This activity had two advantages. Firstly, it helped to me to create some questions 
specific to the individual, which in turn assisted in building rapport. Secondly, 
conducting background research sometimes resulted in finding extra aspects of their 
role or their organisation that might not have been covered otherwise, but that were 
relevant to the research. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured. Questions were mostly ‘non-directive’37 to allow for 
expansion and detail (May 2001 p129). Question types included probing questions, 
specifying questions, follow-up questions, indirect questions and interpreting questions 
                                                
37 Directive questions require only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, while non-directive questions allow a more 
open response (May 2001). 
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(Bryman 2012). I prepared a set of core questions grouped under themes and altered the 
questions asked of each individual based on their organisation (see Appendix 1 for core 
themes). For example, only participants that confirmed experience with creating MEPC 
submissions were asked to explain this process. Additionally, data from interviews 
shaped and refined the questions asked in later interviews. Some participants asked for a 
list of questions in advance of the interviews and were sent a list drawn from the core 
themes (see Appendix 1). Each participant was informed that the list was not exhaustive 
and that they might be asked other questions depending on their responses.  
 
The interview normally started with either a question asking the interviewee to discuss 
the IMO in their own words or to detail their role in their organisation, and, their 
experience with the regulatory process. Encouraging the participants to elaborate on 
their own role or their opinions of the IMO (and by extension the MEPC) gave the 
interviews some momentum and flow and it also allowed me to pick up extra 
background details that would sometimes shape the interview. For example, when a 
Delegate told me that he had been in a Chairman position, I adapted my questions to 
include those regarding the role of a Chairman. 
 
In addition to adapting question sets to reflect an individual’s role and experience, the 
order of questions was varied in response to the interview content in an attempt to make 
the most of limited time. Some questions that seemed to reach a saturation point in 
earlier interviews were dropped from later ones in line with the semi-structured 
interview format (Fulcher & Scott 2011). Flexibility was particularly important in 
interviewing high-level professionals with busy schedules and limited time to give to 
the researcher. Excluding questions that had reached a point of saturation made time for 
questions that arose from new insights from the observation fieldwork.  
 
This study’s participants can be understood to be elite participants (Richards 1996)38. 
They work in offices all over the world and so the majority of interviews were carried 
                                                
38 In using this term, I refer to the work of Richards who defines ‘elites’ as, ‘a group of individuals, who 
hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is 
concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the 
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out over the phone. Skype was used when specifically requested by participants. All 
interviews were recorded39. In addition to recording and transcribing I took handwritten 
notes during the interviews. From the interviews 35 transcripts were generated, as one 
phone interview was too poor in quality to transcribe from the call. The challenges of 
carrying out these interviews will be discussed in the following section.  
 
4.7.3 Reflections on Interviews 
Interviewing as a method of data collection is acknowledged to have certain drawbacks. 
One concern is whether the interviewer is able to get a ‘true’ answer from a respondent. 
ANT considers knowledge to be a production of heterogeneous associations (Latour & 
Woolgar 1979). Thus, questioning whether an underlying truth was discovered, or even 
assuming that there is one, is in conflict with ANT’s epistemological position. 
Interviews, therefore can be seen as an association between researcher and participant 
that produces knowledge. This knowledge was then used to explain the MEPC 
collective. 
 
The main difficulties experienced with the use of semi-structured interviews were of a 
more practical nature. Due to the international context of the participants’ work, many 
interviews were conducted over the phone and the sound quality was not always 
optimum. Recording these international calls and from the phone’s loudspeaker meant 
that during transcription parts of the audio were unclear. In contrast, the recordings 
taken from interviews conducted face-to-face40 were much cleaner and therefore easier 
to transcribe. Face-to-face interviews are often argued to produce a better rapport 
between the interviewer and interviewee however recent studies suggest that there may 
                                                                                                                                          
public’ (Richards 1996, p199). If we switch ‘society’ for the ‘shipping industry’ then most of the 
participants interviewed fit with the definition of an elite when their position in a political process is 
considered.  
39 According to Silverman, ‘It goes without saying that your interviews should always be recorded’ 
(Silverman 2010, p199). In consideration of the choice to record, I drew insight from the discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of recording in May (2001, p137-138) and the discussion of the factors 
affecting the choice to record in Hayes & Mattimoe (2004). 
40 Only seven interviews could be conducted face-to-face. 
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be little difference between mediums (Sturges & Hanrahan 2004; Irvine et al. 2012; 
Vogl 2013). In the case of my research and in consideration practicalities, phone 
interviews were the only option for the majority of the interviews. Being elite 
professionals (Richards 1996) many of the participants were experienced with having 
in-depth discussions over the phone. Other than the practical differences, no difference 
in interview length, flow, rapport or depth of detail was experienced when conducting 
interviews by phone in comparison to the face-to-face interviews, which is important 
considering that the aim was to construct rich description.  
 
Despite the possible disadvantages and practical difficulties, interviews were a vital 
method for this research as they allowed me to reconstruct parts of the process that were 
unobservable and supplement my observations with essential detail. The following 
section moves on to explain the end of the data collection period. 
 
4.8 Finishing Data Collection 
The data collection period finished with a final interview on the 16th of December 2016. 
The MEPC meetings proved the best source of interview participants and so the data 
collection continued after the last meeting had been observed in order to interview the 
contacts made at MEPC70. Although practical time constraints were naturally a factor 
in the decision to end data collection (Saunders 2012), the main reason for finalizing the 
data collection was that I felt I had reached a point of ‘theoretical saturation’ where 
‘new data no longer suggests new insights into an emergent theory or no longer 
suggests new dimensions of theoretical categories’ (Bryman 2012, p421). In ANT 
terms, I felt that I had followed the actors and action enough to construct an account of 
the network responsible for developing control over shipping emissions. Indeed, once 
the analysis and write up process were started this decision was confirmed and it was 
clear that collecting four forms of data throughout 15 months have produced a wealth of 
data to draw upon as illustrated by Table 4.4 below. Following on from the description 
of methods and the amount of data collection, the next section focuses on ethical 
considerations for this research.   
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Table 4.4: Overview of Data Collected From September 2015 to December 2016 
Data Method/Type Data Amount 
Observation 11 days 
Observation Notes 309 A5 pages & 11 A4 pages 
Plenary Transcripts 3 
Researcher’s Photographs 171 
Official IMO Photographs 40 
Documents 130 
Key Documents 57 
Interviews 39 
Interview Transcripts 38* 
* One interview recording was too poor quality to transcribe and so notes were made instead. 
 
4.9 Ethical Considerations  
Prior to commencing fieldwork, ethical approval was sought and was granted (see 
Appendix 2 for Ethics Approval Letter). This section reflects on some of the ethical 
considerations of the data collection methods and the choices that were made to offset 
any concerns. The reflections are broken down by method with a final section on data 
confidentiality, as this was a particularly controversial issue in the context of the IMO.  
 
4.9.1 Observation  
During my observation of the meetings I experienced an ethical issue. Although I had 
permission to attend and observe meetings, not every Delegate was aware of my 
purpose. Although I was not a ‘covert’ observer in a traditional sense (Fulcher & Scott 
2011 p80; Silverman 2010 p203), I was often assumed to be a Delegate of the 
organisation that had registered me, rather than being known as an independent 
researcher. Over the course of the two MEPCs I was invited to sit with two Member 
State Delegations and in a WG I was seated next to an Industry Association. As a result 
I was also mistaken for members of these Delegations. In conducting an ethnography, a 
researcher must be mindful of their ethical choices and in order to avoid the deception 
associated with covert research I explained my research project to any Delegates I met 
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(Neyland 2007). While methods textbooks often draw clear lines between covert and 
overt research in practice, my position as a researcher was overt-unknown.  
 
I also faced an ethical choice about what should be included or excluded from the data, 
though this is a choice faced by most ethnographers (Neyland 2007). In moving around 
the room at break times I overheard snippets of Delegates’ conversations and although 
this type of conversation can often form part of the research data (Fulcher & Scott 
2011), due to the sensitivity of the issues, the elite level of the participants (Richards 
1996), and my role as a researcher being unknown to the majority of Delegates I 
decided to treat these conversations as private and confidential and did not record them 
as part of the data.  
 
4.9.2 Photographs  
The biggest ethical considerations for a researcher taking and using photographs is 
permission and anonymity of those depicted in images (Pauwels 2008). Under my 
registration as a Delegate I had permission to take photographs, which I confirmed 
through email. However, as I did not have every individual Delegate’s permission I 
avoided taking photographs featuring people by taking them early in the morning or 
later at night once the majority of Delegates had left. In making this choice I was not 
faced with issues of anonymity or ‘harm’ (ibid). The photos inserted in the thesis are the 
originals with no filters or editing other than resizing. In order to show the Plenary 
discussions with the Delegates I have used the IMO official photographs and credited 
them accordingly.   
  
4.9.3 Interviews 
All interviewees were asked to sign the University’s consent form, which detailed the 
project and requested to use their responses as part of the research. In each interview, I 
also asked consent to record, transcribe and quote from the interview. All interviewees 
agreed to be recorded and the majority agreed to being quoted. Non-quotable interviews 
were still transcribed in order to capture the detail of the interview. Permission was 
given to assign a random number to their transcript and identify them by this number 
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and an organisational-based title, for example, a Member State Delegate or a member of 
a shipping company. One or two interviewees requested a more ambiguous 
organisational title as they felt they might still be identifiable. The majority of the 
interviewees asked for their nationality and/or region of their organisation to be 
confidential as these were deemed identifiable information.  
 
While I had prepared to deal with issues of consent and anonymity with regards to the 
interview data, an unexpected issue arose from my method for selecting participants. As 
explained in Section 4.7.1, snowballing was used to attempt to travel through 
participants’ personal networks. However, this raised an interesting and unforeseen 
issue. When attempting to snowball I asked participants if they could think of anyone 
who would be good to interview and that would agree to be part of the research. Quite a 
few Delegates recommended people who had already been interviewed and offered to 
put me in touch with them. In order to protect the anonymity of the participants but 
avoid rejecting a generous offer I told them that I had been in contact with that person 
but due to anonymity reasons I couldn’t say whether or not they were part of the 
research. This was an effective approach to a problem that I had not anticipated. The 
issue itself also emphasized the success of the selection approach in that highly 
recommended participants were clearly key actors in the network.  
 
4.9.4 Documents  
The only ethical consideration in connection with the documentary data is the 
confidentiality of documents. Although submissions are only available to Delegates in 
advance of the meeting, they are uploaded to the publically accessible area of the 
IMODOCs after the meeting. The other documents quoted (i.e. meeting reports, Basic 
Document etc.) are also publically available. The only documents that remain 
confidential are the draft texts created, printed and altered during meetings. As such, 
none of these documents have been quoted in the thesis.  
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4.9.5 Meeting Confidentiality 
This section explains the ethical consideration of meeting confidentiality. In 
undertaking ethnography, it is not only important to reflect on how data is collected but 
also how it is presented, i.e. what to include or exclude (Neyland 2007). This was a 
particular issue for me as the aim of this study was to follow actors and produce rich 
and detailed descriptions of the meetings, which pointed towards using direct quotes 
from the meetings observed. However, the IMO meetings are conducted in private 
(IMO 2010) and this raised the issue of whether or not I should quote Delegations from 
the discussions. Although I had permission to observe through my registration with a 
Delegation this did not automatically allow me to quote from the discussions. I made 
the choice not to quote Delegates directly based on three considerations: the rules and 
practices of the IMO, a moment of controversy over discussion confidentiality at 
MEPC69 and the approach of other researchers in this area. I will now elaborate on 
these considerations.  
 
The terms and conditions laid out on the IMO website for members of the media 
attending meetings preclude named quotes without prior consent stating ‘named 
speakers will not be quoted without their prior consent’ (IMO 2018a). This webpage is 
aimed at members of the media and does not say anything about anonymous quotes or 
quoting for the purposes of research. However, the Organization’s own process of 
creating meeting reports involves a level of anonymising. No Delegations are quoted in 
meeting reports, unless they specifically ask their statement to be annexed in the report 
and instead summary comments are created for the collective.41 These practices along 
with the confidentiality of the meetings sensitized me to the issue of directly quoting 
Delegates from the discussions. 
 
                                                
41 Instead of quoting or even referring to individual Delegations the MEPC69 report states, ‘In the 
ensuing discussion, the following general comments were, inter alia, made:’ and then goes on to list the 
comments without naming the Delegations or quoting them directly. In WG reports generalized 
statements such as, ‘There was consensus in the group…’, ‘There was also general acknowledgement 
within the group…’, ‘Several Delegations raised the issue of…’ These statements are used in order to 
avoid directly connecting Delegations to lines of argument. 
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My sensitivity to quoting from meetings was increased at MEPC69 when one of the 
NGOs with Consulting Status at the IMO, disappointed with the result of the 
discussions on the Reduction of GHG Emissions composed and published a press 
release for their website before the end of the MEPC meeting. The piece was critical in 
tone and named specific Delegations, as the excerpt below illustrates: 
 
‘Meeting in London this week, the IMO was hopelessly split in a divisive debate with 
most of the so-called BRICS countries opposing the call from Pacific island nations, 
developed countries and much of the industry to develop a post-Paris work plan on what 
emissions cuts would be needed. 
The IMO’s new secretary-general was forced to intervene, appealing to governments 
not to kill the post-Paris discussion, while France warned that a failure to advance the 
plan would mean the UN shipping body would be “held up to ridicule on the very day 
the Paris agreement was being signed in New York.” In an extraordinary move that 
repudiated the call for action from its island neighbours, the Cook Islands aligned with 
China against developing a plan. The meeting broke up with no agreement and the 
entire issue was put off until the next meeting of the IMO’s environment committee in 
October.’ 
Excerpt from: ‘IMO scuttles shipping’s response to Paris climate deal’, (Transport & Environment 2016). 
 
The excerpt both names Member Delegations in connection with their arguments and 
positions in the discussions and directly quotes. The very next day this was met with a 
harsh response from some Member Delegates. In a statement to the Committee made by 
China, which they requested be appended to the meeting report, they said: 
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It is very regrettable that we have to point out that CSC misplaced and failed the trust 
we as Member States accord to it and abused the rights to attend IMO meetings.  
We are here to call upon fellow Member States and organizations with consultative 
status with this Organization, to cherish the spirit of cooperation that our Organization 
has been thriving upon to safeguard this Organization's credibility. We also kindly 
request the Secretariat to take effective measures to clear up the glaring influence 
caused by that slandering article. 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, p8) 
 
The Cook Islands made a second statement supporting China condemning the actions of 
the CSC, which was also appended to the report. These two statements have been 
presented in full in Appendix 3. As a result of the controversy at MEPC69 and in 
accordance with IMO protocols, I reflected on how best to write up the discussions.  
 
The final factor in the choice not to directly quote from meeting discussions was the 
approach taken by other researchers with the same issue. During post data collection 
conversations with the researchers I met at the IMO (see Section 4.4) I learnt that they 
had decided not to publish data connecting individual Member States with their 
positions in the negotiations. They made the choice not to publish this data due to the 
considerations of meeting confidentiality, sensitivity to the possibility of future access 
to meetings and Delegates and in response to the same moment of controversy I 
observed at MEPC69. This further supported and solidified my own decision.  
 
In summary, I decided not to directly quote or name delegations. However, in order not 
to lose the story completely I have chosen to summarise and paraphrase lines of 
arguments that were used in the discussion. Additionally, and in order to present key 
data, I made the decision to include quotes from the Chairman. He is a figure of 
neutrality and his role was an important feature for the narrative. Furthermore, the 
statements from China and the Cook Islands concern the naming and quoting of 
Member States only. Lastly, excerpts of submissions are presented in the data chapters 
and in general, the positions laid out in submissions are the positions that are upheld 
during the plenary discussions. In this way, I have dealt with a sensitive ethical choice 
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without losing the richness of the data. As the ethical considerations and choices for this 
research have now been presented, the chapter moves on to explain the data analysis. 
 
4.10. Data Analysis 
The aim of the data analysis was to produce thick description (Geertz 1973; Arnould & 
Wallendorf 1994; Tracy 2010; Corson et al. 2014) which would provide answers to the 
research questions and contribute to existing literatures. Data analysis was an iterative 
process as it was undertaken concurrently to the data collection and extending beyond 
the end of data collection. Upon a review of ANT studies, a theorized narrative was 
evident as an output of data analysis. Close reading, open and thematic coding have 
been applied in ANT studies to analyse data for example Rydin (2012), Gherardi & 
Perrotta (2011) and Egan (2014) respectively. Accordingly, I decided to undertake a 
close reading of the data and to supplement this with thematic coding and annotating. 
Indeed, I found myself drawn to thematic coding as a way to organise the data, or in the 
words of Law I used coding as a way to cut through the ‘ethnographic dazzle’ (Law 
2004, p108). The same method of data analysis was used across the documents, 
observation notes, Plenary and interview transcripts. As discussed in Section 4.5, 
photographs were used to supplement observation notes and then inserted into the 
narrative.  
 
A code is a label attached to a chunk of data that assigns meaning to the data (Miles et 
al. 2014). They can be simply descriptive, evocative or complex (ibid.). In addition to 
the thematic codes I added annotations and notes in the margins. The codes and 
annotations were inspired by descriptive and process coding (Miles et al. 2014). They 
included both the themes that emerged from the field itself as well as the application of 
ANT terminologies as theoretical framings for the data, for example the vocabularies of 
translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & Lee 2013). Coding, therefore, was a 
combination of inductive, where the codes were derived from the context, and deductive 
where the codes were drawn from ANT terminology and concepts (Miles et al. 2014). 
By applying inductive and deductive coding the research was analysed and theorized 
concurrently. This is the approach I took to deal with one of the paradoxical tensions of 
ANT mentioned in Chapter 4; to follow and listen to the actors (Latour 2005; Venturini 
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2012) while at the same time not simply repeating their rhetoric (Callon 1986a) or 
losing the language of the actors (Miettinen 1999). 
 
Coding has been criticized for causing ‘data fragmentation’ or the loss of context and 
narrative flow (Coffey & Atkinson 1996). I avoided over-coding or fragmentation by 
choosing not to engage in ‘sub-coding’, also known as second-order coding (Miles et al. 
2014). Recognizing that descriptive depth was the aim, I attempted to code and annotate 
in order to create a thorough explanation to answer the research questions. 
 
In addition to close reading, annotations and coding, writing up was also considered to 
be part of the analysis process. Writing about the data assisted in sorting and processing 
it and evaluating the emergent themes. In writing the data up, connections became 
stronger and new insights were made. Furthermore, writing is acknowledged as a way 
of thinking (Becker 1986), a method for the development and communication of ideas 
(Zerubavel 1999; Lofland et al. 2006) and ultimately as ethnography itself (Van Maanen 
2011). Therefore, writing up was an essential part of shaping the empirical and 
theoretical insights (ibid) and thus a form of analysis. 
 
4.11 Presentation of Data  
Due to the variety of data sources, the presentation of data is explained in this section. 
Observation notes are presented in the form of vignettes and photographs are presented 
in Appendix 4. Interviewees have been kept anonymous with only a number and 
organizational descriptor. I chose to combine anonymity of participants with a 
descriptor of their role, rather than use pseudonyms, because it gives more context to 
the data. This approach is consistent with other ANT studies (McGuirk 2000; Mouritsen 
et al. 2009; Eden 2009; Jollands et al. 2015) and a key study on the future role of the 
IMO in shipping (Lister et al. 2015).  
 
Quotations have been ‘cleaned’ where possible by removing verbal tics and word 
repetition (Copland et al. 2015). Quotes from interviews are consistently presented in 
italics while excerpts from documents have been copied (shortened if necessary) and 
presented in a box. In this way spoken and written quotes can be distinguished.  
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4.12 Heterogeneous Research 
Latour & Woolgar (1979) showed that knowledge is the production of a heterogeneous 
network of actors. As the aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to knowledge, it is 
important to acknowledge the heterogeneous assemblage that made the data collection 
and analysis possible. 
 
Over the course of the fieldwork, observation notes were written in notebooks, which 
were then scanned using a phone and backed up to a computer. The pdfs generated were 
then highlighted, coded and annotated using Adobe. Documents and transcripts were all 
analysed in the same way. Photographs were taken using a phone and backed up to a 
computer. Interviews were recorded using two devices in order to have a backup in case 
one recording failed. A Dictaphone was the primary method of recording and 
QuickTime Player on a laptop was the secondary method. International calls were made 
using a specific application to reduce the cost and a few of the interviews were 
conducted using Skype. Thus, this thesis is the constructed output of a heterogeneous 
assemblage of actors, i.e. devices, people and myself as a researcher. The following 
section reflects on the methodology as a whole and concludes the chapter.  
 
4.13 Reflections on the Methodology 
Qualitative research is not a simple, neat or linear process but one that is complex, 
evolving and often shaped by those being researched (Burgess 1984). The purpose of 
ethnography is not to, ‘generate predictive theory or generalize from specific case 
studies. Rather the goal is to be sufficiently grounded in context so as to be able to draw 
informed distinctions. Ethnographic case studies offer windows into constitutive 
processes’ (Corson et al. 2014, p24). Additionally the aim of ethnography is to produce 
knowledge that both reveals the shortcomings of existing works and then modifies these 
accordingly (Burawoy 1998; Corson et al. 2014). The methodology detailed in this 
chapter allowed me to fulfil the aim of ethnographic research and to create empirical 
and theoretical contributions. Broadly speaking, the methodology in connection with 
ethnographic writings was effective. I will now narrow my focus and reflect on the 
methodology in connection with ANT sensitizations.  
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Reflecting on the appropriateness of the methodology of ANT study is relatively 
difficult, partly because ANT is itself considered a methodology (Law 2004; 
Jóhannesson 2005; Law 2007a; Lukka & Vinnari 2017) or a collective of approaches 
(Cowan & Carr 2008; Fenwick & Edwards 2010) and partly because ANT writers tend 
to reject methodological rhetoric, for example, John Law views ‘Methodological 
cleanliness’ as an issue, rather than an advantage. He argues that research, ‘needs to be 
messy and heterogeneous, because that is the way it, research, actually is. And also…it 
needs to be messy because that is the way the largest part of the world is.’ (Law 2007, 
p3) 
 
On a broader level questions have been raised over whether it is even possible to 
generate a universal criteria against which to measure qualitative research (Symon & 
Cassell 2012). Many studies engage on some level with terms such as validity and 
reliability e.g. Cullinane & Cullinane (2013) and Lu et al. (2009) respectively. These 
terms however are the rhetoric of a different set of ontological and epistemological 
beliefs. To use them for an ANT study is to use a scale of ‘appleyness’ on a bunch of 
oranges. So how can we assess the effectiveness of an ANT methodology? The answer 
is within the theory itself. ANT offers a set of fundamental principles to apply in 
researching controversies and social phenomena (see Table 3.1). By assessing my 
engagement with these principles, I can offer a reflection on the quality of this ANT 
study.   
 
In the beginning of this chapter, I argued that ANT is open and non-prescriptive when it 
comes to methods and instead offers advice such as follow the actors, trace 
associations, and, ‘…just describe the state of affairs at hand’ (Latour 2005, p144). In 
terms of positioning, the researcher must be mindfully symmetrical (Callon 1986a; 
Latour 2005) and appreciate heterogeneous relationality (Law 1992; Latour 2005). In 
his explanation of how to deconstruct controversy Venturini (2012) expanded on these 
points listing his own seven recommendations: 
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‘1. you shall listen to actors’ voices more than to your own presumptions;  
2. you shall observe from as many viewpoints as possible;  
3. you shall not restrain your observation to any single theory or methodology;  
4. you shall adjust your descriptions and observations recursively;  
5. you shall simplify complexity respectfully;  
6. you shall attribute to each actor a visibility proportional to its weight;  
7. you shall provide descriptions that are adapted…and flexible.’  
(Venturini 2012, p800) 
 
Taking each recommendation in turn, I will now explain how I addressed these points in 
my methodology. By collecting multiple forms of data over a longitudinal time period I 
satisfied points 1 and 2. Additionally, listening to the actors was dealt with by 
naturalizing the principle of symmetry during thematic coding, being mindful to attend 
to agency, regardless of the source. This approach to analysis also dealt with point 6; 
attributing visibility in proportion to weight. 
 
Since ANT is known to be a collection of approaches rather than a unitary theory 
(Miettinen 1999) point 3 is addressed by the application of ANT itself. In Section 4.10 I 
explained that writing up was considered part of the analysis process and in this way I 
adjusted my descriptions and observations recursively. Point 5 is complex as Latour 
sees ANT as a reductionist theory that is also the first step to an irreductionist relational 
ontology (Latour 1996; Harman 2007). Furthermore Law argues that ‘clean’ accounts 
are not necessarily in alignment with our messy social worlds (Law 2004; Law 2007b). 
I therefore strived for detail and clarity when writing my description of the network in 
Chapters 5,6 and 7 rather than simplification (Venturini 2012) or hygiene (Law 2007b). 
Finally, point 7 is addressed by the contribution of this thesis to the application of 
existing ANT descriptors (Chapter 6) and of a new ANT descriptor (Chapter 7). 
 
Having covered the principles of applying ANT, it is also useful to reflect on what is 
considered a contribution using this theory, namely: 
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‘A contribution to ANT gently shifts the existing theoretical repertoire…as the 
theoretical repertoire shifts, it becomes possible to describe further, different cases, and 
to articulate so far untold events (relations, phenomena, situations).’ (Mol 2010, p261) 
 
The methods chosen were aligned with the theory and the data produced allowed the 
research questions to be answered over the course of three data chapters where the 
actors and associations that ‘produce’ the MEPC as a network are examined (Chapter 
5), the processes that bind these actors together are explored (Chapter 6) and new actor-
types emerge and are accounted for (Chapter 7). Through the articulation of the network 
in these three chapters the thesis builds towards a contribution that satisfies the criteria 
set out by Mol (2010). This methodology can therefore be regarded as an appropriate 
and effective application of the ANT although Section 8.6 in Chapter 8 will provide 
some reflections on the limitations of the study overall. The following chapter will 
begin the account of the MEPC network, as the first of three chapters presenting a rich 
ethnographical account of developing regulation for the shipping industry.   
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5. Disassembling the Actors and Associations of the MEPC: 
Spaces, People and Things 
 
The aim of this chapter is to address the research question, ‘What is the MEPC?’ In 
doing so the chapter disassembles the MEPC into categories and from within these it 
explains the roles of individual actors. By drawing on observation notes, interview 
quotes, documentary data and photographs in combination with ANT, this chapter 
accomplishes two things. Firstly, a thick description (Geertz 1973; Arnould & 
Wallendorf 1994; Tracy 2010; Corson et al. 2014) of the actors involved in the MEPC 
is offered which allows the macro MEPC assemblage to be understood from a micro 
level (Callon & Latour 1981) and as such contributes ethnographic detail which is 
missing from current literature on the IMO (as explained in Chapter 2). Secondly, the 
description assists in sensitizing the reader to the context. Understanding the actors is 
the first step in explaining this network and this preliminary empirical sketch provides 
the foundation for subsequent chapters.  
 
The structure of the account is purposefully congruent to the experience of the field 
itself. My first interaction in the field was with the IMO Headquarters, so this is 
explored first. People were the next actor-type I encountered and these are foregrounded 
for description following the section on spaces. The last part of the chapter explains the 
objects and technologies in the network.  
 
5.1 IMO Spaces: Principles and Practices, Embodied and Enacted  
This section explores the spaces of the IMO (and by extension, the spaces of the MEPC) 
as constitutive of the Organization and agentive in the process of making regulation. As 
with the chapter over all, the spaces are explored inline with how they were experienced 
during observation.   
 
5.1.1 IMO Building 
Contrary to the ever-mobile industry it governs, the IMO Headquarters does not move. 
Situated in Central London beside the River Thames, the building’s architecture is 
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unassuming, save for a ship’s bow protruding from the façade, implying its connection 
to the sea (See Appendix 4, Photos 1 and 2). The entire world’s fleet is governed from 
within this building. It is the epicentre for control-making over the international 
shipping industry. Meetings hosted in this building draw hundreds of Delegates from all 
over the world to discuss the problems facing the shipping industry and create ship-
shaped regulations42. 
 
5.1.2 The Foyer 
The vignette below presents my experience of entering the Headquarters for the first 
time43.  
 
I enter and speak with the receptionist, explaining that I am registered to attend the 
meeting with a Consulting Organisation. The receptionist tells me they will make me 
an access badge in the afternoon and offers to open the gate. I decline, asking if it is 
okay to take some photos of the model ships that are dotted around the room. It is. 
The ships are in glass cases and the room is very quiet. It feels like a museum – fitting 
for this historic industry. 
 
I have settled down on a red leather chair – part of a group at the side of the room. It 
is 8:10 in the morning. Black official cars slide solemnly down into underground 
parking as Delegates trickle in the main entrance. Two men meet. They shake hands 
and kiss cheeks. I hear multiple languages spoken – there is an international 
atmosphere. No one looks at me. 
 
I am intrigued by the position of the IMO on the waterfront. I am imagining the 
regulations created here flowing out of the building, down the river and out to sea.  
 
It is now 8:35am – I decide to go in.  
                                                
42 I use this wording to convey that the regulations must be tailored to the complex activity of the 
industry and so are shaped by and for Shipping. 
43 This vignette was created from the field notes. The writing was edited for brevity. 
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Inside the building, the foyer is very open. The floor is a shiny dark marble and the 
walls a lighter marble. A high-mounted screen informs Delegates what meetings are 
taking place and where. In the middle of the room a long desk faces the front windows. 
At both ends of this desk, turnstiles sanction entry to the heart of the building. A 
photographic identity card is required to proceed. A second reception-style desk sits in 
the near left corner of the room.  
 
A stairway slants across the room behind the middle reception desk as an escalator 
ascends behind it. A dramatic statue stretches out from under the escalator (depicted in 
Appendix 4, Photo 3). It appears to be a ship’s figurehead; it is a strong, Greco-Roman 
looking, bearded man. Across from this is another statue; the likeness of Queen Amina 
riding a rearing horse with her sword raised, which was donated to the IMO by the 
government of Nigeria (Appendix 4, Photo 4). The statues portray strength, history and 
the connections the IMO has to many different nations.  
 
This impression is further extended by more objets d’art. The edge of the room is lined 
with glass cases containing model ships; more gifts from governments showing their 
gratitude to the IMO. The different model ships represent various industry sectors and 
‘sail’ throughout the halls of the IMO. Photos 5 to 8 in Appendix 4 depict examples of 
gifted models. The model ships scale down an entire international industry and visually 
reproduce it, taking the invisible industry and making it visible (Cheng & Choy 2007; 
George 2013). Shipping is displaced from ‘out-there’, miniaturised, and brought inside 
for regulating. Echoing Star and Griesmar’s study of the museum, the foyer and open 
spaces of the IMO HQ capture and represent the international shipping industry in 
‘microcosm’ (1989, p391). 
 
While most of the objects are ships, some are cultural or historic objects (see Appendix 
4, Photos 9 to 12). The majority of the items are gifts from Member Governments. 
Plaques on the display cases express the gratitude of the donor to the Organization. The 
gifts make the spirit of international relations and cooperation physical in the IMO. In 
doing so they also encourage such practices. These artefacts both reflect and stimulate 
the international relations entangled in the work of regulating the shipping industry. The 
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objects are also a way to make one’s presence and membership clear and evident. For 
example, during the fieldwork, a beautiful mosaic fountain was donated by the 
government of Morocco (see Appendix 4, Photo 12) in advance of Morocco hosting the 
20th Conference of Parties, a UN conference for work on the environment. By donating 
gifts countries can create physical embodiments of their Membership, contribution and 
gratitude to the Organization.  
 
5.1.3 Plenary Room  
The Plenary Room is on the ground floor and is the main discussion room. Agenda 
items are discussed and Committee decisions are made in this room. Working Groups 
(WGs) split off from Plenary to go over specific details of agenda items while Plenary 
continues throughout the five days of the meeting. Plenary meetings have specific start, 
end and break times, which are mostly adhered to, to give the Translators44 breaks. My 
first impressions of the room are detailed in the vignette below: 
 
The room is vast. It is a long walk to the back, up a gentle slope. I pass long rafts of 
wooden desks, floating upon a carpet of blue. Delegates dot the room, individually 
working on laptops or standing in small clusters. Although people are talking, the 
sound in the room is suppressed. There is a quiet contemplative atmosphere, like a 
museum or an art gallery. I feel compelled to tread lightly as I move further in. A 
ship’s bell sits at the front beside the Chairman’s desk. There is nothing green here, 
no sense of land.  
 
Photos 13-15 in Appendix 4 show the Plenary room, though they do not fully capture 
the scale and size of it. There is a soft slope to the room, allowing equal viewing for all 
Delegates and attendees, reminiscent of a theatre. The desks are shaped in a languid 
half-moon. Two pathways cut them into three sections. The arrangement of the desks 
points everyone forward in the same direction. There is no sense of confrontation in the 
room, only cooperation. The names of the Member States (the Country Delegations) are 
                                                
44 Plenary discussions are translated into the six official languages of the IMO: Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish. 
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laid out in alphabetical order, enacting equality between Member States. The seating for 
Member States starts at the front of the room and ends where the seating for other 
Delegation types begins. On the desks there are white name cards with black writing, 
standing to attention and ready for use. At every desk is a microphone and headphones. 
Some chairs have no desks but between them the audio headphones are laid out. At the 
back and top of the room a long observation booth with large glass windows hovers 
over the last rows of desks and chairs. This observation booth provides extra seating for 
Delegations which are too large for their allotted space45. 
 
The Intergovernmental Organisations (IOs) are seated at the end of the Member States 
and beyond them the Consulting Organisations (COs) sit. The CO Delegations are not 
arranged alphabetically, either in the room itself or on the participant list of the meeting. 
Instead, I am told by a Delegate, they are arranged in chronological order according to 
when they gained consultative status at the Organization. This arrangement of Member 
States at the front-to-middle of the room and other organisations in the middle-to-back 
produces a physical representation of a procedural difference. Although the COs are 
able to make submissions and take part in discussions just like the Member States, only 
the Member States have the right to vote, although formal votes are rare. By putting 
these organisations at the back of the room, in a different order to that of the Members, 
the hierarchy between full Member and Consultative states is physically reflected and 
produced.  
 
The room is so vast that cameras and screens are mounted high to record and display the 
Delegates and Chairmen to those at back of the room. Unlike the halls of the IMO, 
which are populated by shipping paraphernalia gifted to the Organization, Plenary has 
little ornamentation. It fosters an environment for discussion with little distraction. The 
only ornamentation in the room is a large metal IMO symbol on the wall behind the 
Chairman and one below him on the front of his desk. An IMO flag stands to the left of 
the Chairman’s desk. In front of the Chairman on the desk is a ship’s bell. This bell is 
used to signal the start and end of sessions of discussion.  
                                                
45 Delegations are different sizes. During the meetings I attended, the smallest Delegation was one person 
and the largest was around 20-30 people. 
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The Chairman sits in the middle of the large desk. On his left sit members of the 
Secretariat and the Director of the Marine Environment Division. On his right the 
Secretary General sits beside him. Along from him sits the Director of Legal Affairs and 
External Relations Division, then the Director of the Maritime Safety Division and 
finally at the end, the Director of Conference Division. There is a second row of chairs 
behind these. The people who occupy these have no name cards. The Directors and 
Secretary General signal the connections between this Committee and the other part of 
the Organization’s discursive network. Above the Chairman’s desk the Translators’ 
offices sit high above the meeting, following the sweep of the room. During a meeting 
each office is populated by two Translators.  
 
This room is a physical enactment of the principles of Equality and Consensus held by 
the Organization. When seated, every person faces the Chairman. The Plenary room 
reinforces the aim of the Organization, to progress en masse together to achieve 
Consensus. This is further shown in the discussion where Delegates very rarely address 
each other directly and instead channel their comments respectfully through the 
Chairman. The layout of the room also serves to reinforce the important role of the 
Chairman, which will be discussed in Section 5.2.3. The Plenary room is a space where 
confrontation is physically minimized and cooperation physically encouraged. Thus it 
both reflects and stimulates the values of the Organization. The following section 
discusses the rooms for the WGs.  
 
5.1.4 Other Discussion Rooms  
During the fieldwork, time was spent observing WG discussions in two rooms; 
Committee Room 9 and Room 11-13. Both of these rooms differed to Plenary in that 
they were rectangular and the seating was level and arranged in straight lines, rather 
than on an incline and with a curve as the Plenary room was. Room 11-13 is shown in 
Appendix 4, Photo 16. Choice of room for a WG can reflect the importance or 
contentiousness of an agenda item, for example during MEPC70 the biggest committee 
rooms were being used for discussion of the Ballast Water regulations and the Fuel 
Consumption Data Collection System (hereafter DCS). This meant that the WG for 
Reduction of GHG Emissions was put in Room 11-13, which had a lower seating 
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capacity. The room filled up quickly as the Delegates came from Plenary to the 
committee room. At one point, after the discussion had started, the Delegates 
representing India came in and found that there was no space left next to a microphone. 
They asked Brazil to speak for them on their behalf and with some rearranging they 
were able to get into a position with access to a microphone. This highlights the 
difference between Plenary and other committee rooms. Contrary to Plenary, the WG 
rooms are not laid out as strictly. If the WG meeting is intercessional and the Secretariat 
has the time to lay out alphabetical names they will, however during the MEPC, 
Members and COs would take their name-cards out of a box and sit in almost any order 
(see photo 16). Equally the COs were not strictly limited to the back of the room, as 
they were in Plenary. Their inclusion in the main body of the Members was also 
reflected in the discussion when they contributed more than they did in Plenary. During 
Plenary, the COs can make interventions but the practice appeared to be to wait until the 
Member States had had their chance to speak before CO Delegates were called on. 
Exceptions to this were made for some of the biggest consulting organisations, for 
example ICS, BIMCO and WSC46 however equally, at one point the Chairman stated 
that he would not take comments from consulting bodies until the member states had 
finished. 
 
The WGs are more informal than Plenary. Participant 28, from a Member State 
Delegation said that Plenary was often about presenting positions by ‘reading prepared 
statements’ while the WGs are a space where ‘interactive exchange’ takes place. 
Participants also told me that Plenary is more of a political space while the WGs are 
more technical, which is one of the reasons the COs make more frequent interventions 
in WGs. As with Plenary, the spatial arrangement of the supplementary committee 
rooms embodies the discussion style. The WG discussions are more free-form, have a 
faster pace and more input from COs which is reflected by the unstructured (and at 
times chaotic) seating and shape of the room. Equally the Delegates all face forward to 
                                                
46 ICS is the International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO is the Baltic and International Maritime Council 
and WSC is the World Shipping Council. All of these Organisations are Industry Associations and 
represent the interests of their industry members.  
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the Chairman, emphasizing the aim of achieving Consensus. The following section 
discusses the role of the Headquarters as part of the network. 
 
5.1.5 Role of the Headquarters in the MEPC Network 
The Headquarters reflects the essence of the work; it makes the invisible industry 
visible and promotes international cooperation to produce regulation. The discussion 
spaces embody the principles of Consensus and Equality and encourage their practice, 
yet each Plenary and WG rooms also differ in their layouts as much as their discussion 
styles. The Spaces reflect and reproduce the values and work of the Organization.  
 
The Headquarters provides a place where Member States and Consulting Organisations 
from all over the world can come together and discuss regulation in-person. Though the 
role of spaces may seem simple, the IMO HQ is an essential facilitative actor in the 
network that assembles to produce regulation, which is then implemented in the global 
industry. Furthermore many participants emphasized the importance of face-to-face 
discussions in the break times for understanding positions. The Delegates see a large 
part of their own role as trust and network-building, which will be discussed in Section 
5.2.5. The physical forum of the IMO HQ allows them to construct their relations 
during break times and in the margins of the meeting. In keeping with the symmetry 
encouraged in application of ANT, this section has highlighted the agential qualities of 
the IMO HQ and its role to embody and encourage the work, principles, practices and 
values of the Organization. The different ‘peoples’ of the IMO will now be presented 
and their roles in the network discussed. 
 
5.2 People in the MEPC 
This section will focus on the people of the MEPC, concentrating on the Chairmen, the 
Secretariat and the Delegates as the key actors in the development of regulation. In 
exploring and describing these actors, the process of creating international regulation 
for the shipping industry is explained. In order to understand the role of people in the 
MEPC, the inner workings of both Plenary and WGs must first be explained.  
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5.2.1 Plenary Discussion 
The committee meeting begins and ends with all the Delegates present in Plenary. It is 
where the agenda items are discussed. The ‘terms of reference’ and issues for discussion 
in WGs are outlined and agreed. The outputs and decisions of the WGs are evaluated in 
Plenary before final decisions are made. WGs are released from Plenary throughout the 
week, while Plenary continues simultaneously.  
 
Discussion in Plenary follows an agenda, which is produced in advance of the meeting 
and uploaded to IMODOCs. Any changes to this agenda are agreed at the start of the 
MEPC meeting. At the start of each agenda item the papers submitted under that item 
are all introduced, excepting Information Papers (these will be described in Section 
5.3.3). Each submission is introduced by the sponsoring Delegation, or, in the case of 
co-sponsorship, they are introduced by a Delegate from one of the sponsoring 
Delegations. Like a verbal abstract, the introduction summarizes the main points of the 
paper. They are speech-like and often pre-written. 
 
There are hundreds of submissions for an MEPC and introductions allow the Delegates 
to focus on the content of a particular text and orientate themselves for the coming 
discussion.  When the introduction of submissions concludes, the Chairman declares the 
floor open for comments. Name cards are raised and discussion commences47. When a 
Delegate speaks it is termed an ‘intervention’. Interventions were generally made in 
English however they can be made in one of the six official languages of the IMO. 
Equally the discussion can be listened to in any of the six languages by switching 
through the channels on the headsets provided at every chair. Despite this, a high level 
of English is necessary, as WGs discussions are not normally translated.  
 
When a Delegation wishes to make an intervention they raise their name card, 
sometimes called a ‘flag’. They keep it raised, until they are spotted and noted by either 
the Chairman or a member of the Secretariat. At this point they slot the ‘flag’ back into 
                                                
47 Sometimes cards were raised during the introductions themselves but comments were only taken when 
the Chairman officially opened the floor.  
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the desk vertically instead of horizontally. The name card then functions as a 
placeholder in the queue.  
 
During the discussion the Chairman attempts to invite interventions from Member 
States roughly in the order that the flags were raised. If many flags are raised 
simultaneously, as was often the case at the opening of an agenda item or in times of 
controversy, the order of interventions is at the discretion of the Chairman.  
 
The pace of Plenary was generally slow and steady. Interventions were polite, 
especially on the first day, when many Delegates took a few seconds to greet the crowd, 
thank the Chairman, make a comment about an international event or include a 
combination of all of these in their intervention. The first round of Plenary interventions 
sound like short speeches. In interviews with Delegates they commented that Plenary 
can seem a little pre-scripted because Delegates are laying out their positions from pre-
written interventions. When a Delegate speaks the cameras cut to them and they are 
shown on the multiple screens at the front of the room. Delegates did not address other 
Delegates directly in the discussion. They do however name other Delegations with 
which they wish to align themselves. Even in times of controversy and tension the tone 
of the meeting remained diplomatic and polite. 
 
If a discussion showed no sign of ending, some Delegations shortened their 
interventions to the bare minimum. This was framed as an expression of support for the 
position of a group of Delegations that have shown a common position in the 
discussion. For example a Delegate might say, ‘We wish to align ourselves with the 
comments made by X, Y and Z’. On the other hand, some Delegations were interrupted 
by the Chairman and asked if they could make their intervention shorter48.  
 
                                                
48 At one point during the MEPC70 this did not work. The Delegate kept to their ‘script’. Their 
intervention ran significantly beyond a normal intervention length so much so that the Chairman, who 
had asked the Delegate to shorten their intervention, slumped his body forward in a humorous display of 
fatigue. This drew murmured laughter from the crowd and highlighted the need for efficiency due to the 
amount of work that must be covered in the short time of the meetings. 
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The first four days of Plenary are spent working through the agenda items and the last 
day is spent checking the MEPC report. At the end of the meeting there is a round of 
applause and Delegates express their gratitude for the work done by the Chairman and 
the Secretariat. 
 
5.2.2 Working Groups 
As previously mentioned discussions in WGs were less formal and less structured than 
Plenary. Interventions were still polite and directed to the Chairman. However, in WGs 
Delegations do not have scripted interventions. Instead, they have general positions and 
make their interventions in line with these. The Delegates must therefore be more 
adaptive in WGs. Occasionally different interventions in quick succession result in 
separate discussions happening almost simultaneously, yet also punctuating each other. 
A few times when the discussion became too fragmented the Chairman halted the 
interventions and disentangled the lines of discussion.49  
 
Plenary and WG discussions have different aims as a Member Delegate explained: 
‘Plenary is more like the political side of things and working group goes into the 
technicalities…’ (Participant 35: Member State Delegate). Many interviewees echoed 
this summation. The WG discussion must work through details and drafting regulations. 
This involves thinking through the application in practice, which is where the 
interventions of the COs can be most helpful. The shipping industry is incredibly 
complex and diverse in its activity and different associations representing different 
sectors are able to remind the group of the constraints their sector works under. For 
example, in the discussions of the DCS at the IEEWG, measuring fuel consumption 
raised the following issues (among others):  
• Should the measurement of a journey be port-to-port, berth-to-berth, pilot 
on/pilot off or something else? 
• How can service ships be included, they don’t travel great distances but burn 
fuel in their service activities? 
                                                
49 As an observer, it was vital to stay focused at risk of becoming lost entirely. 
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• What happens if a ship anchors in a temporary berth and is then moved? If the 
port is long, this is more fuel, but should it be accounted for? 
• Should data about cargo carried be included? Should a proxy be used? 
• How confidential should the IMO fuel consumption database be? 
• When should the recording of fuel consumption start and end?  
• How should the data be verified? 
 
Another feature of WGs that did not occur in Plenary was in-meeting huddles where the 
official discussion was suspended and Delegates rose from their seats to gather together 
and speak directly to each other without the microphones or Chairman. This will be 
discussed further in Section 5.3.1. 
 
By describing the Plenary and WG discussions, the above acts as a context from which 
the individual roles of people and things can now be foregrounded and discussed. 
 
5.2.3 Chairmen  
The Chairmen50 are essential actors in MEPC meetings and this section will shed light 
on their role in the network, both in preparation for and during meetings. There are three 
levels of Chairman in the MEPC: 
1. Chairman of the MEPC who chairs Plenary  
2. Vice Chairman of the MEPC who can take over if for any reason the MEPC 
Chairman cannot fulfil his role  
3. Chairmen of the WGs 
 
One of the Chairmen interviewed stated that a key part of the work is developing a text. 
Whether this is a meeting report in Plenary or draft regulation, amendment, report or 
plan in a WG, the aim of chairing a meeting is to produce a written output representing 
a consensus made through discussion. In order to fulfil this aim, a Chairman has a 
multi-faceted role.  
 
                                                
50 The word Chairman is used to denote both male and female chair-people.  
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The Chairman’s work starts before the meeting with extensive preparation. Chairmen 
must read all of the submissions and are briefed by the Secretariat about the issues in 
the upcoming meeting. In addition, emails and in-person discussions on the ‘margins’ 
of other IMO meetings and external events were also used to gather Member States’ 
views. As such, Chairmen are able to build up knowledge of the positions of Member 
States in advance of the meeting, which allows them to better direct the Committee or 
WG towards agreement. One of the Chairmen interviewed also added that in 
preparation of the meeting he, along with the help of some Member States and the 
Secretariat prepared a document to get the WG discussion started: 
 
‘…in preparation of that base text we incorporated various views from various 
countries so that…before starting the discussion of the working group, the base text had 
to some extent accommodated various views...’ (Participant 25: A Chairman) 
  
In creating this document the Chairman was able to increase his knowledge of Member 
States’ thoughts and positions, which in turn prepared him for the interventions that 
came forward in the discussion. 
 
Once the discussion begins the Chairmen of both Plenary and WGs must patiently 
preside over the discussion, orchestrating cooperation and agreement. Chairmen must 
maintain neutrality while hearing from any Delegations that wish to speak. While doing 
this, they are continually filtering through interventions looking for commonalities that 
can be synthesized into an overall agreement:  
 
‘…Chairman should be kind of neutral on anything and we should hear views from 
various countries as far as possible and as long as possible, and you see normally, even 
at the MEPC, there are more than 60 countries who join the meeting, so we should 
consider there are nearly 60 views on a specific topic and…it’s very difficult to 
coordinate one thing…[in] the case of the IMO it was very difficult and a very tough 
job.’ (Participant 25: A Chairman) 
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One of the most important skills of a Chairman is the ability to recognise and 
acknowledge viewpoints from many different sources, both Member States and COs 
and from these distil, first the essential positions of each speaker, and then the points of 
alignment overall. In the words of one Delegate: 
 
‘…I think a lot of the, kind of the dynamics in the room will ultimately turn to how the 
meeting is run and the role of the Chair. I think the role of the Chair within the Plenary 
discussions or working group…is very important and having a Chair that is trusted and 
that will respond to Delegates concerns…and who is deft at seeing where the 
convergences are among countries statements and countries positions, uh, I think is 
quite important.’ (Participant 28: Member State Delegate)  
 
The interventions themselves can be exceedingly complex. In discussions, particularly 
in Plenary, once the main positions have been vocalized Delegates speaking later will 
often shorten their interventions to a simple statement of support for the Delegations 
with which they align. For example, ‘We would like to align with our distinguished 
colleagues from X, Y and Z’ or ‘We support the statements made by X and Y’. Although 
this is an effective way to shorten discussion time by avoiding re-stating arguments 
made in previous statements, it can make the discussion difficult to follow. The 
Chairman must be able to take short but effective notes, not only of the different 
positions on the issue, but of the Delegations that hold this position. During observation, 
Chairmen seemed to keep a tally of the discussion in terms of support and opposition. It 
takes great skill to keep track of the discussion. Often Delegates name multiple 
alignments in their interventions, some with other Delegates that spoke 15-20 minutes 
earlier. This is also one of the reasons that familiarity with the general positions of 
Member States and having an idea of how the meeting will play out during preparation 
is vitally important.  
 
During analysis of Plenary transcripts it became apparent that interventions, especially 
those early in a discussion in Plenary, often make more than one point on a particular 
issue. This means that when Delegates align with other Delegations, it can be unclear 
exactly what they are aligning with as each of the Delegations in their list had some 
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points of difference in their intervention. Some Delegations would, for example, express 
full support for the contents of a submission while other Delegations would express 
support with comments, exceptions and concerns. If these two types of intervention are 
included in one alignment list, it is difficult to discern the exact position of the 
Delegation in question. Indeed, with the interventions being speech-like in the 
beginning and Plenary discussions lasting hours and straddling coffee and lunch breaks, 
keeping track of all points of agreement and conflict is challenging.  
 
According to one Delegate, a skilled Chairman should also be able to create a discursive 
environment that promotes problem solving stating that it: 
‘…comes back to one of the skills of the chairperson…if you just go around the room 
and one person says X and some person says Y and one person says Z, and the person 
running the meeting just says thank you, thank you, oh what are we going to do? You 
need somebody to try and create a problem-solving atmosphere’ (Participant 15: A CO 
Delegate from an Industry Association) 
 
In addition to the challenge of understanding and mapping positions and bringing the 
Committee or WG to an agreement, Chairmen face difficult time constraints with the 
meeting lasting only 5 days (or less in the case of WGs). Plenary and WG Chairmen 
have the authority to deny the floor to a Delegate if they feel that their interventions had 
become inappropriate or irrelevant. In the IEEWG attended in September 2015 a 
Delegation made repeated interventions stating an apparently unhelpful and seemingly 
irrelevant point. For the sake of progress the Chairman ultimately refused to give the 
Delegation the floor and instead asked them to provide a statement that could be 
annexed to the report. Equally in Plenary discussions on day five of MEPC69, as the 
Committee were going through the report, some Delegations made interventions that the 
Chairman felt were opening up the issues themselves rather than commenting on the 
accuracy of the summary points of the report. He asked Delegations not to re-open 
discussions that were closed. On balance, however, this was rare and Delegates were 
given the floor repeatedly, especially in WGs. They would often express their gratitude 
to the Chairman, saying, ‘Thank you for letting us come in on this again’ or similar 
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wordings. This highlights the authority of the Chairman and also his responsibility to 
orchestrate the negotiations in relation to time, progress, relevancy etc.  
 
The Chairmen need patience and energy. They must be able to listen to hundreds of 
interventions, sorting through Plenary-style speeches, or the more informal WG 
interventions, to the core position of the Delegation while simultaneously using 
commonalities to move the network towards agreement. When all the Delegates leave 
the discussion to go out to dinner or return to their hotel rooms to sleep, the Chairmen 
and the Secretariat can still be busy creating new documents, either new drafts of 
documents under discussion with the day’s amendments and agreements factored in or 
the reports of the meetings. During a brief conversation at MEPC70, the Chairman of 
the WG recounted that he had only managed a few hours of sleep and that the Plenary 
Chairman had only an hour. The Chairman’s job can be a low sleep, high focus 
marathon.  
 
There are differences between Plenary and WG chairmen. In WGs the Chairman will 
hear from a subset of the Committee in specific and technical detail. In Plenary the 
Chairman hears from any number of the Member States and additional COs who wish 
to make interventions across approximately 15-20 different agenda items51. In essence 
the Plenary Chairman deals with volume, variety and overviews and the WG Chairman 
deals with depth, detail and drafting.  
 
The WG Chairman has the discretionary authority to allow or even suggest in-meeting 
huddles and splinter groups. These groupings were seen as actors due to their agency in 
the process and will be discussed in Section 5.3.1. Informal huddles during the WG 
allow Delegates to assemble together and communicate their positions, opinions and 
ideas directly. The Chairman does not orchestrate these, he waits until they are 
concluded and then begins the formal discussion again. Both huddles in the meeting 
room and sub-groupings during breaks can help to resolves points of controversy in the 
discussion. In this way the Chairman mobilizes informal groupings to resolve conflicts.  
                                                
51 Some of the agenda items don’t require an in depth discussion, for example agenda item 1 is the 
adoption of the agenda. 
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Thus far, this section has examined the role of the Chairman as an orchestrator of 
cooperation and progress within strict time limits. In order to fully understand how 
Chairmen carry out this role, their tactics through the negotiations must be examined. 
Plenary and WG Chairmen tend to have different approaches to meet their aims. A 
discussion session on an agenda item may naturally converge to a point of Consensus. 
However, if it does not the Chairman has three main tactics to produce agreement. One 
approach is to appeal directly to the Members themselves to compromise. During the 
contentious agenda item of Reduction of GHG Emissions in MEPC69 and 70 the 
Chairman was observed employing this approach in an attempt to progress past a 
discursive deadlock. He couched his appeals to the Delegates in a personable way, 
asking for ‘help’ to reach agreement and humorously showing disappointment at 
persisting disagreement. There were three general responses to the appeals of the 
Chairman. One was for the discussion to continue with Delegates stuck in opposition. 
However, the Delegates, like the Chairman, are driven by a need to achieve progress 
through Consensus and the more common response to such appeals was for Delegations 
to propose a new direction or to simply compromise their own position52, yielding 
slightly to create agreement.  
 
A second tactic for the Chairman is to suggest a compromise himself. This occurred in 
MEPC69 when the Chairman created a summary of the discussion and the room was 
split over the last two points of the summary. Some Delegations wanted both points to 
remain in the summary making them action points and other Delegations wanted both 
points removed. As a compromise the Chairman suggested including one point. This 
halfway manoeuvre produced an acceptable level of Consensus and as such, it was 
carried out.  
 
                                                
52 This option is only open to Delegates who have authority to do so. During interviews I learned that the 
amount of autonomy of the Delegates differs between Delegations and between agenda items. Some 
Delegations, though accountable to their Government, have the autonomy to adapt on the spot and others 
are constrained by their Government and must have permission before changing their position on an 
issue.  
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Time has already been discussed as being a limiting factor on the negotiations. The third 
tactic for a Chairman is to use time to pressure the Delegations to reach and agreement. 
This can be done by either frequently referring to the time passing balanced against the 
progress level or the denial of breaks and extension of discussion hours to start earlier 
and finish later. Coffee breaks were not only withheld in the face of poor progress, 
Chairmen would sometimes frame them as a bargaining chip; reaching agreement on an 
issue would allow for a coffee break which becomes a highly desired time as Delegates 
both need a break from the long complex discussions and also the opportunity to speak 
directly to other Delegations in margin negotiations. 
 
The extension of discussion hours was a tactic that the WG Chairman employed. WG 
hours were moved as necessary to accommodate progress. During MEPC70, the WG 
negotiations were fraught with controversy and conflict over the possible formation of a 
new type of group discussion, Roadmap dates, level of ambition and the disharmony 
between regulatory principles (to be discussed in Chapter 7). In order to achieve 
agreement, the hours of the WG had to be extended. The first day of the WG ended at 
around 10pm and the second and longest day commenced at 8:30am and finished at 
around 1am.  
 
One Member Delegate who had been a part of the WG stated in interview,  
‘…he [the Chairman] consciously put pressure on people by simply time, hoping also 
that people give in and are more ready to compromise later…This is certainly a 
technique if not a tactic.’ (Participant 29: Member State Delegate) 
 
Throughout this section, the role and techniques of a Chairman have been described. In 
order to more fully depict his position in the network the following diagram was 
created. 
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Figure 5.1: The Role of the Chairman 
 
In Figure 5.1, the flow of the discussions can be seen moving from the Delegates 
(green) who make interventions to present their positions and information through the 
Chairman (black) who synthesises these interventions into compromises, summaries 
and agreements (red) which in turn flow back to the Delegates for further input. The 
cycle continues until Consensus is reached.  
 
In summary Chairmen are the mediators of the discussion (Latour 2005). From their 
background knowledge of previous meetings, and their preparation for the current 
meeting, they generally know the ‘sounds’ each Delegation will make. Using the 
discretion available and their own skills, they gradually orchestrate the discussion, 
bringing the Delegates as far as possible, to a harmonious Consensus. In doing so, they 
are not passive vessels through which the interventions filter; they are active 
constructors, mediating Delegates and the Secretariat to build agreement, and by 
extension, to create regulation.  
 
5.2.4 The Secretariat  
The Secretariat works permanently in the IMO Headquarters. They are the neutral 
assistants to the Member States. This section describes the work of the Secretariat 
before, during and in-between meetings.  
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One of the members of the Secretariat explained the work done with submissions in 
advance of the meetings. They make sure the incoming submissions meet the standards 
of the Organization through formatting and checking for errors. They then make 
submissions available online through the IMODOCs platform. In addition to working 
with documents the Secretariat must work with the Chairmen: 
 
‘…we prepare the meeting for the various chair persons of the meeting in terms of their 
briefing so that they are aware of all the various issues that have been raised by the 
various documents that have been submitted, so for example at an MEPC meeting we 
have over 150 documents submitted at the last session so we have to try and organise 
the meeting over 5 days to try and cover all those documents under various agenda 
items…’ (Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat) 
 
Thus, in addition to assisting the Chairman to prepare the meeting, the Secretariat also 
organise the meeting itself. They provide agendas, updates, schedules, advice and 
essentially ‘…try and ensure smooth running as best we can at the meetings…’  
(Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat)  
 
During the discussions, in both Plenary and WGs, members of the Secretariat assist the 
Chairman by helping with the order of interventions and providing advice when 
required. At the meetings observed, the members of the Secretariat were seen to type 
notes, draft amendments, guidelines, reports and then print and disseminate these drafts. 
Participant 36, a Member of the Secretariat explained their role as supporting the 
Chairman by taking ‘live’ notes of the discussion in order to create the meeting report or 
the draft text which becomes the regulatory instrument for implementation.  
 
For the majority of the discussions observed the Secretariat were silent. Exceptions 
included pre-scheduled moments where they provided reports and updates from other 
Committees, the Council or external events at the start of an agenda item. When 
advising the Chairman they mostly spoke to him directly without the use of the 
microphone. The Chairman then relayed their advice or message to the group. Equally 
the Delegates rarely spoke to the Secretariat during discussion. However, there were a 
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few times during observation when the Secretariat spoke directly to the Delegates in 
WG discussions. Examples from MEPC70 include: 
• Informing a Delegate that the conventional practice in writing advanced dates is 
to use seasons when the exact date of the future MEPC is not known. 
• Answering questions about the possibility of creating a stand-alone group to 
address GHG emissions as was proposed by one Delegation during Plenary 
discussion.  
• Discussion of the possibility of the Secretariat organizing a fourth IMO GHG 
Emissions Study.  
 
These examples highlight three different dimensions of Secretariat input. The first 
shows the level of consistency and knowledge of practices that the Secretariat brings to 
the meeting and specifically to the drafting process. The second shows how they serve 
the Members. When asked what a stand-alone group would look like, the member of the 
Secretariat could only respond that responsibility lay with the Delegates to decide what 
they want and then the Secretariat would be able to facilitate it. The last example also 
highlights their facilitative role but also that they can organise projects at the request of 
the Delegates.  
 
Essentially the Secretariat spend their meeting time organizing and assisting. One 
interviewee emphasized their neutral ‘facilitating role’ while another noted that the 
Secretariat ‘…provide a degree of continuity to the proceedings…’ (Participant 24: A 
member of the Secretariat). Due to the responsibilities associated with their role, they 
work long hours, keeping the process going with their administrative expertise and 
constant support for the Chairman and the Delegates. As with the Chairman, their role 
requires patience and endurance during the long hours of complex discussion. 
 
In addition to their facilitative role, one of the interviewees commented on their liaising 
role between Member States: 
‘…we are party to information that isn't shared widely by various Member States that 
enables us to sort of coordinate with other Member States views and try and work out 
how we can come to a compromise on various issues and that again is part of the role.’  
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(Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat)  
 
The interviewee then expanded on this by explaining that when Member States are not 
able to come to an agreement, the Secretariat can attempt to mediate: 
‘…one way is for the Secretariat to facilitate that process is to discuss the issues on a 
bilateral basis rather than, and again Member States might not want to share particular 
things with the wider body…we will try and help…play go between…that's part of our, 
if you like diplomatic role…’ (Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat) 
 
In addition, between IMO meetings the Secretariat also travel to different organisations 
and events to represent the work of the IMO/MEPC: 
‘…we have a representational role where we try and explain the work we are doing 
because often it's difficult for Member States to go out and talk about the work of the 
IMO…they're free to do that of course, you know when issues have been agreed but 
when things are work in progress…it's easier for the Secretariat to sort of represent the 
status of negotiations and obviously put that very much in…you know, neutral lines...’ 
(Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat). 
 
The Secretariat functions as a conduit; both presenting the work of the IMO 
Committees to external Organisations and then reporting the outcomes of other 
regulatory fora to the Committee. In this way they associate the work of the IMO to the 
wider governmental networks of the U.N. and other bodies. 
 
In summary the Secretariat provides support, advice, consistency, administrative 
services, and generally organise the work done at the IMO. They assist the Chairmen 
with their roles and can also work with Members directly to create Consensus. At the 
same time they provide a consistency between meetings, between Committees and link 
the internal work of the Organization to external governance fora. They are associative 
actors. Assigning this term conveys the role of the Secretariat to create connections; 
connections between meetings, Members, Committees and Sub-Committees and even 
links to external organisations. Through their associative work they create the 
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consistence and hence durability of the network. The next section moves on to discuss 
the Delegates and Delegations.  
 
5.2.5 Delegations and Delegates 
The Delegates are key drivers of the work of the MEPC. This section will begin by 
explaining types and construction of Delegations and then go on to discuss the work of 
Member State Delegates and CO Delegates in particular. There are different types of 
Delegation that attend the IMO MEPC including Member State Delegations, Associate 
Members53, representatives from the UN and Specialized Agencies54, intergovernmental 
representatives55 and observers from non-governmental organisations, which are also 
known as Consulting Organisations.  
 
Delegations vary in size, with the biggest Member States having around 20-30 and the 
smallest just one Delegate. Larger Delegations can have their own internal hierarchy 
including having a head of Delegation, representatives, alternatives, advisers and 
observers56. The size of Delegations caused some contention in MEPC69 and 70. A 
small Delegation took issue with the formation of a new WG (decided at 69 and 
initiated at 70) for the agenda item: Reduction of GHG Emissions. Although the number 
of WGs at the MEPC is capped at five, having simultaneous discussions is problematic 
for smaller Delegations consisting of only one or two Delegates and they must prioritize 
what they attend. It is important for Delegations to have a representative in Plenary 
because this is where decisions are finalized. The outputs of WGs are formally agreed in 
Plenary, however, directions, terminology and regulations can be defined in the WG 
discussions so it is preferable to be able to attend all WG sessions at the IMO. By not 
attending the WGs, small Delegations are not able to embed their own interests and 
                                                
53 For example at MEPC69 the attendees under this category were the Faroes and Hong Kong.  
54 Examples from MEPC69 for this category include the UNFCCC, World Meteorological Organization 
etc.  
55 Examples from MEPC69, for this category include the European Commission, Maritime Organisation 
for West and Central Africa, League of Arab States, International Mobile Satellite Organization etc. 
56 This means that Member Delegates can invite members of industry as their experts, despite having the 
Consulting Organisations as part of the Committee.  
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ideas in the output and instead they must bring these issues to bear in Plenary which can 
in turn slow the process overall.  
 
The type of Delegates on a Delegation can vary, for example some Member State 
Delegates included Diplomats and Ambassadors and Members of Transport Ministries 
among others. They also had differing backgrounds including political, legal, 
environmental, scientific, technical and seafaring or combinations of these. The 
selection of Delegates appears to be at the discretion of the Member State or 
organisation in question. In interviews with Delegates, they explained that Member 
State Delegations also vary in the autonomy they have at the meeting to change their 
positions on issues. Some Delegates have the authority to adapt and evolve their 
positions at the MEPC to a certain extent while others have much less autonomy. One 
Member Delegate interviewed said they were sure that one large Delegation is not able 
to change their position during the meeting and so, ‘it’s difficult to negotiate with them.’ 
 
5.2.5.1 Member State Delegates  
Member State Delegations are the most important Delegations; they represent national 
Registries and take priority over the other Delegations that form the Committee. One 
participant summed his role as a Member State Delegate: 
 
‘As a Delegate I’m responsible for developing [Delegation’s name] negotiating 
positions ahead of all IMO meetings, and developing proposals, analysis of all other 
Delegations papers submitted to IMO ahead of meetings, maintaining and developing 
relationships with other IMO Delegates, I guess coordinating positions domestically, 
I’m responsible for developing research agendas or contributing to the development of 
research agendas in [Delegation name] that support our engagement at the 
International Maritime Organization and during meetings I am responsible for 
conveying [Delegation name] negotiating positions through interventions, dialogue 
with other Delegations, maintaining relations is probably one of the bigger parts of the 
job, and I’m responsible for debriefs to senior management and political levels.’ 
(Participant 5: Member State Delegate) 
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In the run up to an MEPC, Delegates must work on preparing a position, an official 
stance to take during the meeting. From the interviews, most Delegates felt that the 
position they go into a meeting with is their ideal and they work to stay as close to that 
as possible while also attempting to cooperate with the other Delegations and the 
Chairman and create Consensus. One Delegate said he would approach WG meetings 
with a sort of, ‘playbook’. It was widely acknowledged in interviews that though 
meetings can seem pre-scripted at times, it is impossible to know exactly which way a 
discussion will go and so a level of tactical adaptability is necessary. Preparing 
positions in advance of the meeting, whether these become a submitted text or not, 
allows a Delegation to capture the interests of the external actors and networks they 
represent and then attempt to embed them into the meeting discussions.  
 
In addition to preparing a position and strategy in advance of the meeting, Delegates 
undertake a process of Outreach. For Delegates that have prepared a submission, 
Outreach is the process of gathering support and co-sponsorship for the text (this 
process will be discussed in Chapter 6). For Delegates who are not submitting a text, 
Outreach is a process whereby Delegates map out the specific positions of other 
Delegations during the preparation for a meeting in order to help shape their own 
strategy. To do this, they communicate with their network of contacts. Indeed, in order 
to facilitate almost all of their work, Delegates must work hard to create connections 
with other Delegations. Thus, a major part of their role is building and maintaining a 
network of contacts both during and in between meetings. One Delegate explained that 
having connections and communicating with them in advance of the meeting allows 
them to get a sense of the direction the meeting will take. Another Delegate referred to 
this same process as ‘expectation setting’. 
 
While Delegates undertake this process of position mapping in advance of every 
meeting, they must also build up a general sense of Members overall positions over 
time. Member State positions are a result of a number of dynamic factors; government 
in power, economic state and stage of development, experience of environmental 
impacts and of course their connection to the shipping industry e.g. registry size, ports 
and trade flows. Building this knowledge through connections allows Delegates to take 
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account of ‘like-minded’ Member States that they can reach out to for support and 
information.  
 
In addition to Outreach and creating submissions, Delegates can also draw on their 
networks of contacts to get a sense of the ‘thinking’ behind submitted proposals, which 
may not be apparent due to the brevity of IMO submissions:   
 
‘…if you don’t have a relationship with any of the individuals in the Member countries 
it’s difficult to get context behind the papers…in a lot of cases, there is a lot of 
background thinking too, that isn’t highlighted in the papers, so you really like to know 
what other Delegations are really driving towards, beyond what is just written in the 
papers, so maintaining those relationships is especially useful for that.’ (Participant 5: 
Member State Delegate) 
  
Although every Member has equal rights within the IMO to attend, contribute and vote, 
external regional groupings such as the EU are also part of the network. They function 
as both individuals and a collective. The EU members, for example, must adhere to a 
consistent position agreed in advance of a meeting if the issue concerns a, ‘core 
competency’. Having contacts as gateways into regions therefore becomes important: 
 
 ‘…that is the benefit of developing relationships with other Delegates and maintaining 
those relationships…having a couple of good contacts within European Union Member 
countries is a really good way to get a little bit more inside scoop on what the EU is 
doing generally.’ (Participant 5: Member State Delegate) 
 
Thus, networking and communication is a key part of the Delegates’ role. When asked 
about methods for Outreach a Member Delegate explained, ‘…it is pretty unofficial, a 
lot of it is just development of personal relationships…’ and‘…we have a lot of 
relationships that you might not see on the floor…’. In terms of the communication he 
said, ‘...we just have sort of like…friendship-based, most of our conversations are non-
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work related and just sort of get down to business after catching up a little bit’57. In 
addition, another Member State Delegate summarized, ‘…personal relationships are a 
core component of really any multi-lateral negotiation process’.58 Multiple Delegates 
alluded to the importance of trust as facilitative of the process. They noted that the work 
was easier when carried out in trust and good faith with one Member Delegate going as 
far as to call the MEPC a, ‘framework of good faith’. A key part of the work of 
Delegates is to construct their own personal networks to assist them in their work.  
 
Delegates are also responsible for carrying out negotiations. Negotiating activity occurs 
all year as Delegates communicate with other Delegates through phone calls, emails, 
other meetings and generate positions, alignments and submissions. During the meeting, 
however, the work of negotiating, reaches its highest intensity. Delegates capture the 
interests of their home Government and during the meeting they represent these 
interests, attempt to embed them in the regulations while at the same time cooperating 
with others to achieve Consensus. Delegates must use the margin time effectively to 
communicate with members of their own Delegation, of other Delegations and with 
their governments or the organisations they belong to. They must also focus also on 
creating and maintaining their network of connections. Additionally, an interviewee 
explained that even while they are conducting official negotiations at the current 
meeting, during the breaks, the Delegates start to plan and discuss their activities for the 
next meeting. When the meeting is over a Delegate must report back to their 
Governments and present the outputs and then start to prepare for the next meeting. 
Thus they act as conduits transporting and representing Governmental interests then 
reporting on outcomes.  
 
In summary, the role of a Delegate is demanding and varied. They gather and represent 
interests, black boxing these into an official position. They cooperate to create text 
submissions while interpreting the submissions of others. They map the field of 
interests in advance of the meeting while building and maintaining their trust networks. 
They are strategic networkers and tactical negotiators. Their role requires a high level of 
                                                
57 Participant 5: Member State Delegate 
58 Participant 28: Member State Delegate. 
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shipping knowledge, a legal sensitivity, and diplomatic skill. They are key creators of 
regulations and they cross the MEPC network boundaries, drawing external interests 
inside the MEPC and then externally reporting the progress. They simultaneously 
negotiate in the present and plan for the future. While the role of Delegates from COs is 
largely similar, there are a few facets worth highlighting, which are addressed in the 
next section.  
 
5.2.5.2 Consulting Organisations Delegates 
From observation and interviews it was clear that the work done by the COs is very 
similar to the Member States. They capture and represent interests through proposals, 
commentaries and interventions. The main difference is that in the rare event of a 
formal vote, the Consulting Organisations cannot take part. 
 
Table 5.1 below presents the number of Delegations in each category at three MEPCs 
and clearly shows that the CO Delegations, the majority of which are Industry 
Associations, account for around 30% of the attending Delegations. 
 
Table 5.1: Categories of Delegations in Attendance (Source: Author’s Own) 
Meeting Member 
States 
Associate 
Members 
UN and 
Specialized 
Agencies 
Intergovernmental 
Organisations 
Consulting 
Organisations 
MEPC68 99 2 1 5 53 
MEPC69 101 2 3 7 50 
MEPC70 97 2 2 4 44 
(This table was created using the Participant Lists of MEPC68, 69 and 70) 
 
During an interview, a Delegate explained the level of industry input as unusual 
compared with other international negotiations: 
‘…both of my predecessors told me before coming, you will see, the role of the industry 
is striking here, because it's really exceptional…Uh so, as a diplomat you are a little bit 
taken aback at first, because you're not used to that at all. Well, in the end, I can say it's 
probably helpful since, they are the ones which have to be implementing at least part of 
it…’ (Participant 29: Member State Delegate) 
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Mixed feelings were conveyed about this feature of the MEPC network. Some 
interviewees felt that there is too much scope for influence from Industry Associations 
while others felt it was valuable to have the Industry Associations input. A member of 
an Industry Association summarized the role of his Delegation to provide a practice and 
implementation orientation to the discussions: 
‘…we will offer our opinion about different proposals, positions being abdicated, we’ll 
offer information and perspectives about different realities in the industry and how 
those impact certain ideas or proposals. We also will table specific proposals ourselves 
for consideration at the meeting’ (Participant 15: CO Delegate from an Industry 
Association) 
 
Environmental Organisations were another main type of CO. In interviews they 
described their role as representing environmental interests and pushing the Committee 
to produce more stringent regulations regarding pollution. Sometimes NGOs employed 
a soft approach by engaging with Delegates during break times and disseminating new 
research regarding the environmental impacts of shipping. Equally, as one member of 
an NGO explained, their role is also to take a hard line and ‘hammer the table’ if 
necessary. Beyond this, the NGOs work to comment on the outputs of the discussions 
both in the meeting itself through submissions and interventions, and externally through 
their websites.  
 
All Delegates (Members States and COs) are key actors in the MEPC network. They act 
as spokespersons (Latour 2004a) capturing the interests of external stakeholders and 
synthesizing them into a cohesive position represented in submissions and 
interventions. They create alignment within the network by cooperating and conceding 
and they drive the discussions and the creation of regulation forward in new directions. 
In doing this, they are reliant on the Chairman, the Secretariat, the IMO headquarters, 
and an assemblage of non-humans. The spaces and people have been covered and so the 
non-human actors will now be assembled for examination. 
5.3 Things  
The section identifies and introduces non-human actors in the MEPC network and 
explains their roles in constructing regulation. This is not presented as an exhaustive 
 141 
account but instead offers a reflection on key actants that emerged from the data. The 
actants discussed in this section are break times, in-meeting huddles, splinter groups, 
technologies and documents. As part of the explanation of their role these actants can be 
grouped into three types; procedural, technological and textual.  
 
5.3.1 Procedural Actants 
This section describes the role of break times, meeting huddles and splinter groups. 
They have been grouped together as procedural actants due to their facilitative roles in 
the discussion process. Break times allow Delegates to discuss issues and ideas face-to-
face. As such, they enable the network-building activities of the Delegates assisting 
them to make new contacts, organise work and share information. Due to the practice of 
having multiple simultaneous WGs, break times also provide a necessary opportunity 
for Member State Delegates from the same Delegation to catch up and ensure that their 
positions on various agenda items are coherent, consistent and in line with what had 
been agreed in advance of the meetings. Other Delegations, particularly NGOs mobilze 
break times to strategize and plan how they can approach Member States about issues 
and ideas and provide information on external research and developments.  
 
Carrying out informal discussions during breaks allows Delegates to better comprehend 
the motivations behind the official positions presented in Plenary. In Plenary and WG 
discussions, the Delegates are formal, serious and focused. During breaks a more 
personal side could be seen.59 Thus, break times are a contrast to the political and 
technical discussions of Plenary and yet they also allow for Delegates to conduct further 
discussion that in turn facilitates the construction of regulation. Direct communication 
and information exchange result in a greater level of understanding between 
Delegations. In addition, as mentioned in the earlier section about the role of Delegates, 
during interviews, Member Delegates explained that while they are attending the 
current MEPC, they are planning future work at break times.  
 
                                                
59 For example, at lunchtime, some Delegates would go to the open deck adjoining the canteen and take 
photos of each other with Big Ben, the Houses of Parliament and the River Thames behind them. 
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Break times were also mobilized by the Chairmen of both Plenary and WGs. The WG 
Chairmen had more discretion over breaks than the Plenary Chairman and could 
strategically mobilize the smaller coffee breaks in two ways. If an issue seemed to be 
polarizing the group, the Chairman can, and did, choose to break for coffee and 
encourage the Delegates to try to resolve conflicts during the break. On the other hand, 
towards the mid-to-end of the week, the Chairman could, and did, delay or even 
withhold a break. Coffee breaks could therefore enrolled to resolve controversy and 
enacted as pressurizers. By either assisting compromise or pressuring the negotiations 
they act to facilitate the development of regulations.  
 
In-meeting huddles were another facilitative actant that was used during WG meetings 
and could be mobilized either by the Chairman or the Delegates themselves. When the 
discussion reached an impasse or began to go in circles, a huddle could be used to 
effectively reset the discussion and progress ideas. In the MEPC70 WG meeting, 
huddles were used twice on one day. If the Chairman grants the request the official 
discussion is suspended while any interested parties gather in the room and converse 
directly. When standing in this group, there is no Chairman, no microphones and no 
particular order of speaking. Huddles, like break times, facilitated alternative 
communication that helped Delegates resolve difficult issues. 
 
Splinter groups are more formal, for example, during the IEEWG a splinter group was 
scheduled over lunchtime and was open to any Delegate to attend. The group formed in 
another Committee room and did not use microphones. A CO Delegate from an industry 
association led the discussion. He stood at the front with a whiteboard mapping out the 
problem and possible solutions. The issue was resolved and the lunchtime group was 
able to present their solution to the rest of the WG for consideration and agreement.  
 
When asked during an interview about the role of huddles and splinter groups one 
Delegate said: 
‘…in an international negotiation, the challenge is to have meaningful conversations, 
because when you’re doing everything behind a microphone, it’s difficult, and you can 
go around and round in circles, so I think, to an extent, you can have informal 
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discussions where you get people together and you work through a challenging issue…’ 
(Participant 15: CO Delegate from an Industry Association) 
 
The participant added that, ‘I don’t think it’s a good idea that you use an informal work 
group to figure out some massively controversial highly costly system’ and went on to 
highlight the negative side of the splinter groups. He noted that a group known as, 
‘Friends of the Chair’ which had been formed to, ‘make headway on the very 
controversial greenhouse gas issues’ was no longer a feature of the process saying: 
 
‘…the current Chairman says, we’re not doing that anymore, and I think that’s 
probably a very wise call on his part because when you’re talking about a global 
negotiation and you’re talking about something that has tremendous economic 
consequences, this whole idea of an informal or friends of the Chairman group becomes 
very problematic. Namely, let’s say that group comes up with something, and so the 
Chairman then comes out and says, well, we’ve had a group of people together and 
we’ve come up with this idea, and this is really the way we should go, it’s been a 
product of hours and hours of discussion. And then all these other people in the room, 
that weren’t part of that discussion, are like, wait a minute, don’t start telling me how 
this is the way we’ve really gotta go…we didn’t have any part of that conversation’ 
(Participant 15: CO Delegate from an Industry Association). 
 
This shows how important the principles of Equality and Consensus are to the MEPC, 
especially in cases of controversy and contention (which is discussed in Chapter 7). The 
splinter groups, if enacted effectively can assist in the construction of regulation, 
however if they are used in a way that undermines the principles of the Organization 
they can equally hinder progress. As such the mobilisation of splinter groups confers on 
them the ability to assist, facilitate or hinder the process, making them procedural 
actants with a role in the creation of regulations. Through the work that they do to 
facilitate the process of developing regulation, this thesis recognises the agency of 
procedural actants in the MEPC network. 
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5.3.2 Technological Actants 
In order for the construction of regulation to be successful, the MEPC network is reliant 
on a digital, audio-visual infrastructure. This section will explain the infrastructure and 
by doing so, the technological actants are identified and further light is shed on the 
collective that construct regulation.  
 
One of the most important technological actants is ‘IMODOCs’. It is an online facility 
that holds, amongst other documents, all of the meeting reports, submissions and 
circulars. This was introduced in the section on the role of the Secretariat but will now 
be discussed in detail. Registered Delegates of both Member States and COs are able to 
access and download the documents they need or re-listen to Plenary audio recordings. 
By making the documents digitally accessible, the Delegates can search for a particular 
document amongst thousands. This is important as they often draw from historically 
agreed wordings to amend current draft texts. According to one interviewee, there has 
been much effort aimed at improving IMODOCs. Even within the research timeframe 
the user interface underwent a re-design highlighting the importance of the usability of 
the technology. Documents in the IMO provide information, contain proposals, 
agreements, and ultimately formalise regulation. IMODOCs provides an archived 
history of all discussions and decisions while simultaneously assisting in current 
regulation development.  
 
During the meeting discussion in both Plenary and WGs all speakers use microphones 
and the audio is routed to the headphones available at every chair. The size of meeting 
rooms dampens sound, so listening to the discussion without the use of the headphones 
is difficult. During one WG meeting, the headphone sound system was broken and 
portable handsets had to be brought in so the meeting could proceed. The audio system 
allows for clarity, as well as translation in the case of Plenary. Additionally in Plenary 
video screens show the speaker. This audio-visual infrastructure is used to effectively 
shrink the room, allowing hundreds of Delegates to clearly see and hear the speaker in 
several languages at any one time.  
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The audio discussion in Plenary is recorded and available to registered Delegates after 
the meeting on the IMODOCs database. This provision is an important feature of the 
process 60. As will be discussed in Section 5.3.5, understanding the negotiations that 
occurred at the meeting from the MEPC report alone can be very difficult as the reports 
do not name specific Delegations and are very concise summaries of hours of 
discussion. Plenary recordings therefore provide a resource that allows new Delegates 
to better understand historic discussions and current Delegates to revisit discussions.  
 
When a WG is drafting a text, they employ further technologies to assist in their work. 
When drafting text a member of the Secretariat would work on a laptop beside the 
Chairman. The base document under discussion was on the laptop and being projected 
onto two large screens at the front of the room so that all Delegates could view it as 
changes were made.  The ‘Track Changes’ function on MS Word was used and the 
Delegates worked through the hands of the Secretariat to alter the document. The 
program tracked the changes made by highlighting them in red and using a strike-
though format. At MEPC70, when drafting the roadmap almost all of the text was 
coloured red after discussion with many strike-through lines. Despite this the Delegates 
continued to understand and work on increasingly complex paragraphs of text. When 
the text became too altered and was too saturated with changes to read or when they had 
reached a natural stopping point, a ‘clean’ document was requested from the Secretariat. 
The process of writing regulation involves the ideas and comments of the Delegates, 
organised by the Chairman, being embedded into a document by the Secretariat in a live 
textual construction. This also highlights how positions are altered through cooperative 
input, an idea that will be expanded on in Chapter 6. 
 
In isolation these technologies seem ‘mundane’ (Woolgar & Neyland 2013) and their 
contribution perhaps a bit elementary, however, when associated together into a 
collective they create a technological infrastructure which makes the construction of 
regulation possible and thus they constitute network actors.  
 
                                                
60 WG discussions are not recorded. 
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5.3.3 Document Actants: Submissions  
An MEPC submission is a document created by a Delegation or Delegations and 
submitted in advance of an MEPC meeting. Every submission follows a template. See 
Figure 5.2 for an example of the front page of a submission.  
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Figure 5.2: Front Page of a MEPC69 Submission  
 
 
 
 
https://edocs.imo.org/Final Documents/English/MEPC 69-7-2 (E).docx 
 
 
 
E 
  
MARINE ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
COMMITTEE 
69th session  
Agenda item 7 
 
MEPC 69/7/2 
12 February 2016 
 Original: ENGLISH 
 
REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS 
 
International shipping's share in international efforts to limit the rise  
of global average temperature 
 
Submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands,  
Morocco and Solomon Islands  
 
 
SUMMARY 
Executive summary: International shipping is called upon to contribute its fair share to the 
international community's efforts to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. The co-sponsors invite the Committee to develop a work 
plan to define this fair share. 
Strategic direction: 7.3 
High-level action: 7.3.2 
Output: 7.3.2.1 
Action to be taken: Paragraph 12 
Related documents: MEPC 59/24: MEPC 67/INF.3 and MEPC 68/5/1 
 
Background 
 
1 On 12 December 2015 in Paris, the international community agreed to common 
objectives in order to adapt to climate change and mitigate its impact. State parties notably 
emphasized the urgent need for measures to hold "the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels" and committed themselves to "aim 
to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible" and "to undertake 
rapid reductions thereafter" (UNFCCC Paris Agreement, Articles 2.1 (a) and 4.1). The 
Agreement will be open for signature in New York from 22 April 2016. 
 
2 The Organization (IMO) has been taking steps to mitigate climate change for two 
decades and took first measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from a sector that is, in 
general, the most energy efficient mode of transport (as shown in document MEPC 68/INF.24). 
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Submissions are headed with the IMO logo. Under this the Committee name, session 
number and agenda item sit on the left. On the right, there is the document code, date of 
submission and the original language in which it was submitted. This information 
allows readers to read submissions thematically by agenda items or historically by 
session or submission dates. Below the two top columns the full agenda title is 
displayed. Under this is the document title and below that the submitters are listed. A 
rectangular box follows which contains an executive summary. The associated strategic 
direction, high-level action and planned output are then listed, followed by an indication 
of the paragraph that contains the action requested of the Committee. The final section 
of the summary box provides a list of related documents. After the summary box is the 
main body of the document. Due to the amount of documents submitted to meetings 
submissions tend to be concise and all paragraphs and sub-paragraphs are numbered for 
ease of reference.61 Texts therefore, not only organise the work but are highly organised 
themselves. 
 
On the front page, submissions cite other related documents. In doing so, they are 
associated into an archival web containing proposals, discussions and agreements. 
Delegates will often make reference to previously agreed language laid down in reports 
or other regulatory agreements in order to settle conflict over current wording and 
vocabulary choices. In this way, documents produce consistency for the network and 
help to reproduce past agreed wording for current discussions. 
 
There are generally four types of submissions associated with MEPC agenda items: 
• Submissions by the Secretariat 
• Information papers 
• Proposing submissions 
• Commentary submissions 
 
                                                
61 Information and research papers that are submitted for the consideration of the Committee can be long 
and as such are an exception to this. 
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Examples of Secretariat submissions include reports, updates, schedules, agendas, 
timetables, document lists etc. These submissions organise and frame the MEPC in 
terms of time, content and context. Time is structured by the agendas and schedules. 
The content of the meeting is also organised by the agenda, as well as the list of 
submissions and previous MEPC report. The meeting is framed by the updates and 
reports from external events; for example, the Secretariat gave reports of the outcomes 
of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in Bonn and Paris at MEPC69. 
Therefore, the discussion at the meeting is framed by the international environmental 
and political context represented in submissions. 
 
Information papers draw in external research and scientific reports to the MEPC for 
consideration in connection with developing regulations. The research can be contracted 
by the Secretariat, Member governments or COs. These papers request only 
consideration of their contents from the Committee. Both the updates and reports from 
external events by the Secretariat and information papers presenting external research 
draw the ‘outside’ in and connect the internal discussions in the MEPC to wider global-
political and scientific developments. 
 
Some submissions contain proposals. They introduce a topic of concern, lay out a 
background and request that the Committee considers the information within and takes 
action accordingly. This submission type will be the basis of three case studies in 
Chapter 6.  
 
The final type of submission is a commentary paper. Commentaries relate to submitted 
proposals and just as their name suggests, comment on proposals. In doing so, they set 
out the position of their sponsors. By responding to proposals or specific points in 
proposals commentaries are a way to open a textual dialogue in advance of the meeting. 
All Delegations can make information submissions, proposing submissions and 
commentary submissions although participants from COs stressed that ‘tabling’ a 
proposal is much easier if the submission is also co-sponsored by a Member State. 
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During interviews most participants stressed the importance of submissions in the 
MEPC. Proposing submissions are the channel through which Delegations can present 
an idea and generate discussion. Although the process of developing regulations is 
continuous and on-going, submissions, in particular proposing submissions, represent 
points of opening or change. By their nature, they are able to open up black boxes in the 
regulatory process. In doing so, they can also create controversy and those that propose 
amendments or a review of current regulations create moments of unmaking and 
reconstruction. Submissions, therefore, punctuate the cycle of discussion and fuel it 
with new material.  
 
When a group of Delegations create and co-sponsor a submission, they form a 
supportive network around the text, inputting their interests and ideas into the 
document. The submission is altered by the co-sponsors during its drafting according to 
their interests. Submissions can therefore also be understood as boundary objects (Star 
& Griesemer 1989). They connect networks capturing their shared interests and as they 
circulate between co-sponsors they are shaped and modified.  
 
Submissions can also be understood as representative actants. Their role is to lay out the 
ideas, views and official positions of their sponsors in advance of the meeting until the 
Delegates themselves are able to come together at the meeting. Submissions initiate 
dialogue and open the negotiations. The text submissions, just like the Delegates, act as 
representatives for the interests of others. After the meeting passes, the submissions 
become archived as new submissions for future meetings take up the representational 
role.  
 
In summary, submissions are unboxers, capable of opening up taken-for-granted issues 
or indeed re-opening black-boxed regulation for review and amendment. Secretariat 
submissions organise the meetings and draw in external events providing a contextual 
framing for the discussions. Submissions from Delegations act as boundary objects 
during their drafting, linking different networks of interest and fluidly moving between 
them. Upon submission, they become representational actants charged with embodying 
the interests of their authors and beginning the negotiations. At the conclusion of the 
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meeting they become records, fossilizing co-sponsor networks and proposals in 
IMODOCs. Submissions, therefore, have multiple roles that evolve as they act in the 
MEPC.  
 
5.3.4 Document Actants: Meeting Reports 
Meeting reports reflect the main elements of discussion, the decisions made and 
suggestions for the work that needs to be done at the next MEPC meeting. The 
Committee reports follow a consistent structure.62 The reports are bullet-pointed and 
succinct. Delegation names are omitted from the report and general vocabulary is used 
to indicate levels of support, opposition or other comments. An exception to the practice 
of not naming specific Delegations is made if a Delegation requests their statement be 
annexed in the meeting report. This can be the case if a decision has been made but a 
Delegation still want to formalise their opposition.63 Reports were generated by the 
Secretariat within the timeframe of the meeting, which often meant they were worked 
on during break times and at night. The last day of discussions, whether in Plenary or 
WGs, is spent going through the report point by point, sometimes line by line, 
correcting, improving and changing it until it represents the Consensus of the meeting. 
Thus, report checking is a process of creating Consensus of Consensus; agreeing that 
the report accurately reflects the agreements of the meeting.  
 
The report must synthesize days of discussion into a concise overview of the meeting. 
As such, reports were simultaneously a watered down version of the lively discussions 
and a distillation of the main discussion points. For those who attended the discussions, 
it provides a helpful summary. For those who did not attend the meeting, it can be 
difficult to get a full sense of the discussion, and nearly impossible to tell what position 
was held by what Delegation. One CO Delegate explained that this is why he attends 
the meeting in person. Reports also link meetings, encasing decisions and carrying them 
                                                
62 WG reports are similar to the Committee report but with the addition of a participant list at the start of 
the document.  
63 Delegates may request any statement to be annexed in the report but during observation this was only 
done when a Delegation wanted to formalise opposition.  
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forward to the next meeting. They are a physical manifestation of consistency, 
formalizing the discussion and providing a base from which future work is carried out. 
The following section will summarize the agency of texts in the network.  
 
5.3.5 Textual Agency in the MEPC  
This section has contributed to the understanding of the empirical work centring on 
what texts do in organisations (Cooren 2004). Documents have multiple roles in the 
construction of regulation and even change roles at different stages in the process. They 
play a clear role in strengthening network associations (Callon 1991; Law 1986b). 
Submissions can be seen as boundary objects (Star & Griesemer 1989) and 
intermediaries moving between actors, strengthening and defining relationships (Rydin 
2012). MEPC documents overall can be understood as sociolinguistic actors in a 
political system which can, ‘encapsulate complex multidimensional world-views, 
visions of the future, invocations of key actors, introductions of constraints and 
opportunities [and] rules about acceptable behaviour and risks’ (Faulkner 2012, p755). 
 
General IMO documents, such as the establishing Convention are constitutive of the 
Organization, while submissions are generative of the regulatory work and reports 
perform the outcomes of the meeting as much as they encapsulate it (Fauré et al. 2010). 
Similar to Latour’s social aggregates, the outcomes of the meeting are, ‘made by the 
way they are said to exist’, i.e. how they are written up into the reports (Latour 2005, 
p273). Furthermore, both submissions and reports build on the information of past 
meetings and documents. As such, they construct an archived web of information, 
creating an institutional memory of past meetings and consistent framing for current and 
future meetings. The coding and format of the documents allow readers to trace a 
temporal or thematic history, in essence, providing a genealogy of the development of 
regulation.  
 
While this research has aimed to understand the agency of texts in the MEPC, a 
limitation of the documents was also observed and is offered as an extension to the 
work focused on textual agency in organisations (Cooren 2004). Many Delegates 
explained that a large part of their role is constructing and maintaining social networks 
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and trust. ANT encourages the examination of heterogeneity, however, the ‘social’ 
networks of trust between Delegates remain a homogenous association in the MEPC. 
These connections exist only between Delegates and are not captured in regulatory 
texts. Despite this, the trust between delegates is seen as facilitative of the process of 
developing regulation.  
 
Due to the level of influence texts have in the MEPC, they can be viewed as key actors 
in creating control or governing at a distance (Law 1986b; Rydin 2012). As such, the 
next chapter follows the process of creating submissions and then traces three 
submissions through three MEPC meetings.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to answer the first research question, ‘What actors and associations 
constitute and perform this network?’ Although it does not present an exhaustive list, 
three actor categories were identified; spaces, people and things and within these 
categories a multitude of actors have been assembled and accounted for.  
 
The spaces of the Headquarters are an essential part of the network, simultaneously 
capturing and promoting the principles and practices of the Organization. Describing 
the role of people showed Chairmen to be far from passive vessels. Indeed, they were 
active constructors, skilfully orchestrating the discussion towards Consensus. The 
Delegates drive the discussion, representing a mass of external interests, solving 
problems, producing ideas, supporting, opposing and compromising. The Secretariat 
organises the meeting, assisting every actor to carry out their roles. They also 
disseminate and report the work done at the IMO in other international fora. In this way 
they represent and link the IMO to wider structures of international governance.   
 
There are many influential ‘things’ working in the development of regulation. These 
actants were identified as procedural, technical and textual. Procedural actants facilitate 
and stimulate understanding, negotiation and compromise. The technological 
infrastructure makes the work of other actors possible. The textual actants have multiple 
roles throughout the process. Submissions reflect the roles of their creators, with the 
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Secretariat’s submissions organizing, scheduling, and linking the discussions to external 
contexts while Delegates’ submissions propose ideas, open up negotiations, and 
represent interests. MEPC reports capture days of discussion and decisions and 
formalise Consensus while also linking to future meetings.  
 
This chapter has offered an empirically rich account of actors involved in constructing 
regulation that is currently lacking in the literature focused on the IMO. The following 
chapter will give an equally detailed account of the processes of the MEPC by using 
three case studies to explain how international shipping regulations are developed.  
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6. Building and Converging Networks: Following Submission 
and Discussion Processes in the MEPC  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Applying ANT to empirical settings involves not only the identification of actors and 
their roles but also the following of the processes that bind these actors together (Latour 
1999b). The actors that assemble periodically to form the MEPC were unpacked and 
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter moves on to follow, and thus explain, 
two processes of constructing regulation. First, the process of creating submissions is 
examined and then the process of discussion at the meeting is detailed. The sociologies 
of translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & Lee 2013) are applied as 
terminological framings for the data narrative. These vocabularies are used to sort the 
network-building processes into moments or stages and therefore help to ascertain the 
levels of support, resistance and overall outcome. Both submission and discussion 
processes are attempts to translate, i.e. they are attempts to transform an idealized 
proposal into a practiced reality (Callon 1986a). 
 
Before going on, it is necessary to revisit the meanings of translation and treason 
discussed in Chapter 3. The term translation refers to the process of building, 
controlling and maintaining a network (Callon 1986a). Change and re-shaping are 
implied but the overall aim of translation is to construct a network and make the 
translator’s agenda a reality. Translation is key to understanding networked control.  
The term treason refers to the construction of weakness i.e. the action of a group of 
actors, distorting agendas, weakening and locking other actors out of the network (Galis 
& Lee 2013).  
 
The first part of the chapter examines the general process of creating a proposing 
submission as an act of translation, i.e. network building. The main body of the chapter 
is dedicated to presenting three MEPC discussions as small case studies. The case 
studies are anchored to the plight of the Marshall Islands as they propose the creation of 
new GHG reducing regulation and attempt to grow a network of support across 
 156 
MEPC68, 69 and 70. The chapter finalizes with a discussion of the data and contributes 
to the application of the sociologies of translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & 
Lee 2013).  
 
6.2 Creating Submissions  
This section examines the general process of creating and submitting proposals. The 
data has been ordered into the four moments of translation (Callon 1986a). Over the 
course of the three case studies presented, the chapter follows the development of a 
proposal from the Marshall Islands and the growth of their network of support across 17 
months and three MEPCs, from MEPC68 in May 2015 to MEPC70 in October 2016.  
 
6.2.1 Problematization 
The first stage of translation, problematization, occurs when a Delegate or group of 
Delegates problematizes a situation and forms a plan or agenda that they would like to 
see realized. At this stage, they draft a text. Within this text, the interests and agenda of 
the problematizer(s) are embedded. Problematization can occur at any time. It can 
happen during an MEPC in break-times or between MEPCs. Problematizations can be 
formed in reaction to the last MEPC discussion, developments in the industry, global 
environmental governance trends or to the findings of new scientific studies. Proposing 
submissions in the MEPC are the embodiment of a problematization; an ideal around 
which to gather a network of support:  
 
‘…in a lot of ways your objective…is laid out in the submittals or submissions to the 
MEPC...I think most anyone would characterize their submission as at least that 
country[‘s] or that Delegation’s ideal, or outcome that they view as a reasonable’ 
(Participant 28: Member State Delegate.) 
 
The creation of a proposing submission is part of the overarching aim to gain support 
and agreement during the meetings themselves. As such the initial problematization is 
the beginning of a potentially long and slow process, indeed one Delegate advised that 
Delegations should be prepared to sacrifice their first submission as part of a longer 
 157 
strategic process of constructing and mobilizing support and, ‘figuring out how to 
advance your agenda, within the rules that you are given’ (Participant 28: Member 
Delegate). In summary, problematization is the creation of a desired outcome in the 
form of a proposing submission.  
 
6.2.2 Interessement  
Interessement and enrolment can happen simultaneously and the lines between the two 
may blur. In the case of this research it is important that the terms remain distinct. 
Interessement, is the process of engaging actors and aligning their interests with those 
of the problematizers (Callon 1986a).  
 
After the initial problematization, the Delegates generally undertake a process they call 
‘Outreach’, whereby they attempt to build a network of support around the submission. 
This process is important for the creation of a proposal with the potential to gain 
majority agreement during discussions64 as a Member Delegate explained: 
 
‘…there’s a process of getting other countries on board…and it's generally viewed -  
the more countries you've assembled to support you…the better chance that you have to 
get the outcome that you are seeking…’ 
(Participant 28: Member State Delegate) 
 
Outreach occurs largely through correspondence through emails and conference calls 
although delegates may also meet in person.65 One interviewee explained the process of 
initiating Outreach. In this quote the importance of personal networks to Delegates and 
their role as strategic networkers, which was discussed in Chapter 5 is re-emphasized.  
 
                                                
64 There are two forms of Outreach, the strategic position mapping that was described in the previous 
chapter and the strategic network building around a submission.   
65 Delegates sometimes use other international fora (e.g. UNFCCC, EU and ICAO meetings) as an 
opportunity to meet and discuss MEPC business.  
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‘…if you’ve got a standing relationship, we’d go directly to a Member State if we know 
them already on that basis, or if we wanted to reach out to someone where we might not 
previously have done so we’d maybe go through diplomatic networks…so there’s 
various routes open to us but, yes, we spend a fair amount of time on the outreach.’ 
(Participant 3: Member State Delegate) 
 
Selecting actors to support a text is a highly strategic activity. Much consideration goes 
into who should be included with various factors affecting this choice. Delegates try to 
engage actors based on two main factors, similarity of position or intentions defined by 
the interviewees as, ‘like-mindedness’ and interest level in the particular agenda item 
the proposal is being submitted under: 
 
‘…on any given issue, there are a small subset of Delegates in the room that care more 
about certain issues than others...they are the ones that you want to focus on…’ 
(Participant 28: Member State Delegate)  
 
Awareness of like-minded Delegations is gained by analysing past interventions, past 
and current submissions and direct communication with delegates during the MEPC in 
the margins or by intercessional correspondence. Through these methods knowledge of 
other Delegations’ positions is created. A problematizer is not likely to engage a 
Delegation that is active on an issue if their position is in total conflict to the agenda of 
the problematizer. For example, the issue of Outreach consultation was raised during 
the MEPC69 Plenary discussion of Reduction of GHG Emissions. A network of 
regionally close Small Island Developing States, along with some other more distant 
Member States, was criticized by one Member State Delegation from the Central/South 
Pacific region for not seeking their input. However, the content this submission was in 
contrast to the past interventions of the discontented Delegation. As such, they would 
not be considered ‘like-minded’ and so would not be asked to co-sponsor. This 
underscores the politics and tensions that must be negotiated in the process of 
translating an agenda into a mobilized network of support.  
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While the problematizer is attempting to identify common interests, at the same time, 
they need to select difference. Strength of support does not necessarily come down to 
number of co-sponsors; network diversity plays a role as well.  The strongest network 
of support that can be built around text is one that has multiple countries in different 
states of economic development representing diverse regions of the world. Participants 
explained that the more support you have going into the meeting, the more support you 
are likely to gain during the discussion. Thus, interessement is a very strategic 
undertaking that requires time and focus and is an essential part of building a network of 
support. Once the ‘interessed’ parties have been gathered around a text, it is time for the 
third stage: Enrolment. 
 
6.2.3 Enrolment 
Enrolment is the stage where the problematizers assign roles to those who have been 
‘interessed’ into the network as an attempt to further solidify network connections 
(Callon 1986a).  
 
During Outreach, there are two roles to be assigned in connection with a submission; 
co-sponsor or dormant supporter66. All co-sponsors are supporters but not all supporters 
co-sponsor. Co-sponsors are named alphabetically on the submission. As such, 
positions of co-sponsors are formally and visibly fixed to the text, making co-
sponsoring a less flexible form of support than those who chose to remain invisible until 
the meeting67. Once the meeting has passed these co-sponsor connections become 
historic and for the network to remain co-sponsors must re-associate around 
submissions at future meetings. The problematizer does not always initiate enrolment, 
Delegations can also volunteer or request to co-sponsor. Dormant support occurs when 
a Delegation is generally supportive of the text and indicates its intention to vocalise 
this support in discussion yet does not wish to co-sponsor the submission:  
 
                                                
66 The term co-sponsor is an official term however the term dormant supporter is one I have assigned on 
the basis of the data. It is used to describe the type of role these actors take.  
67 The term invisible is used here to convey that dormant supporters are not named on the paper.  
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‘…we’ve also been participating in, contributing to papers over the summer which [we 
are] not a formal sponsor of, but that you will find us supportive of when the time 
comes.’  
(Participant 3: Member State Delegate) 
 
Co-sponsorship must be defined before the document is submitted to the IMO while 
dormant support can be gathered (and offered) after submission. One reason for a 
Delegations choosing to be a dormant supporter instead of co-sponsoring is that they 
may agree with the content of the submission in principle, but have one or two specific 
points that prevent them from putting their name to it as a whole. The process of 
enrolment is similarly strategic to interessement with roles carefully assigned.  
 
6.2.4 Mobilization 
The final stage, mobilization, is when the network begins to function as one, held 
together as a collective and moving towards the realization of the agenda of the initial 
problematizer (Callon 1986a). Mobilization occurs during the discussions when the 
entire network of co-sponsors and dormant supporters vocalise their support for the 
submission.  
 
The discussion presents a new opportunity to grow the network of support by 
convincing actors to align with the submitted proposal. The aim is to show the support 
gathered during Outreach as well as to persuade the rest of the Committee to support the 
proposal. However the discussion is also an opportunity for actors outwith the 
submission’s network of support to test the strength of the network by showing 
resistance and building a network of opposition.  
 
To frame the push and pull of the negotiations and offer a rich account of the 
discussions the vocabularies of translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & Lee 
2013) have been applied to explain the construction of networks of support and 
opposition respectively. Within the context of the MEPC and the IMO in general, 
distortion (i.e. the first stage of treason which involves re-problematization) can occur 
in two ways. Delegations can either submit a commentary text that distorts the initial 
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actors problematization or they can use the discussions to verbally re-problematize and 
distort the issue. Both translation and treason represent actors pushing and pulling in a 
state of flux as they seek to assert their agendas.  
 
The following case studies trace the translation and treason attempts around three 
submitted proposals with a common purpose. The first submission was submitted by the 
Marshall Islands who then built a supporting network of co-sponsors for the following 
two submissions.  
 
6.3 Case Studies  
This section introduces three submissions and follows them into the MEPC discussions. 
Submission 68/5/1, sponsored by the Marshall Islands was chosen as an opening into 
controversy (Venturini 2009). From there, the network growth of the Marshall Islands 
and the translation of their proposal were traced by following submissions to MEPC69 
and MEPC70. Table 6.1 below presents the key submissions in the three cases. As 
discussed in the chapter 4, although MEPC68 occurred before the start of the fieldwork, 
I was able to analyse submissions, the meeting report and Plenary transcript of the 
meeting in order to present this case alongside the others.  
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Table 6.1: Key Submissions Followed 
MEPC Submission Date 
Submitted 
Sponsors Title 
MEPC68 
11th-15th 
May 2015 
68/5/1 20th March 
2015 
Marshall 
Islands  
Setting a reduction 
target and agreeing 
associated measures 
for international 
shipping 
 
MEPC69 
18th – 22nd 
April 2016 
69/7/2 12th 
February 
2016 
Belgium,  
France, Germany,  
the Marshall 
Islands,  
Morocco,  
Solomon Islands 
International 
shipping's share in 
international efforts to 
limit the rise  
of global average 
temperature 
 
MEPC70 
24th – 28th 
October 
2016 
70/7/6 19th August 
2016 
Antigua & 
Barbuda, 
Belgium,  
Côte d'Ivoire,  
Denmark,  
France,  
Germany,  
the Marshall 
Islands, Monaco,  
Morocco,  
Solomon Islands,  
Tonga 
 
International 
shipping's share in 
international efforts to 
limit the rise of global 
average temperature – 
further clarifications 
 
 
6.4 Case study 1: Submission 68/5/1 
Despite climate change being at the forefront of environmental governance 
discussions68, Submission 68/5/1 was one of only three submissions under the agenda 
item: Reduction of Greenhouse Gases from Shipping. The first submission was a report 
by the Secretariat on the outcomes of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences 
                                                
68 The Paris COP 21 was scheduled for 30th November to 12th December 2015 and was at the forefront of 
discussions in the MEPC.  
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of 2014 and 2015. The other submission was an information paper from the Republic of 
Korea about their domestic introduction of a greenhouse gas mitigation scheme for 
ships. Section 2.1 in Chapter 2 explained that the Marshall Islands is the second largest 
ship registry in the world which is important to context submission 68/5/1. Although the 
Marshall Islands are a Small Island Developing State (SIDS), it represents a large 
proportion of registered ships.  
 
The Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands, Tony deBrum, flew to London to 
introduce Submission 68/5/1. Some interviewees explained that the presence of Tony 
deBrum signalled the seriousness of the issue of the Marshall Islands.  In his evocative 
speech detailing the plight of the Islands, he explained how the sea, once a provider of 
food and facilitator of transport, depended on by the Marshallese, now floods the 
Islands due to the rising sea levels linked to climate change. The submission he 
introduced requested a global reduction target for shipping emissions to be set.  
 
The document entitled, ‘Setting a reduction target and agreeing associated measures for 
international shipping’ was submitted on 20th March 2015 in advance of the MEPC68, 
which was held 11th-15th May 2015. The two excerpts below present the main aim of 
the submission.  
 
In this submission, the Marshall Islands provide the justification for and request the 
Committee to undertake the work necessary to establish a GHG emission reduction 
target for international shipping consistent with keeping global warming below 1.5°C 
and to agree the measures necessary to reach that target.  
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The Marshall Islands makes this submission to IMO in recognition that it is now 
essential for the United Nations agency charged with responsibility for regulating 
international shipping in the interests of the global community and future generations, 
to take ambitious and decisive action to address the climate impacts of shipping. 
Specifically IMO needs to set clear net emission reduction targets in line with the 
UNFCCC's ultimate objective to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system. 
(Excerpts from MEPC68/5/1, submitted by Marshall Islands) 
 
This submission is a proposal-type submission and represents a problematization of new 
regulations as a response to global climate change. The submission draws in scientific 
evidence and invokes the negotiations of the Paris Climate Agreement in its attempt to 
engage support. There were no co-authors and one participant explained that the process 
of Outreach for this submission had not been evident: 
 
‘…the Marshall Islands had this Reduction Target paper out...that caught everybody by 
surprise a few weeks before MEPC and if they had reached out in a different way, 
maybe the community could have responded in a different way but at that point, when 
we saw the paper, it was so late…If they had talked to us and said, 'look I have this 
paper, would you co-sponsor it?' a lot of countries would, may have been interested in 
co-sponsoring it’ (Participant 35: Member State Delegate) 
 
This highlights the need to conduct a thorough and strategic process of Outreach to 
construct a network of support in advance of the meeting. The participant also added: 
‘It would have helped at least if the paper had more co-sponsors…but it was kind of a 
very…I guess an alone attempt, and that was not helpful’ (Participant 35: Member State 
Delegate)69 
 
At the time of this submission, GHG emissions related discussions in the IMO had 
converged around considering a review of the EEDI and the construction of the DCS. 
                                                
69 Equally, it is possible that the Marshall Islands had their own reasoning for not undertaking Outreach. 
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The MEPC’s direction on climate change appeared to have been black-boxed until 
submission 68/5/1 opened the box and requested the MEPC begin discussions anew on 
a global target. The next section follows the discussion of this submission. 
 
6.4.1 MEPC68 Plenary Discussion 
Using translation and treason as framings, the reactions to the proposal in Plenary are 
explained. From this, it is possible to show how within the MEPC Committee, sub-
groupings of Delegations form networks of support and resistance in an attempt to 
translate their interests into a majority Consensus.  
 
Since this thesis takes the Marshall Islands submission as the focus, Delegations that 
express support for the proposal will be termed supporters and Delegations that attempt 
to reject the proposal will be termed resisters. Some Delegations fall in between these 
two extremes, whereby they express support for the proposal but they also suggest that 
it should be altered in some way. Again this is an attempt to translate their own interests 
in the discussion and these Delegations will be termed modifiers. These terminological 
categories were created as helpful descriptors to untangle the reactions to the proposal 
in the Plenary discussion.  
 
These categories will be applied throughout the three case studies and will illustrate the 
changing positions with regards to the submissions of the Marshall Islands; as they 
reform their proposal and gather more co-sponsors, their network of support in 
discussions also grows.  
 
The Marshall Islands’ introduction of their submission took nearly ten minutes. Vanuatu 
made a shorter, but supportive, intervention. After this, the Chairman gave the floor to 
the Secretary General of the IMO. Part of his speech was dedicated to reminding the 
Committee of the work already being done by the MEPC with regards to reducing 
emissions. In particular, he mentioned the EEDI and his view that the EEDI is, itself, a 
reduction target that will produce emission reductions over time. He went on to note the 
complex position of Shipping as a servant of world trade. This framing reduces the 
accountability of the industry for its emissions. The logic is that if world trade grows, so 
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too will the international shipping industry and by default its emissions. This often 
emphasized by the industry when discussing environmental regulation. 
 
The Secretary General ended his address by urging the Committee to consider what the 
IMO has achieved, what it can do and what message it may be able to disseminate at 
COP21. The invocation of the external forum of the COP21 in Paris, the congratulatory 
comments regarding current regulations (EEDI and SEEMP) and the connection of 
shipping as a servant of global trade were themes that recurred throughout the ensuring 
discussion.  
 
After the Secretary General had spoken the floor was opened for Member States’ 
interventions. Many Member States expressed sympathy for the position of the Marshall 
Islands and with some expressing a cautious level of support, however, many Members 
equally undertook a distortion of the proposal. Some Member States supported the 
integration of this proposal in on-going and future work. Others explicitly prioritized 
the finalization of the DCS before turning focus on the proposal in this submission. The 
creation and adoption of the Data Collection System is part of a Three-Step Approach; 
(i) Data Collection, (ii) Data Analysis and (iii) Decisions on the need for further 
measures to enhance energy efficiency from ships (Hughes 2016) and is discussed 
under Agenda Item: Further Technical and Operational Measures for Enhancing 
Energy Efficiency of International Shipping. For an expanded explanation of the Three-
Step Approach see Appendix 5. 
 
The interventions contained general support for the core of the proposal but at the same 
time attempted to distort it. The distortion of MEPC 68/5/1 took a few different forms. 
Many Members highlighted the EEDI and SEEMP as major achievements and 
contributions to the reduction of emissions. Inherent in this was the question of whether 
more regulation is actually needed. Some Delegations felt that in time current measures 
would produce effective reduction of emissions in Shipping. Others enrolled the Paris 
COP to help their cause, explaining that it would be best to wait for the outcome of the 
Paris discussions before taking action on the request of the proposal. These 
vocalizations were made in advance of COP21 when it was thought that Shipping might 
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be included in the Paris Agreement and the right to regulate Shipping appropriated by 
that Agreement. These Delegations were effectively mobilizing an external global 
environmental governance meeting to postpone the current discussions of a global 
emissions target for the shipping industry.  
 
Two Delegations felt that the proposal was not in line with the then current discussion 
and that it might actually inhibit future achievement or have the opposite effect of what 
is desired. These two members believed that this proposal could divert attention from 
the DCS and thus hamper it. Other resisters pondered the negative impacts on trade and 
the challenges faced by certain economies if a reduction target was placed on global 
shipping. One organisation invoked the UNFCCC as a barrier, stating that the 
provisions of the UNFCCC are of a ‘single undertaking’ and that ‘individual provisions’ 
in a ‘sectorial approach’ would be in conflict with this. Another Delegation further 
invoked the UNFCCC and Paris COP to suggest that the proposal was premature. All of 
the arguments above constituted resistance to the proposal. As the discussion proceeded, 
resisters began to align themselves with the statements above by specifically naming 
the Delegations that vocalized them.  
 
Submission 68/5/1 did not gain enough support to be taken forward in the form of the 
action requested of the Committee. Though there was sympathy for the proposal and 
iterations of support, there were many attempts to modify the proposal and a strong 
network of resistance formed. In the sociology of treason, the process of distortion, 
‘makes the Other’s agenda seem uneconomical, illogical, untimely, or unsound. For 
every constructed “ obligatory passage point,” there can be a number of “ points of 
irrelevance” that thwart actors in their desire to define a problem’ (Galis & Lee 2013, 
p160). In this case study, both the modifiers and the resisters used timing, organisational 
focus, and economic impact as a distortive framing, making the submission a ‘point of 
irrelevance’ (ibid). Thus, the proposal in submission 68/5/1 was rejected. A successful 
process of treason however did not take place. Although the submission itself was 
rejected from the network, the Marshall Islands were not and cannot be. The Marshall 
Islands were able to redraft a new proposal for MEPC69 and the next section follows 
this new submission through MEPC69. 
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6.5 Case Study 2: Submission 69/7/2 
Submission 69/7/2 was submitted to MEPC69 on the 12th of February 2016 under 
agenda item 7: Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. The submission entitled, 
‘International shipping’s share in international efforts to limit the rise of global average 
temperature’, was submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, 
Morocco, and Solomon Islands. Its summary states: 
 
International shipping is called upon to contribute its fair share to the international 
community’s efforts to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The co-sponsors invite 
the Committee to develop a work plan to define this fair share. 
 (Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
 
This submission can be seen as an extension of submission 68/5/1. Notably, this 
submission had a much larger network of support in the form of the co-sponsors, which 
in turn gave it a better chance of acceptance during the meeting. Diversity of region and 
development, two desirable traits for supporters were embodied in the co-sponsorship. 
Figure 6.1 presents the construction of a network from MEPC68 to MEPC69. 
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Figure 6.1: Network Growth from MEPC68 to MEPC69 (Source: Author’s own) 
 
 
 
MEPC69/7/2 began by reminding readers of the Paris COP and the upcoming signing of 
the Agreement. It went on to note the steps the IMO had already been taking to mitigate 
CO2 emissions. The paper emphasized the length of time since the last discussion on 
targets took place back in 2003. A key word from 68/5/1, ‘target’ had been dropped 
entirely and the words ‘fair’ and ‘share’ were used in this submission. MEPC69/7/2 
represented an attempt to rebrand the MEPC68 submission in more agreeable 
packaging.  
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The document simultaneously associated and disassociated with 68/5/1: 
 
‘More recently, at MEPC68, the Marshall Islands invited the Committee to continue 
discussions on how to define shipping's share (MEPC 68/5/1). This document also 
addressed other aspects, but it is not the intention of the co-sponsors to address all 
aspects in this document.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
 
The document displaced the ‘outside’ and brought it inside the MEPC in its iterations of 
global efforts and time, constructing these as persuasive pressure points, in an attempt 
to ‘interesse’ (engage) readers and align them with the text, thereby potentially enrolling 
them as supporters. The co-authors inserted quotes from the UNFCCC Agreement to 
further the persuasive alignment of the MEPC with wider international governance 
approaches. In addition, regulation is constructed as a market-stimulating device: 
 
‘The long-term objective would give a clear signal to the whole sector, create 
investment stability and stimulate research and development.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
 
This construction could be construed as an appeal to interesse the Industry Associations 
into aligning with the proposal. The shipping industry is an incredibly cost-focused one 
and problematizing regulation as economically stimulating is a tactic to gain support. 
The submission alluded to the threat of tougher future requirements if action is not 
presently and negative impacts on global trade and vulnerable countries. The co-
sponsors also laid out some aspects for the work plan:  
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The co-sponsors are of the view that the following aspects should be included in a work 
plan for development, discussion or decision:  
.1 the methodology to be used to define the required emission reduction effort of 
international shipping;  
.2 the type of GHGs that should be covered;  
.3 the reference years;  
.4 the long-term objective; and  
.5 the intermediary steps. 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
 
The co-sponsors also used this submission to pre-empt resistance in Plenary, based on 
the interventions at MEPC68, by stating:   
 
‘This work plan does not interfere with the MEPC's agreed three-phase approach 
(MEPC 68/21, paragraph 4.8) or the deliberations on the data collection system. The 
efforts to define a fair share should be one part of an overall strategic approach to tackle 
the GHG emissions of the shipping sector. While the data collection system can be 
consulted in the future as an up-to-date inventory, it need not necessarily play a role in 
defining the fair share.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
 
However, this pre-empting was not entirely successful which will be made clear in 
Section 6.5.2 where the proposal is followed in the Plenary discussion. The document 
concluded with a paragraph which contained a final invocation of the ‘outside’, a call-
to-arms type of statement, a nod to vulnerable states, a mention of equity and fairness, 
before it finished with the statement: 
 
We trust that IMO is the organization best equipped to take on this challenge. 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, 
and Solomon Islands) 
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At the time that MEPC69/7/2 was submitted, the IMO’s responsibility to regulate was 
being undermined by the rise of regional regulation, for example the EU Monitoring, 
Reporting and Verification System (EU MRV) (see Section 2.7). This statement 
reminds the Committee of the pressure to produce effective outputs or risk having its 
authority as a regulator destabilised. The next section examines the other submissions 
made under Agenda Item 7 in MEPC69, paying particular attention to those 
commenting on 69/7/2 either in support or opposition to it.  
 
6.5.1 MEPC69: Other Submissions  
This section examines the other submissions of MEPC69. These submissions lay out the 
positions of their sponsors and as such they open the process of translation and treason 
in advance of the meeting. The categories applied in Case Study 1 are reapplied here in 
order to organize the data and understand how the sociologies of translation and treason 
apply in the empirical setting. The three categories are: 
1. Supporters: Delegations/interventions that supported submission 69/7/2 with no 
or almost no changes. 
2. Modifiers: Delegations/interventions that support the essence but attempt to re-
shape details of the proposal. 
3. Resisters: Delegations/interventions that are in opposition to the proposal, 
attempt to re-problematize/distort the situation and grow their own network of 
resistance. 
 
Already a difference can be observed between MEPC68 and 69. Along with submission 
69/7/2, and excepting the Secretariat submission there were four other submissions to 
MEPC69 under agenda item 7, which illustrates the work that MEPC68/5/1 did to open 
up the GHG controversy and discussions of a target (as a MBM). Table 6.2 shows the 
submissions discussed. 
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Table 6.2: Other MEPC69 Submissions 
Submission Submitted by Title 
69/7 Secretariat  Outcomes of the United Nations 
Climate Change Conferences 
held in Bonn in June, August and 
October 2015 and Paris in 
December 2015 
69/7/1 International Chamber of Shipping 
(ICS) 
Proposal to develop an "Intended 
IMO Determined Contribution" 
on CO2 reduction for 
international shipping 
69/7/3 Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC) An appropriate IMO response to 
the Paris Agreement 
69/7/4 WSC (World Shipping Council), 
CLIA (Cruise Lines International 
Association), INTERTANKO and 
IPTA (International Parcel Tankers 
Association) 
Establishing a process for 
considering shipping’s 
appropriate contribution to 
reducing CO2 emissions 
 
The submission by the Secretariat was a simple update. The other three submissions 
were from COs, one from an NGO and two from Industry Associations and are 
discussed below.  
 
Submission 69/7/1 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the principal international trade 
association for the shipping industry. Their submission was a proposal for the MEPC to 
proceed on reducing CO2 emissions in the wake of the Paris Agreement: 
 ‘ICS proposes that the Organization should develop an Intended IMO Determined 
Contribution on CO2 reduction for the international shipping sector as a whole, taking 
account of the UNFCCC (COP 21) Paris Agreement’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/1, submitted by ICS) 
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It was submitted before 69/7/2, and does cite 68/5/1 as a related document. The 
submission began by asserting that the message from the UNFCCC COP21 and the 
following Paris Agreement was clear, that all sectors of the global economy are 
expected to peak CO2 emissions as soon as possible, before eventually decarbonizing 
completely. It went on to say that since the work on the DCS in the IMO is almost 
complete, ICS supports MEPC68/5/1 ‘in principle’. The document then states: 
 
‘An expectation that international shipping should somehow decarbonize at the same 
rate at which developed nations have committed to decarbonize their economies in their 
INDCs70 would therefore be inconsistent with the "spirit of Paris" and the principle of 
differentiation as set out in Article 2 of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/1, submitted by ICS) 
 
This statement raises the tensions between the IMO’s regulatory principles and those of 
other regulatory networks (see Chapter 7 for further discussion). ICS also stated 
concerns over low carbon fuel availability for Shipping stating that it will probably 
depend on fossil fuels for several decades. The rest of the submission is then spent 
proposing that the Committee follow the direction of the Paris COP and agree to 
develop and adopt an, ‘IMO Intended Contribution’. The absence of the word ‘target’, 
used in MEPC68/5/1 is notable. ICS re-problematizes their own ideal, the IMO 
Intended Contribution, and the reasoning behind it: 
 
‘ICS suggests that the term Intended IMO Determined Contribution is appropriate 
because the concept of reduction targets has not been applied to individual Parties under 
the UNFCCC Paris Agreement. This avoids the implication that some kind of sanction 
might follow any reduction target not being reached, which was one of the key reasons 
for the success of COP 21 and consensus being achieved among all nations. ICS sees no 
reason why the international shipping sector should be treated differently, and notes that 
binding global targets have not been developed for any other industrial sector.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/1, submitted by ICS) 
 
                                                
70 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
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This submission works to represent the industry interests in the regulatory process. 
Although it does align with the essence of 68/5/1 in that it argues for the creation of 
new CO2 reduction regulations in the form of an industry-wide contribution, it also 
constitutes a re-problematization by offering a different terminology, drawing in issues 
of regulatory principles and fuel availability.  
 
Submission 69/7/3 
This submission made by the CSC71 suggests four key areas in which the MEPC can 
make progress if it is, ‘to remain relevant and respond in an appropriate and timely 
manner to Paris’. These are: 
 
‘…agreement on a work plan to identify shipping's fair share of GHG emission 
reductions, continuation of work leading to revised phase 2 EEDI requirements, 
agreement to advance consideration of measures for existing ships including MBMs 
and adoption of a transparent global MRV system.’  
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/3, submitted by CSC) 
 
This text, submitted after MEPC69/7/2, works to support both it and the original 
MEPC68/5/1 proposal. The submission enrols ‘Paris’ by quoting directly from the 
Agreement to construct a persuasive pressure. It also quotes the ICS submission in an 
effort to connect together the possible alignments between the core of submission 
69/7/2 and 69/7/1: 
 
‘For the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) "the message from the UNFCCC 
Conference (COP 21) and the Paris Agreement is clear. All sectors of the global 
economy are now expected to determine how they can reach peak CO2 emissions as 
soon as possible before eventually decarbonising completely" and it agrees "that 
international shipping must play its full part in contributing to this objective"’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/3, submitted by CSC) 
                                                
71 The CSC are a coalition of the organisations: AirClim, Bellona, Clean Air Task Force, Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF), Transport and Environment (T&E), Oceana, Seas At Risk, Stichting De Noordzee 
and Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU). 
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The CSC made use of the terminology ‘fair share’ which associates their submission as 
a supporter of MEPC69/7/2 and they conclude with the statement: 
 
‘The decisions that MEPC 69 takes on these issues will be a "litmus test" of the IMO 
and its Member States' determination to play a meaningful role in the fight against 
climate change.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/3, submitted by CSC) 
 
Echoing MEPC69/7/2 this statement challenges the MEPC. The CSC make it clear that 
they consider this meeting to be decisively indicative of how the MEPC will choose to 
regulate CO2 in light of the Paris Agreement. The submission supports both the past 
submission 68/5/1 and the current submission 69/7/2 though it also works to provide a 
wider criticism of the current state of IMO MEPC regulation.  
 
Submission 69/7/4 
The final submission, a commentary paper, is from four industry associations. Rather 
than explicitly supporting 69/7/2, the co-sponsors state that they: 
 
‘…support an open, structured and deliberative process to consider what should be the 
long-term carbon objective for international shipping. A process such as that outlined in 
document MEPC 69/7/2 could initiate that discussion, although in our view the 
proposed schedule would require adjustment to reflect the complexity of the subject 
matter.’ 
(Excerpt from: MEPC69/7/4, submitted by WSC, CLIA, INTERTANKO and IPTA) 
 
Therefore, this submission is a modifier. It is vaguely supportive of the notions of 
MEPC 69/7/2 yet equally the co-sponsors hope to modify the timetable of the proposal. 
They also comment that the DCS should remain a priority and in this way they modify 
the contents of 69/7/2 as something that is better postponed until the DCS is completed.  
 
Despite the differences and modifications, all of the submissions go some way to 
support and align with the core ideals of 69/7/2. Treason, it seems, is not so simple in 
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the IMO. Efforts to reproblematize (i.e. distort) do not change the proposal entirely, but 
attempt to nudge it in slightly different directions according to the agendas of the 
submitters. The submissions begin to reveal that growing a mobilized network in the 
MEPC and successful translation require a process of negotiation, modification and 
dilution of the initial problematization. The next section will examine the MEPC69 
Plenary discussion and sort the interventions into three categories: supporters, 
modifiers, and resisters. 
 
6.5.2 MEPC69 Plenary Discussion 
The discussion began with a short comment by the Secretariat about their participation 
and representation of IMO in UNFCCC meetings in the lead up to COP21. Following 
this, a member of the UNFCCC Delegation gave a detailed update about COP21, the 
resulting Agreement and the expectations upon the MEPC in the wake of these events. 
A UNFCCC Delegate also emphasised the aim to keep global temperature rise below 2 
degrees, with the highly desired limit having been established as 1.5 degrees. The need 
for industry sectors to do their part to peak emissions as soon as possible and move 
towards a decarbonized state was also iterated. The Delegate highlighted that the 
agreement has some differentiation between countries of differing states of development 
and vulnerability and that the emphasis is on cooperation. 
 
After the UNFCCC Delegate spoke, the Secretary General made a short speech lauding 
the achievement of the Paris Agreement, but also noting the IMO’s own achievements 
and finishing with a reference to the EEDI. Introductions of submissions followed this. 
In the case of the joint submissions the Solomon Islands and the World Shipping 
Council introduced 69/7/2 and 69/7/4 respectively. For the most part, the introductions 
summarized and re-iterated the main points of the submissions following the order 
listed in Table 6.2. Notably ICS took the opportunity to assert that the ideas contained 
in their submission should be carried forward and discussed at MEPC70 rather than 
during MEPC69. The floor was then opened for comments.  
 
Not every Member made an intervention and so there are certain states that sit outside 
the networks, being neither a supporter, modifier nor resister. Due to confidentiality 
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requirements of the IMO as have been addressed Section 4.9.5, Member States cannot 
be named in connection with their interventions or directly quoted. As such, this section 
constructs an overview of the main arguments associated with the categories above.  
 
Category 1: Supporters  
Member States in this category voiced their admiration for COP21 and the Paris 
Agreement as a progressive step forward. Their interventions showed support for 
Submission 69/7/2 and attempted to persuade further Delegations to support the 
proposal. Generally, they drew on scientific research concerning climate change and 
expressed empathy for the problems facing low-lying vulnerable islands, such as the 
Marshall Islands. Timing was constructed as a pressure device and often enrolled along 
with the Paris Agreement in an attempt to gather support. Many also commented on the 
need to show ‘the world’ i.e. the world outside of the shipping industry that the IMO is 
accepting the responsibility to progress CO2 reductions further. There were a few 
interventions that included a comment about failure to agree to fulfil 69/7/2 in the wake 
of Paris being an indication of the unsuitability of the IMO to regulate the international 
shipping industry. 
 
Category 2: Modifiers  
Delegations falling into this category were supportive of the need for further discussion 
and work on reduction of CO2 emissions but also attempted to modify the proposal in 
69/7/2. Modifiers suggested prioritizing finishing the DCS by focusing on it during 
MEPC69, thereby delaying full discussion of 69/7/2’s proposal until MEPC70. This 
was even done by ICS with their request to forward their own submission to MEPC70. 
The attempt to modify the proposal was to reframe the request to develop a ‘fair share’ 
as part of a three-step process already underway in the IMO. This would push the 
discussion of a ‘fair share’ back years, until after the data collection and analysis stage 
of the DCS regulation were complete. Those supporting this temporal distortion 
emphasized the need for any policy decisions to be based on ‘real’ data (rather than 
projected). Some modifiers also drew on the argument that Shipping as a servant of 
trade is not entirely in control of its own emissions because in responding to rising 
demand for their service, their emissions rise in relation. The issue with the modifiers is 
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that while they are not attempting a process of treason, i.e. to completely lock the 
Marshall Islands proposal out of the network of discussion, they often attempt to change 
the agenda to a point beyond recognition.  
 
Category 3: ‘Resisters’ 
Although the majority of Delegations fell into category 1 and 2, there were some 
resisters. The Members in this category distorted the proposal and attempted to create a 
network of opposition to ensure the rejection of 69/7/2. The resisters built their 
opposition on various reasons. One distortion was that the proposal was premature. 
Another re-problematization involved the issue of harmonizing different environmental 
regulatory principles, namely the principle of Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities (CBDR), which is external to the IMO, and the principle of Non-
Discrimination, which is held by the IMO. These principles will be discussed fully in 
Chapter 7. Resisters argued that the principles would need to be reconciled in the MEPC 
before any discussion of assigning fair share could take place. In essence their distortion 
amounts to the harmonization of two principles which, at their core, are in opposition. 
In order to do this, any discussion of fair share would need to be postponed. Thus, their 
distortion is a temporal one.  
 
These Members also reframed and enrolled the ‘Paris’ discussions to point out that 
shipping, by serving trade demands, helps the growth of poorer and less developed 
economies. Resisters expressed concerns that regulations that sanction or restrict 
Shipping in any way, could damage these countries. Some also expressed displeasure at 
the thought of multiple agenda items with intertwining content. As noted in Chapter 4, 
there are three agenda items in the MEPC with relevance to emissions.  
 
Resisters did not support the proposal in 69/7/2 or further discussions of it. Three of the 
resister Delegations requested their statements be annexed to the MEPC report. Two 
statements from Brazil and India were in English and one statement from Argentina was 
written in Spanish. The content of these statements can be used to illustrate the 
resistance to 69/7/2 more clearly.  
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The statement from Argentina opens by aligning with its network of opposition, i.e. 
China, Brazil, Panama and India. It continued by raising the issue of CBDR and the 
need to prioritize the DCS before finishing by re-problematizing the proposal as 
premature. Brazil draw upon the conflicting regulatory principles in their resistance:  
 
‘Important political decisions remain unaddressed by IMO, both at a technical and a 
political level, including the right balance to be struck between the basics principles of 
'common but differentiated responsibility' (CBDR) and non-discrimination.  
The provision for nationally determined contributions (NDC) is at the core of the Paris 
Agreement. Proposals to establish a global target for ships of all countries, 
indiscriminately, would fail the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC because they 
disregard the differentiation between developed and developing countries.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC 69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, page 6)  
 
Brazil noted the role shipping plays for developing economies and felt that economic 
impact of regulation must be considered: 
 
‘Furthermore, we urge the Committee to consider the impact of any measures adopted 
by IMO on international trade and the development of all countries, in particular 
developing countries, that already pay 40 to 70 per cent more on average for the 
international transport of their imports when compared to developed countries, 
according to the 2015 Review of Maritime Transport published by UNCTAD.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC 69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, page 6)  
 
Brazil suggested that the impact of current measures should be assessed before any 
discussion of adopting new measures. They closed their statement with a declaration of 
resistance: 
 
At this time, Brazil cannot support the launch of negotiations on a sectorial target for 
international shipping." 
(Excerpt from MEPC 69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, page 6)  
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India reiterated the need to assess the impact of current measures and the need by the 
Committee to address questions of maintaining the balance between:  
 
‘…the basic principles of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities' (CBDR – RC) and non-discrimination’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC 69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, page 7)  
 
They went on to echo Brazil about the vital role of Shipping in facilitating world trade 
and social and economic growth and finished with the statement: 
 
We also support (in principle) views expressed by distinguished Delegations of China 
and Brazil." 
(Excerpt from MEPC 69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, page 7)  
 
Although a minority, the resisters have tightly associated their network of resistance and 
formalised it in the meeting report. The following section focuses the outcome of 
MEPC69 by tracing the discussion of the Chairman’s summary and attempts to bring 
the divergent interests to Consensus. 
 
6.5.3 MEPC69 Outcome 
Much of the Plenary discussion was spent with Delegations debating whether or not 
there was a need to open a discussion about further measures to reduce CO2 and initiate 
a work plan. After hearing all interventions, the Chairman read out an eight-point 
summary of the discussion. This summary would go into the meeting report and so 
would become a record of the discussion, points of majority agreement and the basis of 
the work for the next meeting. The points of summary (paraphrased) were: 
1. The IMO welcomes the achievement of Paris discussions and the Agreement as 
a major achievement. 
2. The Committee emphasizes that current methods to enhance energy efficiency 
adopted by the IMO are recognized and commended.   
3. It is recognized that further appropriate enhancement of shipping can and should 
be pursued.  
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4. The IMO commitment to the Paris Agreement is recognized.  
5. There was understanding that approval and adoption of the DCS was a priority.  
6. The three-step approach of data collection, analysis and decision-making is 
acknowledged.  
7. The development of a work plan for an appropriate long-term objective for the 
Organization should be properly structured and also should consider the issues 
raised in the extensive debate. 
8. Details of the work plan would be considered at MEPC70 with the establishment 
of a WG which would take into account all documents submitted at this session 
69 and invite further proposals for MEPC70.  
 
Name cards, signalling the wish to speak, immediately went up. As the interventions 
were made, it was clear that the room was split. Most Delegations agreed with the 
summary however resisters signified disagreement with points 7 and 8. In response to 
this, the Chairman called for a break appealing to the Delegates to be constructive in 
helping him summarize the discussion.  
 
The meeting resumed a short while later. The Chairman began by taking each point 
individually and opening the floor for its discussion in order to identify the points of 
controversy. There was wide agreement for all but points 7 and 8. The Chairman 
suggested that some Delegations were attempting to open up the actual debate again, 
rather than comment on the correctness of the summary. One resister claimed that there 
had not been majority support for the creation of a work plan. Another resister intimated 
that the Chairman may have been letting his personal bias feed into his summary. 
Although the Chairman replied politely, the atmosphere became tense at this comment.  
 
Discussions in the IMO need to reach a Consensus decision. There was a network of 
support for both points remaining and a network of resistance calling for the removal of 
both points. As such, the Chairman suggested a compromise in the form of keeping only 
point 8.  He reasoned that not only was this a compromise, but that due to the discussion 
today, the lack of decision and the points raised, there was a clear need for further 
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discussion, and that would best take the form of a WG at MEPC70. After some further 
interventions this was finally (and reluctantly by some) accepted.  
 
In the final analysis, Submission 69/7/2 was not translated unaltered. It underwent 
reframing and re-problematizing and was ultimately modified before it was taken 
forward. While a work plan was not agreed at MEPC69, the establishment of a WG for 
this discussion at MEPC70 represented a successful compromise. The main 
modification desired by modifiers was postponement, which was achieved. The WG 
also provides a further forum for modifiers to rework future proposals and embed their 
interests. Those who sought to reject i.e. treason 69/7/2 were not able to, however, their 
resistance stalled action and the further discussion would provide them new opportunity 
for attempts build opposition.  
 
Network growth in the MEPC comes at the price of diluting and changing your agenda 
in order to progress through the stages of translation. Therefore, networking is 
simultaneously strengthening and weakening the problematizer’s agenda. Even though 
the network for support was larger and more diverse than the network of resistance, the 
problematizers did not gain a position of durable power in the MEPC. Equally the 
resisters, though able to stall the proposal, could not reject any co-sponsor from MEPC 
as the sociology of treason would suggest. Prior to discussing the relevance of these 
findings in relation to the literature, the next section details the third and final case.  
 
6.6 Case Study 3: Submission 70/7/6 
The submission entitled, ‘International shipping's share in international efforts to limit 
the rise of global average temperature – further clarifications’ was submitted on the 19th 
August 2016 by Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Côte’Ivoire, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Morocco, Solomon Islands and Tonga. The 
network co-sponsoring Submission 69/7/2 had been extended to include five new 
members. This network is a careful balance of regional diversity and economic 
development making it a strong network, as discussed in Section 6.2.2. The 
representation of different states of economic development by the co-authorship may 
have been a response to one of the arguments of the resisters in MEPC69; that 
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regulations sanctioning or restricting shipping activity could result in damage to the 
economic growth of less developed countries. If the vulnerable states themselves put 
their name to the proposal, it throws doubt on this argument. Indeed the submission 
repeatedly states that agreement on a fair share will not, itself, increase transport costs. 
Here, the attempt to reshape the content of submissions to interesse further support can 
be seen. The support network that surrounded 69/7/2 did not achieve its aim without 
undergoing moments of modification and resistance. However, the network did not 
collapse or disperse. Instead they remained together, gathered new members and drafted 
a new text. Thus, the attempt to translate their agenda goes on. The figure below 
presents the network growth from MEPC68 to 70. 
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Figure 6.2: Network Growth from MEPC68 to MEPC69 (Source: Author’s own) 
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Submission 70/7/6 responded to the MEPC69 debate and reiterated the need for the 
IMO to define a ‘fair share’. It clarified the complimentary connection with the DCS but 
provided a separate timeline for the fair share discussions. As mentioned it states that 
transport costs will not increase by assignment of a fair share. The co-sponsors, 
therefore, enrol the document to pre-empt and alleviate concerns, which could be used 
to ‘treason’ the proposal.  
 
The document raises the possibility of launching the discussion of a fair share 
immediately, using available data and then supplementing this with new data gathered 
from the DCS: 
 
Preliminary discussion of shipping's fair share could be facilitated using currently 
available data (e.g. from IMO's GHG studies), with further refinements and calculations 
informed using data obtained from IMO's data collection system. In this way, the fair 
share discussions can be informed by and benefit from IMO's three-step approach, but 
can progress immediately’  
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/6, submitted by Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Côte’Ivoire, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Morocco, Solomon Islands and Tonga) 
 
The submission made a time-based appeal to further assert the core of the argument: 
 
Where other countries will review their commitments in 2018 and 2020, the three-step 
approach alone would not permit IMO to reach any outcome before 2021-2023 but a 
combination of the two concepts will allow the Organization to show progress and 
prove leadership in this issue. 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/6, submitted by Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Côte’Ivoire, Denmark, France, 
Germany, the Marshall Islands, Monaco, Morocco, Solomon Islands and Tonga) 
 
The document finished by inviting the Committee to consider the fair share proposal to 
reduce GHG emissions and develop a work plan and timeline to define that share (see 
Appendix 6 for Timeline). 
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6.6.1 MEPC70: Other Submissions   
There were fifteen submissions under agenda item 7 with the case submission 70/7/6 
being the 6th. This section will discuss the submissions that lay out support, 
modification or resistance to 70/7/6. As such, the submissions discussed have been 
narrowed to 70/7/3 – 70/7/5 and 70/7/7 – 70/7/14. While the codes denote the 
chronology of the submissions, this section has been structured thematically. The 
section begins by discussing the resisters, moving on to modifiers then to supporters.  
 
Submission 70/7/4 was co-sponsored by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, 
Iran, South Africa and Uruguay. As was discussed in the case study of MEPC69, Brazil 
and India were resisters to the original fair share proposal. Submission 70/7/4 
considered a possible future measure that might result from the ‘fair share’ or 
‘contribution’ discussions, an overall emissions cap. The submission then went on to 
suggest an alternative: 
 
Rather than setting an absolute reduction target or an overall cap, IMO should focus its 
contributions on further enhancing energy efficiency and encouraging the uptake of 
alternative fuels. 
(Excerpt from MEPC 70/7/4, submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South 
Africa and Uruguay) 
 
The submission emphasized shipping as a facilitator of trade and quoted a previous 
IMO Secretary General: 
 
‘…measures aimed at reducing shipping's overall contribution of CO2 emissions, such 
as a global overall cap, "would artificially limit the ability of shipping to meet the 
demand created by the world economy, or would un-level the level playing field that the 
shipping industry needs for efficient operation, and therefore must be avoided.”.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC 70/7/4, submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South 
Africa and Uruguay) 
 
The submission went on to question the need for discussion under agenda item 7 and 
prioritized the work on the DCS. By doing this they were attempting to cast doubt on 
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the need for the WG, which had been determined at MEPC69. Thus this submission 
captures and continues the resistance of these Member States to the proposals of the 
Marshall Islands et al. and constitutes an attempt to distort and reject. 
 
Submission 70/7/7 by the Republic of Turkey also represents resistance. In it they 
attempted to dissuade the Committee from discussion of further instruments until the 
DCS system is finalized, implemented and provides the Committee with data. On this 
basis they included a timetable that delayed a decision about further measures until 
2024. They posited the IMO as a promoter for increasing efficiency and using 
alternative fuels, rather than a regulator and boldly framed shipping itself as a CO2 
mitigation measure: 
 
…using of shipping instead of other transport modes on the purpose of reducing GHG 
emissions is of itself main preventative measure in the world.  
(Excerpt from 70/7/7, submitted by Republic of Turkey) 
 
As with most resister distortions, emphasis was placed on economics and growth: 
 
‘…any measures to be taken to limit the emissions of shipping…should not suppress the 
growth of international shipping in any way. Within this scope, we would like to call 
the attention of the Committee to this sensitive issue to plot the sector's route with a 
Turkish proverb by asking: Is our main goal to eat grapes or to beat the grape grower?’ 
(Excerpt from 70/7/7, submitted by Republic of Turkey)  
 
Moving on from the resisters the modifiers will now be presented starting from the 
submissions that suggest the highest level of modification though postponement, to 
proposals with a lower level of modification. Submission 70/7/8 was co-authored by a 
network of industry associations, among them, ICS, the organisation that proposed the 
IMO Determined Contribution in MEPC69 (Submission 69/7/1). Submission 70/7/8 
begins to integrate the wording ‘fair share’, combining it with the wording of ICS to 
produce a proposal for a ‘fair share contribution’: 
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‘The following submission proposes the development of a road map to determine a 
possible IMO fair share contribution on CO2 emissions…’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/8, submitted by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and WSC) 
 
This submission also criticized the ‘unrealistically high’ CO2 scenarios, used to model 
future emissions trends in the Third IMO GHG Study72 and prioritized obtaining the 
data from the DCS before taking any decision. This would push any decision on 
measures further back than 69/7/2 and 70/7/6 proposed. The co-authors, like the 
Republic of Turkey, positioned shipping as a CO2 mitigation method itself, and seemed 
to suggest that the IMO should keep shipping as an attractive option for trade before 
considering limitations: 
 
‘Shipping is already, by far, the most energy efficient form of commercial transport. 
Any increase in shipping activity due to a shift from other less efficient transport modes 
will in fact contribute to an overall reduction in the world's total CO2 emissions. On the 
other hand, an unrealistic contribution to reduce the sector's absolute CO2 emissions 
could lead to a shift to less energy efficient transport modes…The opportunity to switch 
from land and air based transport modes to shipping should be encouraged.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/8, submitted by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO and WSC) 
 
Although there are clear efforts to modify the proposals of 69/7/2 and 70/7/6 through 
postponement and reframing, there is still an acknowledgement that more work on 
reducing CO2 is needed. The submitters use the terminology Road Map thereby 
associating with 70/7/4, however despite the supportive rhetoric of the submission, the 
modifications suggested in the submission take it towards a similar level as the 
preferences of resisters.  
 
Submission 70/7/8 was supported by submission 70/7/9; a commentary submission 
from the International Association of Ports and Harbors’ (IAPH) and again by 
submission 70/7/12 from industry association Cruise Lines International Association 
                                                
72 The GHG Studies are comprehensive research studies commissioned by the IMO.  
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(CLIA). Together these three submissions capture the views and proposals of 7 key 
Industry Associations. The three submissions are supportive of further work to reduce 
GHG emissions however they also modify and distort the timetable by postponing 
decisions until after the establishment and application of the DCS. 
 
Three MEPC70 submissions were supportive modifiers. Submission 70/7/3 by Japan 
proposes development of a GHG reduction target based on the energy efficiency of 
ships. As such, the submission represents a general acceptance of the need to define a 
‘fair share’ target and proposes a methodology to achieve this making it a supportive 
and modifying submission. Norway and the United States co-sponsored submission 
70/7/5 which proposed the development of a long-term strategy to address GHG 
emissions from ships: 
 
We share the view that IMO should provide a long-term vision for the sector on how to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but question whether IMO should solely focus its 
efforts on defining a target. 
Rather, the co-sponsors propose that the IMO develop a long-term strategy…The 
process of developing a long-term strategy would include discussions of a long-term 
target, but its primary focus would be to provide tangible outputs to guide near- and 
long-term action and investments throughout the sector. 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/5, submitted by Norway and United States) 
 
This submission is a supportive-modifier because it supported the core aim in 69/7/2 but 
repackaged the work in a different form. There are many similarities to the ‘fair share’ 
proposal, however, the submission moves emphasis away from only working on a target 
for the industry and towards an accumulation of reductions through different measures 
under the banner of a long-term strategy. The submission envisioned completing 
development of this strategy by 2018. 
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The International Cargo Handling Coordination Association (ICHCA) suggested that 
the Committee take account of the approach of ICAO73 in its attempts to reduce 
emissions from the aviation industry in submission 70/7/10. The ICAO approach 
involves a strategy to progress technology, operations and uptake of alternative fuels, 
with the remaining reductions coming from a carbon-offsetting scheme. This 
submission is supportive with the core aim of 70/7/6, and offers a modification through 
a possible methodology.  
 
Two supporting submissions were 70/7/11 and 70/7/14. Submission 70/7/11 by the CSC 
welcomed the increased amount of attention under agenda item 7. They echoed their 
MEPC69 submission (69/7/3) by criticizing the EEDI levels, and the level of 
transparency of the DCS. They asserted the need for the ‘fair share’ discussion to be a 
priority of MEPC70 with enough time and resources dedicated to it. Essentially, they 
remained a supporter of 69/7/2 and 70/7/6. They went on to raise concerns about the 
level of ambition and timelines of some of the MEPC70 proposals and warned that 
postponement may be detrimental: 
 
The later action is taken, and some are suggesting that no new measures are agreed or 
even discussed for 10 years, the harder it will be for the industry to adjust.  
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/11, submitted by CSC) 
 
The final submission by Canada, 70/7/14, commented on 70/7/3, 70/7/4, 70/7/5, 70/7/6 
and 70/7/7. They supported discussion immediately and the original timeline in 70/7/6. 
Their only reservation was the terminology ‘fair share’. Canada stated that they would 
prefer the ICS terminology of ‘IMO Determined Contribution’. They also supported 
part of the Japanese submission, particularly the idea of an ambition cycle. This 
submission therefore falls into the category of supporter.  
 
                                                
73 ICAO is the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is also a UN specialized agency like the IMO, 
but deals with air transport.  
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Submission 70/7/13 was a commentary co-sponsored by most of the original 
problematizers. Submitted by Antigua & Barbuda, Belgium, France, Germany, the 
Marshall Islands, Monaco, the Netherlands, the Solomon Islands and Tonga it 
represented an extension of the problematization of 70/7/6. Interestingly, some of the 
co-sponsors of 70/7/6 (Denmark, Morocco and Côte d’Ivoire) were not named as co-
sponsors to this submission and we also see a new addition of the Netherlands. The 
submission built on the work of 70/7/6 and attempted to answer resistance and correct 
some distortions. The co-authors made use of stabilized and archived past precedent, 
and attempted to persuade the resistors that they have historically been in line with the 
fair share terminology: 
 
‘…it is noted that document MEPC 69/7/2 is not the first introduction of fairness to the 
IMO MEPC discussions on GHG. For example, in document MEPC 57/4/27 South 
Africa stated that "shipping should contribute fairly to reducing GHG emissions, but 
there is no global emission measure to align a reduction target for the shipping sector 
with yet." In document MEPC 57/21, India's statement was referenced: "India expressed 
the view that any IMO framework on GHG emission reductions from shipping should: 
have a shared vision for long-term co-operative action, including a long-term goal for 
emission reductions; contribute fairly to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC in 
accordance with its provisions (…)".’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/13, submitted by Antigua & Barbuda, Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall 
Islands, Monaco, the Netherlands, the Solomon Islands and Tonga) 
 
The co-authors also suggested some methodologies for defining a ‘fair share 
contribution’ from shipping. For the most part, the document was concerned with 
overcoming distortions and resistance. They re-iterated a point from their earlier 
submission, that assigning a ‘fair share contribution’ would not automatically increase 
transport costs.  
 
In summary, two submissions showed outright resistance, three Industry submissions 
were supportive in rhetoric but heavily modified the timescale of 70/7/6. Three 
submissions were supportive modifiers and two submissions showed support. There 
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were many attempts to modify the proposal in 70/7/6 from its wording, to the aim and 
timeline. At the same time, in modification, there is also acceptance. The increased 
amount of submissions shows that the work of the Marshall Islands has focused the 
attention of the Committee on this issue. Equally, the resistance shown in MEPC69 
remained strong and the network of resistance contained the same Delegations. The 
following section traces the reactions to the proposal in the Plenary discussion at 
MEPC70.   
 
6.6.2 MEPC70: Plenary Discussion 
The majority of the Plenary discussion was spent with the Delegations vocalizing 
support for the proposals, emphasizing particular points and explaining their reasoning. 
The process took hours and towards the end the Chairman requested that Delegations 
shorten their interventions. Some Delegations brought up releasing the WG as soon as 
possible to begin their deliberations, which emphasizes time as a limiting factor for 
controversial discussions that the Chairman must work around, echoing back to Section 
5.2.3 in Chapter 5. 
 
During Plenary there was majority support for submission 70/7/6. Many interventions 
specifically supported its timeline and nearly all supporting Delegates felt that 
discussions under this proposal could start immediately and in parallel to the three-step 
approach of the DCS. Some supportive Delegations specifically stated they could not 
support submissions 70/7/4 and 70/7/7 (i.e. the resisters). Other Delegations supported 
the proposal but distorted the time line, placing the decision at the time of the third step 
of three-step approach. There was also support for the Norway-United States proposal 
(70/7/5), with one Delegation suggesting that it might be a bridging document between 
submissions and another Delegation later supported this positioning. Here again, we can 
see that translation requires modification and a combination of compromise and 
dilution. The resisters mobilized their own network of opposition to speak against the 
progress 70/7/6 and similar proposals, continually re-iterating their network Members 
and their arguments.  
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From the above, it is clear that submissions can pre-script a meeting however at this 
Plenary, the Cook Islands introduced a new element for discussion; the creation of a 
standalone group to address reduction of GHG emissions from ships. The Delegate 
from the Cook Islands requested the statement to be annexed to the report. The 
reasoning by the Cook Islands was that:  
 
‘The MEPC cannot continue to operate as it has in recent years, with all the emphasis 
and now all the working groups dedicated to one issue, namely the important but 
contentious issue of GHG emissions from international shipping. This has been to the 
detriment of proper and timely consideration of the many other and more traditional 
issues that are clearly within the Committee's mandate and can no longer be considered 
acceptable. We must, in recognizing the importance of these highly charged issues, 
show some vision and accept that for the Organisation to fulfil its destiny and not get 
bogged down in endless standoffs…In our view the best approach is not to continue 
having working groups that are clearly linked and working in parallel. This has the 
effect of denying smaller delegations, most notably the SIDS and LDC members most 
at risk from the effects of climate change, the opportunity to engage fully in the process, 
regardless of the number of committee meeting days allocated.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/18/Add.1 Annex 22, page 7) 
 
The suggestion was to: 
 
‘…to send a clear and unambiguous signal to other agencies that we are in control, and 
to demonstrate that the Organization can rise above the vested interests and inflexible 
procedures that have and may continue to inhibit progress on these sensitive and 
contentious issues, we must consider allocating adequate time and space for these 
specific discussions to take place. To our mind this can only be done by establishing a 
"Standalone Group" considering "Further measures to reduce the carbon 
footprint of international shipping""’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/18/Add.1 Annex 22, page 7; original emphasis) 
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Although this gathered some support, this construction is a modifying distortion. Setting 
up a new stand-alone group would take time, discussion, planning and organisation. 
Thus, the focus would be transferred away from the proposal of assigning a fair share 
itself and towards the logistics of the establishment of the new group. It could take 
months or years to establish the group and only then would the focus return the subject 
of fair share. Indeed, discussion of this suggestion ended up taking hours of the limited 
time of the WG, yet nothing was decided or established and so the concept had to be 
side-lined in order to make some progress on the original proposals. This particular 
show of resistance took the form of diverting and stalling the discussion. Once the 
Chairman had heard all interventions, the WG was then ‘released’ to go about its work.  
 
6.6.3 MEPC 70: Working Group Discussion 
The ‘Terms of Reference’ for the WG that were set in Plenary are shown below: 
 
 
(MEPC 70/WP.2)  
 
The WG Chairman had been in both the MEPC69 Plenary discussion and MEPC70 
Plenary discussion of agenda item 7. He had taken note of the interventions and 
combined these with the commonalities amongst submissions to create a ‘base 
document’ for the group to start working on.  
 
The group proceeded to discuss the various elements of the base document, from the 
title, dates, goals, and level of ambition. Although the Chairman had advised the group 
to avoid getting ‘bogged’ down in terminology, long periods were spent debating 
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precise terms or wordings. The MEPC’s reliance on past precedent or agreed wording 
means that great efforts are made to consider possible interpretations of a particular 
word or phrasing and adjust according to the interests and aim of the group. The WG 
discussions were long and ended at around 23:40 on their first night and went all the 
way to 01:30 the next (having started at 08:30).  
 
The Cook Islands’ proposal of a stand-alone group was raised and there was general 
agreement with the concept. The discussion of a standalone group took up valuable time 
(most of the first evening) without the group being able to agree on details. As such it 
could be construed as a tactical move to divert the discussion and so use up some of the 
limited time. As time went on it became clear that the idea required much more 
discussion and so the group decided to side-line the option (though not reject it) with 
the aim of making some immediate progress on the original submitted proposals.  
 
From there, points of controversy during the complex discussion included the timeline, 
activities, dates, and emphasis on SIDSs and LDCs in the base document. The second 
day of discussing and drafting the document was the longest. The discussion in the WG 
ebbed and flowed between moments of translation and moments of resistance echoing 
those discussions from Plenary. There was much discussion on the availability of 
current data to assist in policy making and its usefulness. Some were of the opinion, as 
already seen in Plenary discussions, that only data from the DCS could be used to make 
decisions.  
 
The issue of harmonizing CBDR and non-discrimination was revisited by some 
Delegations. Later in the evening a Delegate from a CO sitting beside me commented, 
sotto voce, ‘they are going in circles’ and began to pack up to leave. Other Delegates 
trickled out as it got later. The remaining Delegates pushed on and achieved Consensus 
on a timeline which was annexed to the WG report to be agreed in Plenary on the last 
day of the MEPC. The timeline was agreed by Plenary and is shown in Appendix 6 of 
this document.  
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6.6.4 MEPC70: Outcome 
Submission 70/7/6 put the identification of a provisional fair share in April 2018-
October 2018 at MEPC72 and 73. The agreed text annexed to the MEPC70 report puts 
adoption of an initial strategy, which appears to be a list of measures rather than a target 
or share, in MEPC72 in 2018 but with a decision at MEPC78 in Spring 2022. The two 
timelines are presented for comparison in Appendix 6. The proposal to define and 
assign a ‘fair share’ contribution from shipping to global CO2 reduction efforts became 
a ‘Roadmap for Developing a Comprehensive IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG 
Emissions from Ships’. The new timeline placed the adoption of an ‘initial IMO 
Strategy’ which would include, ‘inter alia, a list of candidate short-, mid- and long term 
further measures with possible timelines, to be revised as appropriate as additional 
information becomes available’ at MEPC72 in Spring 2018. This aligns with the 
‘Identification of a provisional fair share and discussion of any further work/steps that 
this implies’, set for MEPC72 in 70/7/6. However, the new timeline also puts a decision 
step at MEPC78 in Spring 2022 and revision of the strategy, in Spring 2023 at 
MEPC80.  
 
The essence of Submission 70/7/6 was that discussion should start immediately, carried 
out independently of the DCS and a ‘fair share’ may be defined using available data. 
The WG re-problematized ‘fair share’ to ‘IMO strategy’ and their timeline offers a plan 
to create this strategy.  Submission 70/7/6 expressed concern that focusing on the three-
step approach alone would not permit the MEPC to reach any outcome before 2021-
2023. This appears to be exactly what the newly agreed timeline suggests. When the 
WG returned to Plenary one CO expressed their discontent with the lack of ambition 
shown.  
 
Submission 70/7/6, though gaining much support in Plenary and the WG, has been 
distorted through the process and its problematization diluted. Furthermore, the genesis 
proposal (submission 68/5/1) from Case Study 1 had requested immediate discussion of 
a target and measures to achieve it. Two MEPC submissions and one larger, stronger 
network later, the outcome was the establishment of a WG and a Roadmap to a 
comprehensive strategy to reduce GHG emissions. The translation of the interests of the 
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Marshall Islands and its network has therefore not been entirely successful but it has not 
been entirely unsuccessful either. While no target or MBM has yet been agreed, the 
submissions have opened this black-boxed discussion and unleashed the controversy 
(Cloatre & Dingwall 2013; Venturini 2012; Venturini 2009). The case studies show that 
in the MEPC, translation means compromise, cooperation and even the dilution of the 
problematization. The insights gained from the Case Studies will be expanded on in the 
following discussion.  
 
6.7 Discussion 
In ANT literature translation and treason have been applied individually and separately. 
Moreover, they have been applied retrospectively to examine empirical contexts. This 
chapter combines them, and in doing so, demonstrates this as a viable and valuable 
addition to the application of ANT, particularly as a framing for untangling and 
understanding international regulatory discussions. The chapter also demonstrated their 
suitability for analysis of real-time data. This section summarizes the main findings of 
this chapter. 
 
6.7.1 Strategic Selection 
Translation has been shown in the IMO to be a process of network building, agenda 
creation, text re-working and mobilization of support. The process of Outreach involves 
the stages of interessement and enrolment. How actors are chosen to join the network by 
the problematizer has not been discussed in the literature in great detail. The data from 
this research shows a strategic and careful selection process is carried out. The aim for 
the problematizers is to orchestrate specific characteristics into their network to achieve 
their goal. In the case of the MEPC, they aim for a deliberate balance of similarity and 
difference. Similarity is sought in the context of national positions, ideas and ideals. 
Geographical distance and economic difference are desired characteristics to create 
convincing network variety. The data also further shows that enrolment is not always 
one directional, with some Delegates offering support upon reading the draft or final 
submission.  
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6.7.2 Reaction Categories 
The submissions and interventions were analysed and sorted into categories; supporters, 
modifiers and resisters. The MEPC discussions are extremely complex and last for 
hours or days at a time (in the case of WG discussions). Interventions can be vague and 
due to the speech-like style of Plenary and the less structured style of WG discussions, 
it can be extremely hard to sort through the micro interactions to create a macro account 
of the networks of support and resistance. Thus, this chapter shows that combining 
translation and treason allows actors’ responses to be organised into a rich account of 
the complex and controversial negotiations. Furthermore, by doing this, it became 
apparent how translation is achieved in the MEPC context i.e. it requires multiple 
attempts across meetings, cooperation, modifications, and ultimately the acceptance of 
the dilution of proposals as more and more interests are embedded. This will be 
discussed in detail in the following section.  
 
6.7.3 Understanding Translation and Treason in the IMO MEPC 
Successful translation in the IMO results in acceptance of the problematizer’s agenda, 
with the most successful translation being the acceptance of a proposal with little 
change to the original idea. Translation in the MEPC is a process of cooperation and 
interest infusion. The first stage of interest infusion is when the co-sponsor network 
drafts a submission and embeds their interests into the text document. This document is 
then discussed at the MEPC, with the proposal undergoing further modification in the 
process of gathering agreement and majority support.  
 
The realization of an agenda can be a long, slow process that involves strategic planning 
and flexibility. Problematizers must often plan for the long term, across more than one 
meeting. Contrary to past studies (Callon 1986a; Egan 2014; Jollands et al. 2015) that 
show that network failure involves the disassociation of the network, this study shows 
that if a network is unsuccessful at translating their agenda in one MEPC meeting, they 
are likely to stay together and gather more members for the next meeting. If however, 
the submission network is successful, they do not become durable. Instead, they become 
fossilized and the focus becomes enacting the proposal rather than continuing to build 
network support. Therefore, in this context unsuccessful translation attempts can 
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therefore be said to lead to a more durable network. Moreover, to Callon a successful 
translation involves assuming a durable position of power atop a mobilized network 
(Callon 1986a). This is not possible in the MEPC and will be explained in Section 6.7.4. 
 
Successful treason in the MEPC is the construction of a network of resistance and the 
rejection of a proposal. In one sense the text submission can be locked out of the 
discussion through rejection and disruption which aligns with the literary definition of 
the sociology of treason however in another sense treason is impossible. The text may 
be rejected but it also becomes historic, archived in the database and therefore is never 
disrupted into silence (Galis & Lee 2013). Moreover, no Member State can be locked 
out of the MEPC due to the principles and processes of the Organization. In the case of 
a rejected proposal, the submitters can draft a new proposal for the next meeting, which 
was evident in the case studies. Although the Marshall Islands were unable to translate 
their agenda in MEPC68, they gathered more actors into their submitting network, re-
worked the proposal and gained more support with every iteration (i.e. 69/7/2 and 
70/7/6). In the MEPC, translation involves multiple attempts, cooperation, infusing 
interests into proposals to gain support and overall dilution of the problematization. 
Treason involves attempts to build networks of resistance, distort and reject proposals.  
 
6.7.4 The Practice of Principles  
Drawing on the analysis presented in this chapter, full translation and full treason 
according to the definitions laid down by Callon (1986) and Galis and Lee (2013) in 
their case studies, cannot occur in the MEPC. In ANT, successful translation means the 
problematizers have built a mobilized network for the realization of their agenda and in 
doing this, the problematizers assume a position of power. Equally successful treason 
means that one group of actors, the re-problematizers, is able to lock another group of 
actors out of the network, thereby constructing them as weak. In the MEPC however, no 
Member State can assume a position of durable power over the other Member States or 
reject them from the network.  
 
The IMO, and by extension the MEPC, anchors its processes to its principle of Equality 
between Member States, and its practice of Consensus. Every Member has the right to 
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submit proposals, voice their position in the discussions and vote if one is called. 
Chapter 5 explained that in Plenary, Members sit in alphabetical order and that the 
Secretariat must assist all of the Member States. Thus the Member States are made 
equal by the principles, rules and practices of the Organization. The enactment of 
Equality constrains treason to the rejection and disruption of ideas and submissions 
only. This observation was supported in interviews. Participants explained that although 
some Member States are more active on certain issues and some are more effective 
problem solvers, no Member has the power over others.  
 
Additionally the principle of Consensus acts on the discussions by bringing all the 
Delegations together. Consensus is the sense of general agreement necessary for 
acceptance of a proposal. It is the reason that problematizers continually re-shape and 
modify proposals seeking agreement. They dilute their agenda with the interests and 
modifications of others until they achieve Consensus. Consensus also acts on the 
resisters in the same way, encouraging them to dilute their resistance and come together 
in agreement in order to make regulatory progress. In the ANT literature, networks have 
triumphed over other networks (Callon 1986b; Galis & Lee 2013), however in the 
MEPC process, opposing networks are brought together by Consensus.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This thesis aims to understand how regulatory control is constructed by building up 
layers of the account in each data chapter. In the application of ANT, Chapter 5 
identified some of the actors, namely spaces, people and things. This second data 
chapter has followed the Organization’s processes of submission and discussion. 
Through application of the sociologies of translation and treason, the principle of 
Equality and practice of Consensus, were identified as significant explanatory data and 
furthermore, as actors themselves. This section has explained that as an actor, the 
principle of Equality constrains the formation of powerful positions. Understanding the 
agency of this principle raised the question of other similar sources of agency in the 
MEPC that had yet to be fully accounted for. This thesis moves on to account for these 
‘missing masses’ (Latour 1992). Consensus, conflicting regulatory principles and the 
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Paris Events were identified for following and Chapter 7 assembles them into the 
explanation of the network and of control making.  
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7. Assembling the Missing Masses: Meta-Actors in the MEPC 
 
7.1 Introduction 
‘The project of ANT is simply to extend the list and modify the shapes and figures of 
those assembled as participants and to design a way to make them act as a durable 
whole.’ (Latour 2005, p72) 
 
The quote above encapsulates the work done by this chapter, i.e. it extends the 
explanation of the MEPC as a whole by identifying further sources of agency that have 
yet to be accounted for, and follows these agents as they act upon the Committee. The 
principle of symmetry (Callon 1986a) guided the research and the analysis of the data 
was shaped by the Latourian definition of an actor, i.e. ‘any thing that does modify a 
state of affairs by making a difference is an actor’ (Latour 2005, p71). The attribution 
of agency is therefore possible when traceable effects are observed. The entities 
presented in this Chapter, emerged as agential in the MEPC but did not belong in the 
aforementioned categories being neither Spaces, People, Things (Chapter 5) nor 
Processes (Chapter 6). As such, the goal became to assemble these ‘missing masses’ 
into the account of constructing regulation (Latour 1992). Thus, this chapter adds a 
further layer to the explanation of the MEPC network. 
 
Chapter 3 explained that controversy would be used as a mode of inquiry; a gateway 
into social construction (Venturini 2009; Venturini 2012). The entities followed here 
arose through, or caused controversy, in the MEPC, however they lack physicality 
within the MEPC. They are abstract and are dependent on the heterogeneous collective 
to enliven them and yet despite this dependence they maintained a level of influence 
throughout the negotiations. Three entities will be described: (i) Consensus, (ii) 
Regulatory Principles and (iii) the Paris COP and Agreement. As this chapter will 
illustrate they constitute a new actor category: the Meta-actor. This terminology is 
offered as a contribution, both to the empirical understanding of the MEPC and for the 
advancement of ANT understanding of control and influence.  
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7.2 Consensus 
After exploring the actors and processes of the MEPC in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
researcher was faced with a question: Why does a network of heterogeneous actors with 
often opposing positions come to a decision? At points during the observation, the 
Delegates themselves noted that they were, ‘going in circles’. If controversy can be 
understood as, ‘a space of conflict and negotiation among actors that would otherwise 
happily ignore each other’ (Venturini 2009, p261), then what influences the Delegates 
to move beyond moments of controversy and reach a decision? This question prompted 
the exploration of how Consensus, as a network convergence, is produced by the actors 
of the MEPC.  
 
As a term, Consensus simply refers to, ‘a general agreement’. Prior studies have black 
boxed Consensus as feature of international frameworks, explaining its origins 
(Lockwood Payton 2010) and the advantages and disadvantages of its application 
(Buzan 1981). However, they do not address its role in the process of constructing 
regulation. As such, the following section explores, not only the production of 
Consensus but also its agency in the MEPC network. 
 
7.2.1 Consensus in Documents  
This section explains how Consensus was represented in IMO documents and in doing 
so, it shows that the production and influence of Consensus can be more fully 
understood in practice.  
 
The visibility and influence of Consensus in IMO documents is contradictory. As the 
following excerpt illustrates, the rules and standards adopted by the Organization are 
done so through Consensus: 
 
‘…all Members may participate in meetings of the IMO bodies responsible for drafting 
and adopting recommendations containing safety and anti-pollution rules and standards. 
These rules and standards are normally adopted by consensus;’  
(Excerpt from LEG/MISC.8: Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for 
the International Maritime Organization; A Study by the Secretariat (2014) p8, emphasis added) 
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Furthermore, Consensus is noted to be a driver of the construction of regulation: 
 
‘Through their input into IMO’s consensus-driven regulatory processes, the shipping 
industry and other maritime stakeholders are an integral part of the solution to reduce 
administrative burdens and thus achieve better and smarter regulation.’ 
(Excerpt from ‘IMO Public Consultation on Administrative Requirements in Maritime Regulations’, 
emphasis added)74.  
 
Consensus is a core practice for the adoption of regulations within the IMO (Karim 
2015), yet the term is notably absent from four documents that are central to the 
establishment (IMO Convention), practices (Rules of Procedure and Guidelines on the 
Organization and Method of Work)75 and strategic operations of the Organization (the 
High Level Action Plan).76 Given the lack of explanation of the term in core texts, it 
became clear that Consensus could not be understood as a written rule or formal 
instruction. Rather, it is an abstract concept that requires collective performance to 
make it visible. Thus, understanding the agency of Consensus would require tracing its 
enactment and influence in practice.  
 
7.2.2 Consensus in Practice 
In an interview with a member of the Secretariat, Consensus was explained: 
“…we work in a different way to some of the other UN…we work by what we call 
consensus. Now, Consensus, here it normally means that majority rules and so if the 
majority views are something that is acceptable to them, then the thing normally gets 
progressed. In other UN bodies Consensus means unanimity which means everybody 
                                                
74 Available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/rab/Documents/Final%20report%20of%20the%20Ad%20Hoc%20Steer
ing%20Group%20for%20Reducing%20Administrative%20Requirements%20to%20Council.pdf  
Accessed: 25.05.17  
75 The Rules of Procedure for all part of the Organization are presented in the Basic Document and the 
Guideline for the Organization and Method of Work are presented in MSC-MEPC.1/Circ.4/Rev.4 
76 The High Level Action Plan (A29/Res.1097) is a document laying out the Organization’s strategy and 
goals 
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has to agree everything before it's agreed…for example, that's the way it works in 
UNFCCC, for the climate change agreement, so it depends on the forum you are in but 
here…as long as sufficient numbers of Parties or Member States make their view 
known, usually if the majority of those views will be considered as supportive then the 
amendment will be moved forward.” (Participant 24: A member of the Secretariat) 
 
Consensus in the IMO has a different existence to its parent Organization, the UN. 
Though explained here as, ‘majority rules’ as opposed to ‘unanimity’, Consensus was 
not clearly defined in practice. The following vignette presents observations of the 
discussions to establish a new WG for Reduction of GHG Emissions from MEPC69, a 
case where there was a majority agreement among Delegates and yet the decision had to 
be modified before it was felt that Consensus had been achieved. Consensus can be seen 
most clearly during times of controversy as it is working to drive the Delegates from 
opposition to a point of commonality, and thus to a decision.  
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After listening to all of the interventions on the submissions under agenda item 7, the Chairman 
attempted to create a summary. Points 1-6 of his summary were all agreed upon, however points 
7 and 8 were not. In the MEPC every Member State has one vote and in terms of simple 
numbers there was a majority of support for including all eight terms. Some Members, however, 
were in opposition to the inclusion of the last two points and although the resistance was smaller 
in number, they were vocally strong. In response to this the Chairman offered a compromise. He 
noted that the support was for both points being taken forward and the resistance was against 
both points being taken forward. As such, he proposed including just one point: the 
establishment of a working group at MEPC70 to discuss the matter further. In his own words,  
 
“Those are the two contentious issues. What I am listening to now is…some of you would like 
both and some of you would like none. So my trade-off is we agree to one of them. In all 
fairness, I am trying to find a compromise, as we always do here.”  
(Plenary Chairman, Agenda Item 7: MEPC69) 
 
However, his compromise met resistance and after multiple interventions he said, 
 
“Dear colleagues. I am trying every trick from the bag but it’s just not working. I want to keep 
you united. I don’t want to go into numbers, you know that…You know that I want to keep you 
united so that’s why I am trying to find a compromise” 
(Plenary Chairman, Agenda Item 7: MEPC69) 
 
He then proposed a slight change in his wording and opened the floor again. After further 
interventions he made an appeal to the crowd: 
“I am really trying that road in the middle to get you to move forward. If you all go quiet and 
do not raise your cards that means you can agree to that. So I have your agreement? Tell me 
that I have your agreement. I don’t have the agreement, really?” 
(Plenary Chairman, Agenda Item 7: MEPC69) 
 
In a following intervention the Delegation of Brazil made the following statement, which they 
also requested to be attached to the MEPC69 report: 
"We feel obliged to remind the Committee, since we are discussing sectorial targets for 
emission reduction, that at UNFCCC the discussion is based upon the respect to the consensus 
rule. So we should have at the IMO an inclusive and transparent process, a multilateral 
approach consistent with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC. I would like the 
statement to be reflected in your report." 
 
Another Member Delegation then aligned with this, reminding the Committee that any outcome 
of the working group would need to be agreed by Consensus. 
 
The resisting Delegations reluctantly agreed to compromise and near the end of the discussion 
the Chairman re-iterated the Consensus principle, “It’s an in-depth discussion. You threw many 
things at me. I hope you know that we work on Consensus and that’s what I am trying to do 
here.” (Plenary Chairman, Agenda Item 7: MEPC69). Ironically, Delegates and Chairmen more 
often invoke Consensus at the times when it is not being reached. 
 
In the end, the Chairman was able to create Consensus by first offering a compromise, then 
changing the wording of the compromise and finally reasoning with the Delegates and 
reminding them of the principle of Consensus by which they work. It was not only the 
Chairman’s efforts that created this Consensus; the Member States who supported his initial 
summary and then agreed to the compromise. Equally the resistance that lessened and then 
became consent was also part of creating Consensus. 
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Despite the earlier explanation from the Secretariat defining Consensus as a majority 
rule, in the case of MEPC69 there was a majority of support for including the last two 
summary points in the report. However, the Chairman clearly felt he needed a greater 
level of alignment in the Committee before he could close the issue. Consensus, it 
seems, is not necessarily a matter of numbers; in practice, more than a majority was 
needed before the Chairmen felt Consensus had been achieved. Additionally, echoing 
back to Chapter 5, this vignette also illustrated the role of the Chairman as a Consensus 
builder.  
 
During the meetings observed, Consensus was invoked multiple times by the Delegates 
and the Chairman. In these moments, it was positioned not only as an organizational 
principle but also as a feeling. Delegates spoke about “the spirit of Consensus” or a 
“feeling of Consensus in the room”. Equally, Consensus was often positioned as an aim 
for the negotiations and as an achievement if accomplished. Furthermore, not reaching 
Consensus appeared to be considered as a kind of collective failure. In times when the 
discussion reached an impasse, Delegates continued negotiating and attempting to reach 
agreement. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, they would stay late into the night in WGs 
coming up with new ideas until they managed to achieve a satisfactory level of 
agreement that they identified as Consensus. In addition, individual Delegations 
generally experience pressure to try to construct proposing submissions that are more 
likely to achieve Consensus when faced with negotiation. In interview, one participant 
from a CO Delegation explained the need to reach Consensus to progress proposals: 
 
‘…I’ve seen plenty of times where submissions or proposals basically get, they get 
killed because the Committee doesn’t come to a Consensus agreement on it and the 
worst words from a representative’s point of view who’s trying to accomplish an 
agenda is…“Ok, come back to a future session with a more concrete proposal”’  
(Participant 31: CO Delegate from an Industry Association) 
 
In addition to the feeling of Consensus being an achievement by the Committee, it is 
also a source of pride for Delegates:  
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‘Well, and I would say if you’re familiar with other UN agencies and organisations, the 
IMO is actually really acclaimed for being one of the most successful UN bodies 
because of its ability to come to consistent Consensus decisions very quickly actually, 
and I know when you’re there, if it’s new, it seems very tedious when you consider that 
from a new proposal to an actual adoption of an amendment and then the entry into 
force…you’re looking at 8 to 10 years or longer. But comparing that to how the 
UNFCCC makes incremental decisions where they don’t take one decision, they just 
take these tiny little steps towards a decision with every meeting…’ (Participant 31: CO 
Delegate from an Industry Association) 
 
In the discussions, Consensus became a shaping influence and a driving force. With the 
heterogeneous assemblage aiming at the production of this ethereal entity, it can be seen 
to influence their work, from submissions through discussions to the decisions 
themselves. The level of influence that is given to Consensus is due to the 
characteristics of the shipping industry and the Flag Registry System (see Section 2.6). 
In the words of the IMO: 
 
‘IMO usually tries to act on a consensus basis. This is because it is important that 
measures adopted by the Organization, which can have a major impact on shipping, 
achieve as much support as possible. A treaty that was supported by only 51 per cent of 
the IMO membership, for example, would be opposed by nearly half the shipping world. 
Not only would they not ratify the treaty concerned but they might go off and adopt an 
alternative treaty of their own, thereby dividing the maritime community.’ (Excerpt 
from the IMO Webpages77) 
 
From this, it is clear that Consensus is a key requirement for regulations to be accepted 
and effective. The influence of Consensus on the MEPC is also strengthened by the 
desire of the Delegates and Chairmen to avoid formal votes. The next section will 
                                                
77 Frequently Asked Questions under the drop down question: ‘Doesn’t IMO always aim for the lowest 
common denominator?’ Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx Accessed on 
01.05.18 
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discuss the link between the avoidance of formal voting and the practice of building 
Consensus.  
 
7.2.3 Consensus as a Mechanism to Avoid Votes 
In an analysis of the origins and history of Consensus across International Organisations 
state-actors were found to ‘bargain in the shadow of the vote’ (Lockwood Payton 2010, 
p5). This was confirmed during observation of the MEPC meetings. The Delegates 
resist opting for formal votes and indeed general quantification of the discussions as 
much as possible. In the vignette above the Chairman of Plenary himself stated that he 
did not want to “go into numbers”.  
 
Decisions in the IMO are rarely taken by voting. During interviews this was often stated 
and indeed, the respondents gave the impression that voting was taken only as a last 
resort: “they are very very rare and I stress it's something we try and avoid because that 
indicates that there isn't a degree of Consensus going forward.” (Participant 24: A 
member of the IMO Secretariat). 
 
In an interview a Delegate explained the hesitancy to vote as linked to the applicability 
of the regulations in the industry itself: 
‘But that process [voting] is actually really quite rare because as a general principle, 
IMO does prefer to…to take decisions based on Consensus, and that’s because the rules 
and regulations that are developed over at the IMO are of course applicable for these 
international treaties and Shipping is unique in this sense because, with Shipping 
having an international regulatory structure its absolutely paramount in order to 
enable efficient implementation of the requirements because ships are going from port 
to port and country to country, so having a Consensus based rule certainly favours the 
maritime industry in general.’ (Participant 31: CO Delegate from an Industry 
Association) 
 
Some respondents noted that the impact of the last vote taken at MEPC62 in 2011 for 
the adoption of the EEDI and SEEMP could still be felt five years later. The vote was 
requested by Delegation of Saudi Arabia (IMO 2018b). There were 59 of the 64 Parities 
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to MARPOL Annex VI present and eligible to vote. 49 Parties voted for and 5 Parties 
voted against the adoption of the Energy Efficiency Measures (2 Parties abstained).  
The Parties that voted against the adoption were Brazil, Chile, China, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia (ibid). One respondent claimed the vote had left a ‘bad taste’ in people’s mouth. 
Equally at one point in the MEPC68 discussion, a Member State Delegation spoke 
about how the ‘house’ [MEPC] had reached a degree of harmony in the last few years. 
In saying this he seemed to be alluding to the time period after the vote when there had 
been division and feelings of disharmony among the Committee. This again illustrates 
that even though the IMO technically works on a majority basis, Consensus represents a 
feeling of unity that has more value in the practice of developing regulation than formal 
quantification approaches do.  
 
The desire to avoid voting, despite voting being part of the written Rules of Procedure, 
fuels the influence of Consensus. In avoiding the use of voting on decisions, the 
Committee are instead coordinated and driven by the principle of Consensus. In their 
collective enactment of Consensus, they make it a durable actor across meetings. Yet 
Consensus is also vulnerable as it must be constructed and performed at each meeting 
by the assemblage.  
 
7.2.4 Consensus as a Meta-actor  
The MEPC is an assemblage that relies on heterogeneity and cooperation to do its work 
(Star & Griesemer 1989), and Consensus is the actor that encourages (even persuades) 
the diverse network to cooperate. In contrast to Star and Griesemer’s examination of 
scientific communities where ‘Consensus is not necessary for cooperation nor for the 
successful conduct of work.’ (Star & Griesemer 1989, p388), observations of the MEPC, 
as a politico-technical community, suggest that Consensus is not only necessary for the 
successful conduct of the work; it is an actor that is part of the MEPC assemblage.  
 
Latour asks Actor-Network theorists to consider the difference an actor makes to a 
situation (Latour 1992; Latour 2005). Consensus pervades the process with its directive 
influence. Remove Consensus as a principle and the MEPC would become a group of 
heterogeneous actors caught in a discursive loop with no concessions, compromise or 
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progress. In times of controversy, Consensus manifests and moves the Delegates on to a 
point of convergence. 
 
Though it is often presented as a simple term, Consensus was far more complex when 
its influence was traced through the process. Consensus has no material qualities; its 
written form is simply a black-boxed terminology while its practised form is quite 
different. Though sometimes explained as a majority rule in the negotiations, in practice 
it was a term that the Committee filled with their own meaning. In its enrolment, it 
infused the discussion and acted on the work of creating regulation, yet it was not made 
visible until invoked.  
 
Consensus is both the creator of, and created by the work. It has no physicality and acts 
through others yet it cannot be created or controlled by any single actor. Instead, it is a 
construction of the assemblage. The Delegates not only aim to achieve it, during their 
discussions, they enact it, enlivening it as an actor itself. They are continually sustaining 
it, allowing it to achieve a durable level of influence upon the process of creating 
regulation. Though abstract and dependent on the collective for its existence, it drives 
their negotiations, directing them to converge and thus acting upon all negotiations and 
decisions in the MEPC. Thus, as an actor, it highlights a link between influence and 
vulnerability.  
 
As ANT works show, actors are never working in isolation. Consensus works on the 
MEPC assisted by the ‘shadow’ of voting procedures (Lockwood Payton 2010), 
however it is also supported and strengthened by the regulatory principle of Non-
Discrimination which is held by the Organization and embedded into its work. This 
Principle and its opposing, international counterpart: Common But Differentiated 
Responsibilities are the focus of the next section.  
 
7.3 Regulatory Principles  
This section follows the influence of two conflicting principles in the MEPC. The first 
principle, Non-Discrimination sometimes referred to as ‘equal treatment for ships’. is 
one held by the Organization. The second principle, Common But Differentiated 
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Responsibilities (CBDR), is external to the IMO and is embedded in the Kyoto 
Protocol. These two principles, when enrolled, created a disharmony during discussions 
and often stalled the negotiations, particularly during the working group at MEPC70.  
 
The non-discriminatory principle is held by the IMO due to the regulatory framework of 
the international shipping industry. As outlined in Chapter 2, the Flag Registry System 
and possible use of Flags of Convenience means that IMO aims to ensure all Members 
agree to adopt and enforce regulations. Furthermore, it is important that is no favourable 
treatment for Members because this would result in the vessels being flagged in the 
Registries with the least stringent regulatory requirements. CBDR was laid out in the 
UNFCCC: 
 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof.  
(Article 3, Principle 1: UNFCCC 1992) 
 
CBDR and Non-Discrimination are essentially in opposition. CBDR advocates for 
differentiated regulations and targets for different states of development, while Non-
discrimination aims for regulation, which is equally applicable across all flag states to 
avoid evasion through flag switching. 
 
CBDR is an important feature in international climate change governance and although 
external to the MEPC it was invoked often during the discussions observed, particularly 
in conjunction with discussions of emissions targets, caps or IMO Determined 
Contributions. In MEPC70, CBDR was displaced from its external context and drawn 
into the MEPC discussions where it was enrolled by resisters in a submission and 
during both Plenary and WG discussions.  
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The enactment of CBDR in MEPC70 created a discursive tension during the 
negotiations and the disharmony between the principles of CBDR and Non-
Discrimination affected the progress of the meeting. The exploration of the enactment 
of CBDR in MEPC70 highlights how it acts to slow discussions. This enactment of 
CBDR is then examined on a longer timescale to more fully demonstrate its agency.  
 
7.3.1 CBDR in MEPC70 
This section focuses on CBDR as an external principle drawn into the MEPC, which 
creates a controversy with the internal principle of non-discrimination. The enactment 
of CBDR is traced through a submission and into the Plenary and WG discussions to 
show the agency that regulatory principles can have in the process.  
 
Submission 70/7/4: ‘Proposal on how to progress on the contribution of international 
shipping to GHG emissions reduction efforts’ was co-sponsored by Angola, Brazil, 
Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South Africa and Uruguay. In the submission, the 
co-sponsors argued that an overall cap for emissions would be ‘fundamentally unfit’ for 
the shipping industry and suggested that the Committee should focus on enhancing 
energy efficiency and uptake of alternative fuels in the industry. Echoing the analysis of 
Chapter 6, the network of co-sponsors for 70/7/4 are understood as the network of 
opposition to proposals of ‘determined contributions’ ‘fair shares’ and ‘targets’. In 
their submission, they displace CBDR from the UNFCCC and draw it into the IMO 
MEPC negotiations:  
 
‘There is a clear imperative for IMO's Member States to rise to the challenge set by the 
Paris Agreement for the international community and continue to make contributions to 
this global effort, taking into account the principles and provisions of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and recent 
developments of the Convention in order to avoid contradictions in the 
intergovernmental sphere.’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/4, Submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South 
Africa and Uruguay, p2) 
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Here the co-sponsors are deliberately creating dependence between progress in the 
MEPC in the wake of the Paris Agreement, with the need to incorporate provisions 
from the UNFCCC. The co-sponsors then go on to state:  
 
‘The mandate of IMO for addressing marine bunker fuel emission arises from the Kyoto 
Protocol of UNFCCC3. IMO Assembly resolution A.963(23) urged MEPC to identify 
and develop the mechanisms needed to achieve limitation or reduction in GHG 
emissions from international shipping, in cooperation with UNFCCC. Furthermore, 
resolution MEPC.229(65) on Promotion of technical co-operation and transfer of 
technology relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of ships recognizes the 
principles enshrined in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, including the principle of 
"common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities".’ 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/4, Submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South 
Africa and Uruguay, p5) 
 
Here, the co-sponsors are constructing an argument that, not only should the CBDR 
principle be considered when creating regulations in the MEPC and harmonized with 
the Non-Discrimination, but that there is evidence of CBDR being accepted already 
within the IMO and MEPC texts (A.963(23) and MEPC.229(65) respectively). By 
doing this they are attempting to associate the principle of CBDR with established IMO 
and MEPC text and to re-problematize the guiding principles of regulatory work in 
order to translate their own agenda: 
 
It is the view of co-sponsors that IMO should make explicit reference to CBDR when 
addressing these matters as it forms part and package of delegated mandate to it arising 
from the Kyoto Protocol of UNFCCC and recognize the role IMO can play to level the 
playing field between the developing countries and developed countries. 
(Excerpt from MEPC70/7/4, Submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South 
Africa and Uruguay, p5) 
 
In effect, this network echo opposing interventions made at MEPC69 and even 
MEPC68 that suggested the problem of contradictory principles would need to be 
resolved and that CBDR should incorporated into the MEPC deliberations before they 
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could open discussions on or agree to a target or emissions cap. Of the fourteen 
submissions to MEPC70 under Agenda Item 7, seven submissions contained proposals 
on how to progress the issue of reduction of GHG emissions from ships (see Section 
6.6.1). The submission above (70/7/4) was the only proposal that stated the need for 
CBDR to be incorporated into the discussions; indeed, it was the only submission to 
mention the CBDR principle at all.  
 
At MEPC70, the objective of the Plenary session on Agenda Item 7 was to gather the 
Member States positions in response to the submitted proposals and the commonality of 
views and incorporate these into Terms of Reference for the WG. During this time, the 
issue of incorporating the CBDR principle was raised, echoing the submission. In 
response to this, one Delegation voiced their concern about the renewed discussion of 
CBDR. This Delegate went on to invoke the principle of Non-Discrimination, 
reminding the group that this principle was part of a set of guidelines adopted in 
MEPC57 to direct the regulatory process and suggest that the issue of principles should 
not be reopened.  
 
The WG discussion echoed this pattern from Plenary. The WG was drafting a Roadmap 
to guide future discussions on GHG emissions. During the drafting, the network 
opposing a target, share, or contribution invoked CBDR. A circular discussion ensued 
wherein the network of opposition felt that CBDR should be included in the creation of 
new regulations for the reduction of GHG emissions while the other Member States 
voiced their concern and indeed, “discomfort” in opening this discussion. These 
Members argued that the mandate was to construct a Roadmap and that discussing 
CBDR was outwith that remit. The interventions on this went back and forth until the 
Chairman called for a coffee break. After the break, the group agreed to move on with 
the Roadmap that a discussion of CBDR should not take place presently but may be 
returned to in future. However, with such a limited time for the WG to produce an 
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output, the deadlock on CBDR had taken up valuable time78 and is partly why the WG 
discussions ended after midnight on the second day.  
 
CBDR, in MEPC70, was a concept that when enrolled acted to stall the discussions. 
Furthermore, as the question of how to embed CBDR in MEPC regulations remains 
unresolved, yet key to some Delegations, the issue is likely to continue to arise during 
discussion, slowing progress with the difficulty of harmonizing two near-contradictory 
values. In MEPC70, the discussion concerned whether or not it was appropriate to 
discuss CBDR. As a result, it was not entirely clear what an actual discussion of the 
principle would look like and so the choice was made by the researcher to follow CBDR 
in historical discussions to get a better sensitization of its influence.  
 
7.3.2 The Historical Influence of CBDR in the MEPC  
During the observation of the discussions, some interventions gave the researcher the 
impression that this discussion of CBDR had been addressed many times before and so 
this section uses documents to flesh out the account of the influence of CBDR over 
time. Data from MEPC70 showed that CBDR slowed the progress of negotiations. This 
section illustrates that CBDR has been able to do this across months and years in the 
MEPC. 
 
One of the key aspects of the principle of CBDR is its fundamental disharmony with the 
principle of Non-Discrimination held by the IMO. The principle of Non-Discrimination 
is enshrined in the IMO Convention: 
  
                                                
78 It is not possible for the researcher to quantify the exact amount of time the principle of CBDR was 
argued for because taking live notes of the discussion meant she chose to focus on content of the 
interventions and only record the start and end times of the discussion sessions overall. 
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To encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions by 
Governments affecting shipping engaged in international trade so as to promote the 
availability of shipping services to the commerce of the world without discrimination; 
assistance and encouragement given by a Government for the development of its 
national shipping and for purposes of security does not in itself constitute 
discrimination, provided that such assistance and encouragement is not based on 
measures designed to restrict the freedom of shipping of all flags to take part in 
international trade; 
(Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Part 1, Article 1(b) in IMO Basic Documents 
Volume 1 (2010), p9) 
 
In a report of its work to address GHG emissions from Shipping the IMO present this 
principle as necessary due to the characteristics of Shipping: 
 
The global character of shipping has resulted in the adoption of global regulation that 
applies universally to all ships irrespective of the country of ship registration, in line 
with the basic principle of non-discrimination set out in IMO’s constitutive Convention.  
(Excerpt from Submission by the IMO to the 37th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA 37) (2012), p2)79 
 
The rationale underlying Non-Discrimination is to ensure that regulations are consistent 
across flags in order to limit regulatory avoidance or evasion though flag switching 
which was made apparent when it was adopted at MEPC57: 
  
                                                
79 Available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Documents/COP%2018
/IMO%20Info%20Note%20to%20SBSTA%2037final.pdf 
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MEPC 57 (April 2008) acknowledged the importance of developing fundamental 
principles as a basis for future regulations and decided, by overwhelming majority, to 
take the below listed principles as its reference for further debate on GHG emissions 
from international shipping. A coherent and comprehensive future IMO framework 
should be:  
.1  effective in contributing to the reduction of total global greenhouse gas emissions; 
.2  binding and equally applicable to all flag States in order to avoid evasion;80  
(Excerpt from Submission by the IMO to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, 8th Session of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AGW-LCA8) at COP15 (2009), entitled: 
Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships Engaged in International Trade, p16)81  
During an interview, one of the Delegates who was part of an Industry Association in 
the MEPC and an employee of a large shipping company explained how easy it can be 
to switch flags: 
 “…but certain flags in particular within the open registries, you can basically change 
the flag overnight, they do the whole thing on the internet and you can have all the new 
certificates printed the next day, so for some flags it’s a very, very easy process, some 
even say it is probably too easy…” (Participant 6: A CO Delegate from Industry 
Association Delegate and member of a shipping company) 
 
Indeed, in a publication entitled, ‘Tackling Ship GHG Emissions at IMO’ by the CSC82 
state that the principle of ‘equal treatment of ships’ held by the IMO is ‘essential for a 
global industry where ships can change their nationality overnight’ (Seas at Risk & 
Transport & Environment, n.d.).  
 
                                                
80 There were seven additional principles, nine in total that can be seen in the document itself.  
81 Available at https://unfccc.int/files/methods/emissions_from_intl_transport/application/pdf/imo_awg-
lca_8_submission.pdf Accessed: 17.04.18 
82 The authoring Organisation, which has observer status in the IMO as an NGO Delegation 
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Flag switching can be seen, therefore, as a form of regulatory avoidance. In interviews, 
industry members explained that due to this possibility, it is imperative for the industry 
that the regulatory ‘playing field’ should be as even as possible. The problem of CBDR 
in the MEPC can be traced historically through discussions. In a submission from the 
IMO to COP15 in 2009, the issue is summarized:  
 
28 A number of delegations have maintained the view that any GHG reduction measures to be 
adopted by IMO should only be applicable to ships flying the flag of Annex I parties to the 
UNFCCC in accordance with the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’. This 
principle was adopted by the UNFCCC and should be upheld in all international negotiations 
regarding climate change. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States should have common but differentiated responsibilities based on the Rio 
Declaration from 1992. These delegations have been unable to agree to mandatory emission 
reductions measures applicable to all ships and reasoned that developing countries (non-Annex I 
countries) cannot take on emission reduction commitments related to international shipping and 
that such measures on the part of ships registered in developing countries should only be on a 
voluntary basis.  
 
29 Other delegations have expressed the opinion that, given the global mandate of IMO, as 
regards safety of ships and the protection of the marine and atmospheric environment from all 
sources of ship pollution, the IMO regulatory framework on GHG emissions should be 
applicable to all ships, irrespective of the flags they fly. It has been stressed that, as three-
quarters of the world’s merchant fleet fly the flag of developing countries not listed in Annex I 
to the UNFCCC, any regulatory regime on the reduction of GHG from shipping would become 
ineffective for the purpose of combating climate change, if applicable only to ships flagged in 
Annex I countries. IMO has its global mandate from the IMO Convention itself as well as from 
UNCLOS, and not from Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol and that there is no precedence in any 
of the more than fifty IMO treaty instruments currently in existence where measures are applied 
selectively to ships according to their flag. On the other hand, there are several international 
environmental agreements which have a differentiated approach, such as the Montreal Protocol 
(on substances that deplete the ozone layer), yet when IMO has dealt with the same issues, the 
principle of differentiated approach (according to flag) has not been taken on board.  
(Excerpt from Submission by the IMO to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, 8th Session of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AGW-LCA8) at COP15 (2009), entitled: 
Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships Engaged in International Trade, p17) 
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This excerpt is a key indication of the state of discussions. Although from 2009, the 
content is applicable to the contemporary discussion at MEPC70. Furthermore, it 
perfectly captures the incommensurability of the essence of the principles. If the MEPC 
were to incorporate CBDR into development of MBMs then it would be in conflict with 
the principle of Non-Discrimination and allow certain flags more lenient regulations. 
The excerpt states that the majority of ships are flagged with developing countries and 
this remains true. Granting leniency to those flags based on historical emissions and 
developmental state would most likely result in flag switching and regulatory 
avoidance, not to mention a patchwork of control over emissions.  
Attempts to enrol CBDR in the MEPC negotiations allow the principle to act upon the 
discussions. Historically, a lack of progress on MBMs has been attributed to it. A 
summary of the discussions held at MEPC59 states:  
Furthermore, the Committee overwhelmingly agreed that “a market-based measure was 
needed as part of a comprehensive package of measures for the regulation of GHG 
emissions from international shipping”. With this in mind, the Committee “considered 
and agreed to a work plan for further consideration of market-based measures”, 
culminating in 2011, to complement the technical and operational reduction measures 
and to provide economic incentives for the shipping industry.  
(Excerpt from Submission by the IMO to the United Nations Climate Change Conference, 8th Session of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AGW-LCA8) at COP15 (2009), entitled: 
Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Ships Engaged in International Trade, p4) 
 
This same point is reiterated later in the document, this time with the wording 
‘overwhelming majority’ (p21). By the definition of Consensus given in Section 7.2.2, 
this should represent a Consensus on the need to develop MBMs for Shipping. 
However, at time of writing (2018), there are still no MBMs in the shipping industry. 
The IMO provides a short historical explanation of this:  
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MEPC 60 called for an expert group to undertake a feasibility study and impact 
assessment on MBMs that had previously been proposed by governments and observer 
organizations. The results of the expert group were presented at MEPC 61 where an 
extensive debate was held on how to progress the development of suitable MBMs. The 
Committee agreed to hold an Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on GHG 
Emissions from Ships (GHG-WG 3) that was held in March/April 2011 and its report 
was submitted to MEPC62. However, due to time constraints and the busy agenda of 
MEPC62, it was agreed to postpone the consideration of MBMs to the next MEPC 
session (MEPC 63 in February/March 2012). 
MEPC 63 continued its consideration of proposed MBMs, and agreed on the need to 
undertake an impact assessment of the MBM proposals with focus on possible impacts 
on consumers and industries in developing countries, in general, and in particular, least 
developed countries, small islands developing States and remotely located developing 
countries with long trading distances, and considered in detail the methodology and 
criteria it should be based on. 
MEPC 65, in noting several submissions on this matter, agreed to suspend discussions 
on MBMs and related issues to a future session. 
(Excerpt from IMO Webpage: Market Based Measures (IMO 2018g)) 
 
Clearly, the MEPC has been wrestling with the question of MBMs for years. Its failure 
to progress this issue is attributed by some to the influence of CBDR: 
‘Progress at IMO on appropriate ship GHG emission reduction measures has also been 
held up by the wider climate negotiations. Disagreements over who should make cuts in 
emissions in the future has spilled over into the IMO in the form of a dispute over the 
relative importance of the IMO’s principle of “equal treatment of ships” and the 
UNFCCC’s principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR).’ (Seas at 
Risk & Transport & Environment n.d.) 
More specifically, discussions on the MEPC Resolution on the Promotion of Technical 
Co-operation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy, which 
was finalized at MEPC65 were seen to be holding up discussions of MBMs: 
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‘Today the member states of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) agreed on 
a Resolution on technology cooperation, which was delaying the implementation of 
standards to improve the energy efficiency of new ships. This resolution had been in 
discussion for two years and was hindering any progress on other measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from ships.’ (Kedzierski 2013) 
These discussions also included a debate on how to align the Non-Discriminatory 
principle with CBDR. This issue was resolved at MEPC65 with the phrase: ‘ “being 
cognizant of principles enshrined in” the IMO and the UNFCCC conventions.’ (IMERS 
2016) 
It is therefore clear that historically CBDR has acted for many years to stall 
negotiations, evident from the accounts above. During the observations of MEPC68,69, 
and 70, it was clear that the MEPC are once again on the cusp of discussing MBMs for 
Shipping and again the issue of CBDR was raised during MEPC69 and more actively 
during MEPC70, both in Plenary and the WG. The discussion of CBDR did indeed 
seem to stall progress. In the words of one Delegate interviewed after the observation of 
the WG: 
‘Well, um…I will be very frank with you. I think it's [CBDR] much used as way to delay 
decisions which these countries don't want to see….I can't tell you yet but I suspect it's a 
matter of principle for these Delegations but it's also a way to block or delay decisions 
which they don't want, to be very blunt [*laughs].’ (Participant 29: Member State 
Delegate) 
 
Another Delegate, this time from an industry association, felt that invocation of CBDR 
and principles in general, raises the status of discussions from political to ‘ideological’, 
‘…and it winds up taking a lot of time and very little progress is made as a result’ 
(Participant 31: CO Delegate from an Industry Association) 
The following section will summarise the attribution of agency to both the principles of 
CBDR and Non-Discrimination in the case of the construction of regulation.  
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7.3.3. Regulatory Principles as Meta-actors 
CBDR has been identified in this section as a Meta-actor in the MEPC due the way in 
which its agency is evidenced. The principle itself has no materiality in the MEPC, it is 
not enshrined in the governing text of the IMO i.e. the Convention on the IMO or the 
Rules of Procedures. Of course, as noted earlier, Consensus was not a visible part of 
these texts either but where Consensus is continually and collectively embraced as a 
core value of the Organization, CBDR is not.  
Despite its lack of physicality, the concept is brought into the network and acts upon the 
discussions through the Delegates and the submissions that enrol it. Its disruptive 
influence can send negotiations in impossible ideological circles, stalling the process 
and using up valuable discussion time. The decisions and documents that govern the 
entire international shipping industry must be made in a matter of days at an MEPC and 
time lost to irresolvable issues delays the development of regulations. CBDR has been 
identified in many accounts as responsible for the lack of development on the necessary 
MBMs for emission reduction. It is a open controversy that resists black boxing and is 
likely to remain an impossible issue in future negotiations (Venturini 2009).  
The principle of Non-Discrimination is equally identifiable as a Meta-actor. It is made 
visible through the IMO Convention text. During the practice of negotiations it is either 
black-boxed into invisibility in the process (Cloatre & Dingwall 2013), or it is made 
visible and enacted as a response to the controversy of the CBDR enactments. Its role is 
also to connect with and strengthen the practice of Consensus. It shapes the 
development of the regulations themselves, directing the Committee to create 
universally applicable regulations.   
 
The following section will discuss a third and final Meta-actor: the combination of the 
Paris COP21 and the Paris Agreement. Like CBDR, the Paris events are external yet 
were drawn in to the MEPC negotiations where they acted upon the assemblage.  
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7.4 The Paris COP21 and the Paris Agreement 
This section introduces the third and final Meta-actor, namely the COP21 meeting and 
the Paris Agreement in the development of new CO2 regulations. This particular entity 
(hereafter Paris) exists externally to the MEPC but during observation actors in the 
MEPC enrolled Paris in various ways and in turn Paris acted upon the discussions. This 
section follows the enrolment of Paris in the submissions to MEPC68, 69 and 70 and 
explains its influence over the negotiations in the respective plenary sessions. Following 
this, the observations of its influence are supplemented with a discussion of the 
interview data. 
 
In order to contextualize the agency of Paris in the MEPC meetings the timeline of the 
Paris Agreement must be detailed. The Paris Agreement text was in negotiation at 
COP20 in Lima, Peru in December 2014 and the Geneva Climate Change Conference in 
February 2015 (MEPC68/5). MEPC68 occurred in May 2015 meaning that the Paris 
Agreement was still in a stage of discussion and negotiation at that time. COP21 then 
occurred from 30th November 2015 to 12th December 2015. Once accepted at COP21, 
the Paris Agreement then was open for signing from 22nd April 2016 to 21st April 2017. 
MEPC69 occurred in April 2016. This means that MEPC69 occurred in the wake of the 
COP21 during which the Agreement was accepted. On 5th of October 2016, the 
threshold for entry into force was crossed and the Paris Agreement entered into force on 
4th of November 2016 (UNFCCC 2017). MEPC70 in October 2016 just as the Paris 
Agreement was reaching the required signatories for entry into force.  Figure 7.1 shows 
the timeline of the Paris COP and Agreement and the MEPC meetings.  Understanding 
the different stages of the Paris Agreement during the three MEPC meeting is vital as 
the way it acted on the discussions changed in accordance with the development of the 
text and the network of actors which mobilized it.   
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Figure 7.1: Timeline of the Paris Agreement and MEPC Meetings 
 
 
7.4.1 Paris in the MEPC68 Submissions 
During MEPC68 the Paris text was still under discussion, however, it was drawn into 
discussions in three ways. Firstly, the Secretariat submitted a report entitled, ‘Outcomes 
of the United Nations Climate Change Conferences held in Lima in December 2014 and 
in Geneva in February 2015’ (MEPC 68/5). At this time, it seemed possible that the 
shipping industry may be included in the text of the Paris Agreement, which was in 
development under the framework of the UNFCCC. Although the IMO itself is a UN 
specialized agency, there was speculation in the IMO that they may lose some 
autonomy to create regulations under the Paris Agreement.  In their MEPC68 
submission, the Secretariat, taking up the role of conduit between UN networks, 
reported elements of the negotiating text which were relevant to the IMO: 
 
"23bis. [In meeting the 2°C objective, Parties agree on the need for global sectoral 
emission reduction targets for international aviation and maritime transport and on the 
need for all Parties to work through the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop global policy 
frameworks to achieve these targets]." 
(Excerpt from MEPC68/5, submitted by the Secretariat, p3) 
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b. Encourage the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International 
Maritime Organization to develop a levy scheme to provide financial support for the 
Adaptation Fund.  
c. In establishing the levy scheme, ICAO and IMO are encouraged to take into 
consideration the needs of developing countries, particularly the LDCs, SIDS and 
countries in Africa heavily reliant on tourism and international transport of traded 
goods.  
(Excerpt from MEPC68/5, submitted by the Secretariat p4)  
 
Here, the Secretariat brought to the Committee’s attention, discussions and drafted text 
which might alter the course of the MEPC’s own work, and indeed, its level of authority 
as the regulator of Shipping. Thus, the MEPC68 negotiations were taking place in the 
shadow of the decisions to be made in Paris.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Submission 68/5/1, by the Marshall Islands, used the Paris 
Agreement as part of a persuasive submission aimed at interesseing the other 
Delegations to align with their suggestion of assigning a reduction target for shipping 
and agreeing to take suitable measures to achieve this target (Callon & Law 1982; 
Callon 1986a). The negotiating text for Paris was framed as part of a rationale for 
accepting the proposal contained in the submission: 
 
Nations are being asked to make ambitious carbon dioxide reduction commitments in 
the months leading up to COP 21 in Paris, as is required by the seriousness of the 
challenge. The Pacific Island nations are joining this call. The international shipping 
sector must be included in this process because the task requires that a global agreement 
include quantifiable economy-wide mitigation targets covering all sectors and all 
greenhouse gases. 
(Excerpt from MEPC68/5/1, submitted by the Marshall Islands, p2)  
 
The Marshall Islands attempted to mobilize Paris in order to make their proposal 
stronger and more likely to translate through the discussions towards acceptance. 
However, though Paris was invoked, it did not act upon the Committee until the MEPC 
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discussion and indeed it had quite the opposite effect to what the Marshall Islands had 
hoped for. The next section will follow the effect of Paris upon the MEPC during its 
68th session.  
 
7.4.2 Paris Acting in the MEPC68 Discussion 
During the Plenary discussion, there were 53 interventions83. 28 Member States 
expressed support for the Marshall Islands proposal and 21 Member States either 
expressed no support or opposed the proposal outright. In summary, a minimum of 4 
Member States and maximum of 11 attempted to enact COP21 as a reason to support 
the proposal and a minimum of 8 Member States and maximum of 12 enacted the 
COP21 to stall further discussion on the proposal. These Delegations argued that it 
would be best to ‘wait’ for the outcome of the COP21, that the proposal may be 
‘premature’ and that ‘now was not the appropriate time’ to open such a discussion. The 
maximum and minimum are given due to the complexity of mapping positions through 
interventions. Interventions can be vague and often contain multiple lines of argument. 
As the discussion progressed, delegations often made interventions naming only the 
other delegations with whom they aligned. As such it was challenging to discern exactly 
what they align with from the previous delegations intervention, however by untangling 
the discussion, it is clear to see that Delegations attempted to enrol Paris in two ways.  
 
As shown in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1, submission 68/5/1 was not translated into 
agreement successfully, despite gaining some support, the contents of the submission 
were eventually rejected. From the numbers above, the maximum number of Member 
State Delegations attempting to mobilize Paris in support or opposition to the proposal 
in 68/5/1 was very similar. COP21 was an event external to the MEPC and yet it was 
drawn in, conceptualized and enrolled by the Delegates. The Marshall Islands and their 
supporters attempted to mobilize Paris to persuade the Committee to accept and take 
action on the content of Submission 68/5/1. At the same time other Delegations, 
particularly the network of resisters enrolled Paris as a reason to postpone such action. 
This enrolment was successful meaning that despite the external COP21 representing a 
                                                
83 52 interventions were from Member States and one from an environmental CO. 
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global awareness of the need for action to reduce emissions, when Paris crossed the 
boundary into the MEPC it was mobilized as a reason not to act. Thus, it acted upon the 
negotiation and contributed to the rejection of MEPC68/5/1. The next section examines 
how the Paris Agreement, created at COP21 became an actor in MEPC69. 
 
7.4.3 The Paris Agreement in MEPC69 Submissions 
Paris was drawn into the discussion in MEPC69/7 through the report of outcomes by the 
Secretariat that directed readers to the official Paris text. The shipping industry was not 
included in the Paris Agreement, which, in the end, focused only on national efforts for 
the control and reduction of CO2 and called for a limit of temperature rise to below two 
degrees (UNCC 2018). Despite this, Paris continued to act, both before and during the 
meeting. The first submission to MEPC69 was made in 12th February 2016 by ICS, 
known as ‘the voice of the industry’ by some participants. In their submission, they 
stated: 
 
 1 ICS asserts that the message from the UNFCCC Conference (COP 21) and the Paris 
Agreement is clear. All sectors of the global economy are now expected to determine 
how they can reach peak CO2 emissions as soon as possible before eventually 
decarbonizing completely. ICS agrees that international shipping must play its full part 
in contributing to this objective. 
 
 2 Now that work on the global CO2 data collection system is almost complete, and in 
expectation of its mandatory application by 2018, ICS supports in principle the request 
by the Marshall Islands at MEPC 68 (MEPC 68/5/1), supported by other IMO Member 
States that the Committee should discuss the establishment of IMO commitments for 
CO2 emission reduction on behalf of the entire international shipping sector. This 
would be consistent with the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and commitments made by 
nations to produce Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) and to 
update these on a five year basis. 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/1, submitted by the International Chamber of Shipping, p1) 
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It is clear that the Paris Agreement, despite not including the IMO and the Shipping 
industry84 acted on this Delegation and catalyzed a response. From conversations during 
the observation two things were made clear to the researcher. Firstly, the industry 
Delegations were previously considered by environmentalists to be stalling progress in 
the field of environmental regulation, or at the very least, they were not as proactive as 
necessary. Secondly, this submission was thought to represent a turning point for the 
industry members and particularly for the Delegation responsible for its submission. 
Indeed, this submission created quite a buzz among Delegates at MECP69, with a few 
stating that it was quite surprising85. 
 
The next submission, 69/7/2, also invoked the Paris stating: 
In the view of the co-sponsors, now is the right time to go about defining the maritime 
sector's fair share in the "global response to the threat of climate change, in the context 
of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty" (UNFCCC Paris 
Agreement, Article 2.1). We feel encouraged by the last Conference of the Parties of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the spirit of cooperation shown 
in Paris, the commitment of 196 Parties to the UNFCCC to mitigate climate change and 
the text adopted. The co-sponsors therefore invite the Committee to initiate the relevant 
proceeding to define the fair share of the international maritime sector in the global 
reduction efforts of the international community to keep the increase in global average 
temperature well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
(Excerpt from MEPC69/7/2, submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, the Marshall Islands, Morocco and 
Solomon Islands, p2)  
 
Here again Paris was enrolled in order to strengthen the construction of the co-sponsors 
argument. Echoing Chapter 6, the submission represents a network growth for the 
Marshall Islands (see Figure 6.1). During the fieldwork, it was apparent that Member 
States hosting a COP would strive to make themselves more visible in the meetings and 
to contribute more. The French Delegation was very vocal in the discussions of 
MEPC69 and 70 and frequently reminded the Delegates of the Paris Agreement. They 
                                                
84 ICAO and the airline industry were also not specifically included in the Paris Agreement. 
85 These comments were made to the researcher in casual conversations during the MEPC69. 
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also co-sponsored submission 69/7/2, 70/7/6 and 70/7/13. The Delegation of Morocco 
did not make an intervention on the proposal of the Marshall Islands at MEPC68 
however by MEPC69 they were a co-sponsor on 69/7/2 and sponsored a coffee break 
during the MEPC itself86 reflecting that Morocco was the host COP22. At MEPC70 
they also co-sponsored 70/7/6. Due to its invocation in the text and the make-up of the 
co-sponsors (hosts of COP21 and 22), the Paris Agreement can be seen assisting in the 
both the growth of the network of co-sponsors and the strengthening of their argument.  
 
Submission 69/7/3 by the Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC) associated together the Paris 
Agreement and the comments of submission 69/7/1. The submission itself is titled: ‘An 
appropriate IMO Response to the Paris Agreement’ and stated: 
 
3 For the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) "the message from the UNFCCC 
Conference (COP 21) and the Paris Agreement is clear. All sectors of the global 
economy are now expected to determine how they can reach peak CO2 emissions as 
soon as possible before eventually decarbonising completely" and it agrees "that 
international shipping must play its full part in contributing to this objective".  
4 The IMO has said that there "is a clear imperative now for IMO's Member States to 
rise to the challenge set by the Paris Agreement" with former Secretary-General Koji 
Sekimizu saying, "I now encourage Governments to bring the spirit of the Paris 
Agreement to IMO"2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, has 
highlighted "the major role that IMO and the maritime sector has to play in 
translating… the Paris Agreement on climate change into tangible improvements in 
peoples' lives"3.  
5 The stakes are high and the rhetoric supportive. An appropriate response from IMO is 
now essential […]  
 (Excerpt from MEPC69/7/3, submitted by the Clean Shipping Coalition p2)  
 
In their submission, the CSC used the statements of the ICS and Secretary General to 
associate (i.e. connect) those actors into a network with the Paris Agreement and then 
                                                
86 Sponsoring a coffee break seemed to be a gesture of good will from one Member State to the rest of the 
MEPC and observers.  
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enrol that construction to pressure the Committee to accept the need to develop new 
CO2 regulations. Equally, Paris itself had facilitated this submission thus influencing the 
contribution made to the negotiations by the CSC. 
 
The final submission (69/7/4), which was submitted by WSC, CLIA, INTERTANKO 
and IPTA (all Industry Associations), is more of a commentary paper than a proposal. It 
makes reference to the Paris Agreement’s focus on the relationship between poverty and 
international trade. This is an attempt to lay the groundwork for the argument that 
further CO2 regulations may be costly for the shipping industry and this economic 
disruption could then negatively impact the many developing nations that depend on 
shipping. This argument was used later in the MEPC discussion and will be considered 
further in Section 7.4.4. Here again, we can see that Delegations attempt to make Paris 
into an actor in multiple ways. While the earlier Delegations enrolled it to pressure the 
development of new regulations, this network was attempting to enrol Paris as a 
conservative rationale to avoid the development of a target or emissions cap. 
 
From the submissions alone it was clear that Paris had been acting on the Delegates in 
the run up to MEPC69. It catalyzed activity and caused new proposals to be submitted, 
both a new evolution of the proposal in submission 68/5/1 and the proposal in 69/7/1. 
Three co-sponsoring networks attempted to enrol Paris in their submissions. However, 
the way in which the Agreement would act upon the negotiations remained uncertain 
and outwith the control of any one actor. Enrolling an actor does not guarantee its 
cooperation, especially when the actor in question is dependent on a collective to take 
shape and form. The following section traces the agency of the Paris Agreement 
through the Plenary discussions in MEPC69.  
 
 7.4.4 Paris in the MEPC69: Discussion 
The Paris Agreement was invoked repeatedly during the Plenary session at MEPC69 
and acted upon the Committee negotiations. The discussion opened with the 
Secretariat’s Report of the Outcome of COP21 and an account of the Paris Agreement. 
A speech about the Paris Agreement by from a UNFCCC Delegate then followed. 
Subsequently the Secretary General made a speech discussing the Paris Agreement and 
 233 
calling for the Committee to base further action on the example set by Paris. As such, 
the Paris Agreement was immediately made present at the opening of the negotiations.  
 
The first round of the Plenary discussion of Agenda Item 7 concerning the proposals in 
the submissions was 61 interventions long. Excepting the introductory speeches by the 
Secretariat, UNFCCC Delegate, Secretary General and the introductions to the 
submissions, the Paris Agreement was referred to in 50 out of 61 interventions, more 
than 80% of them. During these interventions, the Paris Agreement was enacted as a 
convincing catalyst. One Delegation noted that the same countries that had just 
committed to the Paris Agreement were sitting in the MEPC and so should consistently 
echo their commitments to targets across the two fora. Others constructed the Paris 
Agreement as a call for action requiring a response or a challenge. The Agreement was 
seen as a global effort that the shipping industry must also join.  
 
The Delegations that enacted the Paris Agreement as reason to support the proposals 
used evocative language. The Delegations that did not support or that opposed the 
proposals merely welcomed or acknowledged the Paris Agreement as a recent global 
achievement. During the discussion, there were 36 Delegations (35 Member State 
Delegations and 1 Industry Association) that supported the two proposals (establishing 
a fair share or an IMO Determined Contribution)87 and 23 Delegations (21 Member 
State Delegations and 2 Industry Associations) that either showed no support or 
opposed the proposals88. Two Delegations made conflicting interventions that when 
analysed contained a mixture of support and opposition. 
 
The Paris Agreement was enrolled by 30 of the 36 supporters of the proposals as a 
reason for the proposals to establish an IMO determined contribution (MEPC69/7/1) or 
a fair share (MEPC69/7/2) in the reduction of global emissions. The enrolment of Paris 
constructed it as a pressure for the Committee to take action and as reasoning for 
                                                
87 Despite ICS stating in their introduction to their submission that they would like the ideas within to be 
carried forward, many Delegations still responded with support or opposition to the submission during the 
discussion.  
88 Not every member state speaks in Plenary. Some Delegations remain silent during the discussions. 
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accepting the proposals. It was positioned to convince the room for the need to agree to 
and support the proposals. 18 of the 23 Delegations that did not support or opposed the 
proposals also mentioned the Paris Agreement in their interventions. However, their 
referral was merely an acknowledgement of Paris, (they ‘welcomed’ the Agreement) 
rather than an enrolment.  
 
The Paris Agreement was constructed as an actor and took effect as such. In MEPC69 it 
interessed support for the proposals, which contrasts with how it was enacted in 
MEPC68, where it was successfully enrolled to stall discussions of the possibility of the 
establishment of targets. As illustrated in Chapter 6, the outcome of MEPC69 was the 
formation of a WG to start discussions on the proposals in submissions 69/7/1 and 
69/7/2 (and others) at MEPC70. The mobilization of Paris as a convincing actor was 
therefore successful as it effected the network’s convergence on the decision to 
establish the WG for further discussions on the topic of new emission reduction 
regulation. Although any agreement in the MEPC is the result of many different factors, 
participants felt that the influence of the Paris Agreement was largely responsible for 
the decision to establish a WG at MEPC70. The following section gives a review of the 
Paris Agreement at MEPC70.  
 
7.4.5 The Paris Agreement in MEPC70 Submissions and Discussions 
MEPC70 occurred from 24th to 28th of October 2016, approximately 11 months after 
COP21. The Paris Agreement had steadily been gaining signatures and had reached the 
required level for entry into force by the time MEPC70 occurred (UNCC 2018). The 
Paris Agreement was once again enrolled in submissions (70/7/3, 70/7/5, 70/7/6, 70/7/8, 
70/7/10, 70/7/12) to strengthen proposals and catalyse agreement to progress the 
development of new approaches for reducing CO2. Commenting submissions 70/7/11, 
70/7/13, 70/7/14 also constructed Paris as a pressurizing actor to accept the need to take 
action. The invocations of the Paris Agreement in the MEPC70 submissions represented 
a collective acknowledgment of the need to open discussions of further measures to 
control and reduce CO2 emissions from international shipping. At the same time the 
content of the proposals differed between setting a ‘contribution’, ‘share’, or ‘target’ 
and continuing to enhance the energy efficiency of ships. Submission 70/7/4, co-
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sponsored by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South Africa and 
Uruguay represented the network of opposition to proposals of ‘targets’. In their 
submission they stated: 
 
‘As long as world trade is growing, shipping will grow too. This responsive 
characteristic of shipping makes it impossible to determine its peak emissions in the 
same way that a country could do. In his statement at the Future-ready Shipping 2015 
Conference, the former IMO Secretary-General, Mr. Koji Sekimizu, highlighted that 
measures aimed at reducing shipping's overall contribution of CO2 emissions, such as a 
global overall cap, "would artificially limit the ability of shipping to meet the demand 
created by the world economy, or would un-level the level playing field that the 
shipping industry needs for efficient operation, and therefore must be avoided”’  
(Excerpt from 70/7/4, p2, submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South Africa 
and Uruguay) 
 
Later in the submission they added that: 
 
The overall emission cap is therefore fundamentally unfit for shipping. 
(Excerpt from 70/7/4, p3, submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South Africa 
and Uruguay) 
 
This submission demonstrates clear opposition to the essence of the MEPC proposals 
that seek to establish some sort of industry-wide limit on emissions. Yet despite this 
resistance, the co-sponsors of 70/7/4 also state: 
 
‘There is a clear imperative for IMO's Member States to rise to the challenge set by the 
Paris Agreement for the international community and continue to make contributions to 
this global effort…’ 
(Excerpt from 70/7/4, p2, submitted by Angola, Brazil, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, India, Iran, South Africa 
and Uruguay) 
 
Thus, although there may be no convergence around a new approach to regulating the 
future of CO2 emissions regulation in shipping in the submissions, the agency of the 
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Paris Agreement has pushed Member States to acknowledge the need to open 
discussions in contrast to the strong opposition at both MEPC68 and 69. Even the 
network of resistance has been pushed past the question of ‘if there was a need to 
discuss further regulations for the reduction of GHG emissions?’ to the question of 
‘what should be done at MEPC70?’.  
 
In the Plenary discussion, the Paris Agreement was enrolled in two ways. It was cast as 
a pressurizing actor to encourage the Committee to accept the need to establish a share 
of or contribution from shipping to the global efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. 
Examples of these enrolments included encouraging the Committee to produce a 
meeting output that would ‘send a signal following the Paris Agreement’ and to ‘take 
definitive action to support the Paris Agreement targets’.  
 
On the other hand, networks opposing the creation of a ‘target’, ‘share’ or 
‘contribution’ voiced their concerns with the economic impact these might have on the 
industry. They argued that the growth of Shipping emissions is tied to the demand for 
the industry to serve world trade so if trade grows, Shipping’s emissions will grow as 
well. Capping emissions, in their view, would limit the growth of Shipping. They also 
attempted to enrol the Paris Agreement to suggest that ‘an absolute sectorial target’ 
would be inconsistent with the concept of differentiation between nations that was 
embedded into the Agreement. This network of opposition argued for the continued 
focus on enhancing energy efficiency and uptake of alternative fuels and the three-step 
approach.  
 
Once the WG at MEPC70 was released from Plenary the traceability of the Paris 
Agreement lowered. This is due to the difference between Plenary and WG sessions 
(see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). Plenary interventions are high level and political, they lay 
out the national positions of Member States and the support and opposition for the 
general direction of proposals. WG discussions are where the Members can negotiate 
the specifics and begin to draft text. As a result, the majority of the interventions were 
alterations to the base document though the Paris Agreement was enrolled several times 
to attempt to pressure agreement.  
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In MEPC 69, the concept of Paris acted upon the Committee negotiations leading to the 
acknowledgement that further discussion of how to reduce CO2 emissions was required 
and a working group for MEPC70. Thus, Paris acted to push the Committee to establish 
the space and time for this discussion (Jollands et al. 2015). By the MEPC70 
discussions, the Delegates had largely agreed that there was a need to look at the 
development of new measures to reduce CO2 from Shipping in the wake of the Paris 
Agreement and the negotiations moved to the shape, form and timeline of these 
measures.  
 
The next section supplements the observations above with an examination of the 
interview data regarding the Paris Agreement and shows that it was influential in the 
establishment of the WG at MEPC70. 
 
7.4.6 The Influence of the Paris Agreement: Insights from Interviews 
ANT scholars argue that there is great value in an actor’s own understanding of their 
reality and recommend engagement accordingly (Callon 1986; Latour 2005). As such, 
during interviews, participants were asked about the effect of Paris Agreement in the 
MEPC. Presented below is a collection of responses from participants that emphasize 
the influence of Paris on the negotiations: 
 
‘Well I think it’s had a substantial impact. Since the IMO as a UN organisation, I think 
that makes sense that it would.’ (Participant 33: Member State Delegate) 
 
‘…the rhetoric that they might have used in the past sort of softened slightly, sort of 
showing that there might be sort of future room for manoeuvre on these discussions.’ 
(Participant 3: Member State Delegate) 
 
Both Member State Delegates and members of COs shared this belief in the influence of 
Paris on the negotiations. One participant stated that: ‘it provided more impetus to the 
Member States of IMO to make a quicker decision’ (Participant 20: A CO Delegate 
from an Industry Association) although he also commented that the effects may be 
temporary.  Another interviewee stated he heard a, ‘…tonal shift in how the IMO was 
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treating the topic. Again, on the introduction of a paper that was headlined by the 
Solomon Islands, I think that was something that we probably would not have seen last 
year’ (Participant 26: CO Delegate from an NGO) 
 
A few Delegates from Industry Associations agreed that the Paris Agreement had a 
pressurising effect and commented that during the negotiations of the Paris text the 
‘primacy’ of the IMO as regulator of shipping activity had been challenged and even 
though Shipping was left out of the final text, the IMO was expected to make further 
progress. Indeed, during the Plenary discussion at MEPC69, many Delegations took the 
opportunity to comment that the IMO is still the ‘best placed’ organisation to regulate 
shipping, which made apparent that this might have been questioned during the 
negotiations. 
 
Another Member State Delegate gave more detail commenting that the Paris had a 
pressuring effect: 
‘I think that provided a bit more pressure on Delegates to move some of these 
discussions forward and discussions related to Greenhouse Gas emissions and you have 
our new IMO Secretary General that has, re-iterated that call, and you have other 
senior political leaders that are putting pressure so that I think definitely translated into 
an increased willingness among Delegates…to be more open to moving these 
discussions [forward].’ (Participant 28: Member State Delegate) 
 
Paris therefore was clearly influencing the collective yet it was also influential on an 
individual level as well: 
‘…the Paris Conference has a positive effect on agreement at the last MEPC[69]…in 
the very first instance you see China and Brazil and other developing countries have 
opposed severely on the discussion at the IMO. But you see after the Paris conference, 
China, in particular…became very, say positive attitude…and clearly I believe that the 
outcome of the Paris conference has the positive effect...on discussion at the IMO.’ 
(Participant 25: Member State Delegate) 
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Indeed, the influence of Paris was noted to span more than one agenda item as 
participants felt that it had positively impacted the negotiations under Agenda Item 689: 
‘So I think that IMO discussions on the data collection system, the fact that we achieved 
agreement at the last session was in large part due to the Paris Agreement’ (Participant 
5: Member State Delegate). Similarly, one interviewee discussed their Delegation’s 
expectation that there would be an intense discussion on whether the DCS should be 
voluntary or mandatory. They saw the casual acceptance of the DCS as mandatory as 
due, in part, to the effect of Paris.  
 
In addition to influencing negotiations across different agenda items Paris was 
influential across time. A Delegate from a Member State felt that the Paris Agreement 
had affected not only MEPC69, but MEPC70 as well: 
‘…I don't think we would be with a Roadmap now if there has not been the Paris 
Agreement, but I must admit that it took a while, because until the coin dropped, I 
would say, last MEPC was very difficult, most people were not cooperative at all, 
except the European Union, that was the only one, and somehow things change and I 
would think that the coin dropped because the Paris Agreement was being ratified and 
now even entered into force so I think that changed definitely.’ (Participant 29: Member 
State Delegate) 
 
In discussing the influence of Paris, two Delegates explained that its influence was 
partly due to the need to keep a coherent and consistent national position on climate 
change across international fora. Participant 32, a Member State Delegate, specifically 
pointed out that all of the countries in the MEPC expressing reservations on the 
establishment of a ‘fair share’, ‘intended contribution’ or a Working Group to discuss 
these options were the same countries that signed the Paris Agreement. He felt that there 
is no excuse for the resisting Delegations to ‘sit on the side-lines’ and that everyone 
must ‘come on board’. 
 
                                                
89 Agenda Item 6: Further Technical and Operational Measures For Enhancing Energy Efficiency of 
International Shipping 
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The Paris COP21 and the subsequent Paris Agreement can be seen from the data to be 
actors meeting Latourian criteria with their traceable effects and influencing the MEPC 
(Latour 2005). Beyond this, they are Meta-actors because of their characteristics. Both 
the COP21 and the Agreement are external to, and have no physicality inside the 
MEPC. Instead, they are made visible and enacted through the heterogeneous collective. 
i.e. Delegates and submissions, decisions and reports. Furthermore, there was evidence 
that the influence of the COP21 and the Paris Agreement differed from MEPC68 where 
it acted to postpone discussions of new measures to reduce CO2 and MEPC69 where it 
acted to establish a WG to open discussions of new measures. Enacted by the collective, 
the influence of Paris grew beyond the control of any one Delegation as it acted upon 
their negotiations.  
 
7.5 A New Age for Agency  
In following the actors and their work, this chapter has introduced a new actor-type, the 
Meta-actor. In Chapter 3, it was explained that one of the fundamental tenants of ANT 
is the abandonment of a priori divisions or dualisms (Callon & Latour 1992; Law 
1999a). Together ANT authors have brought down the barriers between the ‘Natural’ 
and the ‘Social’ (Callon & Latour 1992; Callon 1986a) and further, they have applied a 
ruthless symmetry in their observations, analysis and writings (Callon & Latour 1992; 
Callon 1986a). Despite this, ANT remains limited in its treatment of the non-material 
(Entwistle & Slater 2014). An imbalance remains in the works of ANT between the 
focus on the material, for example humans, objects, devices and, the immaterial, i.e. 
entities without a durable material visibility (ibid.).  
 
Though there is often a division of focus that favours material objects, even early ANT 
works acknowledged the influence of non-tangible agents. In their study of laboratory 
work and the construction of facts, Latour and Woolgar include ‘time’ as part of the 
heterogeneous network which created a scientific paper (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p88).  
 
Following the principle of ‘symmetry’ (Callon 1986a), recent ANT literature has been 
directly engaging with immaterial agency and constitutes an attempt to extend the 
attribution of agency under the banner of ANT. For example, boundary objects can be 
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conceived of as concepts as well as things (Gray et al 2014) and abstract constructions 
such as Culture and Sustainability can enrol other actors and act upon and within 
heterogeneous assemblages (Entwistle & Slater 2014; Jollands et al. 2015). This chapter 
has gone further by following three sources of immaterial agency as part of an account 
of the construction of control over an international industry. Furthermore, this chapter 
offers a typology and approach for identifying such agency and assembling it into the 
definition of the social, which is after all, the remit of ANT: 
 
‘it is always necessary to redefine who is acting, why it is necessary to act together, 
what are the boundaries of the collective, how responsibility should be allocated, what 
are the best metalanguages to define collective action – this is what I call maintaining 
the origins of society in the present.’ (Latour 1986, p276) 
 
The next section will explain the characteristics of a Meta-actor, the creation of the 
terminology and how these actors may be identified.  
 
7.6 The Typology of a Meta-actor 
Actor-Network Theory is often noted for its descriptive capabilities that are seen as a 
form of analysis (Latour 2005). ANT is viewed as not just a theory and methodology 
(Latour 1999a), but a vocabulary as well (Collins & Yearley 1992; Callon 1986a). It is 
full of meaningful descriptive words that when empirically applied become theoretical 
framings. ANT writers began with a redefinition of actor and have over the years added 
the following terminologies: association, actant, mediator, intermediary, token, 
obligatory passage point, boundary object, translation (and its sub terms), treason (and 
its sub terms) etc. Thus, when contributing to ANT, it is vital to use a convincing 
descriptive framing of the data and thus enhance the overarching theoretical repertoire:  
 
‘The vocabulary chosen for these descriptions and explanations can be left to the 
discretion of the observer. He cannot simply repeat the analysis suggested by the actors 
he is studying. However, an infinite number of repertoires is possible. It is up to the 
sociologist to choose the one that seems the best adapted to his task and then to 
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convince his colleagues that he made the right choice...’ (Callon, 1986a, p4 in the 
online version, emphasis added). 
 
To paraphrase Callon, this research has created and employed the terminology of Meta-
actor to discuss an actor with a particular set of traceable characteristics and hopes to 
convince the reader of the utility of this actor-categorization. In doing so, the thesis also 
attempts to enrich existing ANT literature by focusing on immaterial actors and thus 
enhances the descriptive capacity of future ANT works. 
 
7.6.1 The Characteristics of a Meta-actor 
Just as the terms ‘actant’ and ‘mediator’ can be used to illuminate the qualities of the 
actor in question, the term Meta-actor denotes a set of characteristics and just as actants 
and mediators are still considered actors, so too is a Meta-actor. The word ‘meta’ is 
used to denote a level of abstraction. The term seemed suitable to describe an actor that 
only acts through other actors. Therefore, a Meta-actor is once removed from the 
tangible world. Furthermore, Latour, himself suggested that sociologists consider the 
best ‘metalanguages’ to explain collective action (Latour 1986, p276).  
 
Much as the terminology of translation assists in following stages of network formation, 
the term Meta-actor allows the sourcing and characterization of abstract agency in 
networks. The Meta-actors in the MEPC, though individually different shared a 
common set of characteristics. They were influential and this influence was apparent 
through traceable effects. They were immaterial, lacking in the physicality of the human 
and objects in the network. They are brought into visibility by the actions of others and 
so they are enacted by a collective and finally they exist beyond the control of an 
individual actor. The four characteristics underlined above constitute the typology of a 
Meta-actor. Having explained the characteristics of a Meta-actor, the next section will 
explain how they can be followed.  
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7.6.2 Following Meta-actors  
A Meta-actor can be traced (or identified) in much the same way as any other actor. 
Actors, associations and networks reveal themselves to the researcher (Callon 1986a) by 
the effects they have and the difference they make (Latour 2005). Employing this 
understanding of agency allows identification of action regardless of the source. With 
particular regards to their emergence in the context of this thesis, Meta-Actors were 
visible through controversy; for example, Consensus is enacted to resolve controversy, 
while the enactment of CBDR and the Paris Agreement, which are external to the 
MEPC network, opened up controversy within the MEPC.  
 
The tracing of a Meta-actor is directly correlated with embracing the principles of ANT. 
When constructing an account of actors, the principle of symmetry must be applied in 
conjunction with a resistance to assuming inherent characteristics a priori (Callon 
1999). Thus, the qualities of any actor or network must emerge from the data a 
posteriori: ‘But where to localise agency in such a web? Where to pin it down? This 
becomes a matter of attribution, post hoc and after the action.’  (Law & Mol 2008, 
p58). Action, it seems, has consequences and the tracing of consequences will lead to 
the identification of actors and networks and the formation of explanations.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
Three Meta-actors were identified in this chapter: Consensus, Regulatory Principles and 
COP21 and the Paris Agreement. These actor-types, though individually different share 
a particular set of characteristics which set them apart from the human and object actors 
detailed in Chapters 5 and 6. They were immaterial and enacted through the 
assemblage. Neither their definitions, nor actions were stabilized. Despite these actors 
being entirely dependent on the collective MEPC network to grant them an existence, 
they proceeded to assume a position of influence over the Committee and remained 
outwith the control of any individual actor. Their role in the MEPC is key, not only to 
understanding the development of regulations, which is, in itself, a form of control 
making, but also to advancement of understandings of power and control in general, 
particularly the link between dependence and influence. By following Meta-actors, we 
can see that associations that connect actors simultaneously make them stronger and 
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weaker. They become susceptible to influence by association. This will be discussed 
more deeply in Chapter 8.  
 
The following and final chapter will offer a summary of the three data chapters and 
discuss key contributions in connection with current literature before concluding with a 
look at future research in this area.  
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The IMO MEPC is a heterogeneous network that entangles environmental, political, 
international, geographical and economic concerns in its regulatory processes. Taking 
the MEPC as a black box and following the actors and associations that create it 
resulted in three data stories and four main contributions. The study overall is an 
observation of the constructive process of regulating and an explanation of how a 
network builds a device for controlling industrial activity across the oceans. 
 
This chapter will begin by revisiting the core research questions and aims of the thesis. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are then sequentially reviewed, recapping their key findings and 
discussing these in connection with current literatures before the overall contribution of 
the thesis is discussed. Following this the limitations of the study are reflected on as 
areas for further research before the wider opportunities for future research in the 
shipping industry are presented. Finally the chapter ends with some concluding 
thoughts.  
 
8.1 Revisiting the Aims of the Thesis 
This section revisits the issue that stimulated the research project and the research 
questions that guided the study. Our globalised world is dependent on the shipping 
industry (George 2013), while our environment is under threat from human-industrial 
activity. The high seas are considered the last frontier, a 21st century Wild West 
(Langewiesche 2004). There is a growing need to understand how we currently regulate 
shipping activity in this area. Climate change is a current and serious issue, stemming, 
at least in part, from human industrial activity, and emissions from the shipping industry 
are on the increase (Wan et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2015).  
 
Existing work in shipping focuses predominantly on the impact of regulation (Stevens 
et al. 2015; Devanney 2010) and the regulatory avoidance possible with the Flags of 
Convenience/Open Registry System (DeSombre 2006). While there is recognition of 
the need for further regulation (Cullinane & Cullinane 2013; Lister 2015, Wan et al. 
 246 
2018), little is written about the process of creating regulation. Criticism of the IMO for 
its slow speed of regulating abounds in both academia and media outlets (Cullinane & 
Cullinane 2013; Lister 2015). The majority of the literature focusing on the IMO gives 
mostly a general overview, largely unguided by theory, with somewhat unclear methods 
(See for example Tan 2006; Karim 2015 and Hackmann 2012 respectively). Against 
this backdrop, there is a need to better understand the regulatory network that attempts 
to control industrial activity and respond to environmental problems. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis sought not to understand what has been done, but who is doing 
what and how. It aimed to understand the Organization through which all state-led 
regulatory activity is carried out. From the existing literature, reviewed in Chapter 2, a 
need for an in-depth observational study of the regulatory process was perceived and 
two guiding research questions were formed: 
 
1. What is the IMO MEPC? 
2. How does the IMO MEPC create regulation? 
 
Actor-Network Theory was selected as the conceptual toolkit for this project due to its 
appreciation of non-human participants in organisations and processes (Latour & 
Woolgar 1979; Latour 1983; Latour 1990; Latour 1992); its understanding of power, 
control and knowledge as a network construction (Latour 1986; Callon 1986a; Law 
1986b; Latour & Woolgar 1979); and its roots and proven applicability in scientific-
technical communities (Latour 1987; Latour 2004a; Latour & Woolgar 1979). ANT 
fundamentals and concepts were applied both as a guiding methodology for data 
collection and as a theoretical setting for the thesis narrative. The term ‘setting’ is used 
here in both senses of the word. ANT surrounds and entangles the data i.e. it is the 
setting in which the data stories are told, however it is also what holds the data in place 
as a whole. Like a gemstone in a ring, the data has been mounted for viewing, held in 
place in this thesis by Actor-Network Theory.  
 
This project identified the MEPC as a black-boxed regulatory network and aimed to 
unpack and explain it, foregrounding and discussing the actors and associations to 
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assemble them into a durable whole (Latour 2005). As a result, the research questions 
were answered with rich detail and a greater understanding of the construction of 
control in an international industry with areas of unclear or absent jurisdiction is 
presented.  
 
Although ANT writers value the interconnectivity and relationality of actors and 
associations (Boelens 2010; Latour 2005), there is a need to foreground parts of the 
network and specific actors in order to describe and discuss them. These constituent 
actors represent and explain the whole (Callon & Latour 1981; Latour & Woolgar 1986; 
Latour & Woolgar 1979; Latour 1983). As such, data chapters were specifically written 
and ordered to break down the network into its constituent actors and processes. Hence 
each chapter is individual and yet also part of the construction of a collective account of 
networked control. The chapters were also ordered specifically as the researcher 
‘experienced’ them. The spaces, people and things (Chapter 5) were experienced first 
and because of these actors the processes (Chapter 6) could be traced and appreciated 
before the (new) ‘missing masses’ (Chapter 7) were assembled into the account. The 
next section will review the key findings of Chapter 5 and how these contribute to the 
literature on the IMO and textual agency. 
 
8.2 Revisiting the Data: Spaces, People and Things 
In Chapter 5 spaces, people and things were assembled to constitute and explain the 
IMO MEPC. Chairmen, Delegates, artefacts, rooms and texts (inter alia) gather 
periodically together to produce the MEPC meeting. The first actor discussed was the 
IMO Headquarters, which provides the network with the facility to temporarily 
converge. Some of the actors (i.e. texts, Delegates, Secretariat) work throughout the 
year however the network is physically dispersed. Most of the work carried out during 
the year is done in preparation for MEPC meetings. The discussion, decisions and 
drafting can only occur in the IMO HQ. Thus the physical space gathers the assemblage 
together facilitating the work of every other actor in the network. The space itself 
seemed to be constructed and furnished, purposefully or not, to represent international 
cooperation and encourage compromise and Consensus. The international artefacts 
evoke differences; different cultures, histories and heritages and yet they also suggest a 
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sense of togetherness and appreciation for the work of the IMO. Thus, the space both 
captured and enacted the purpose and principles of the Organization.  
 
Chairmen were found to be Obligatory Passage Points (Callon 1986a) through which all 
information, positions, decisions and agreement must flow. Chairmen are the 
Consensus-builders, responsible for conducting the discussion and negotiating the 
alignment of points of compromise in the Member States positions. Furthermore, they 
were observed to mobilize other actors at their discretion in order to achieve progress. 
They are a focal node whose directive actions bring the network’s disparate positions 
together.  
 
The Secretariat organizes and contextualizes the work of the Committee during IMO 
meetings. They provide structure and consistency both during and between meetings. 
They are neutral assistants and can assist Member States as mediators, helping them to 
achieve understanding and Consensus. They also have a representational role 
themselves, capturing the complex discussion in the IMO and presenting these at other 
international regulatory fora. They provide procedural advice and assist in the 
submission and drafting of texts. Ultimately, they are the facilitative constants of the 
Organization.  
 
The Delegates build and maintain relationships, capture and represent interests and 
create submissions throughout the year. Their role is multi-faceted, with some having a 
separate organizational role as well as their representational one. Delegates ‘stand for’ 
larger networks of actors beyond the Organization (Callon 1986a; Latour 1992) acting 
as network representatives for Member States, Industry Associations and NGOs. They 
displace the interests of external organisations (Latour 2004a), deploying these interests 
into submitted texts and interventions then subsequently into decisions and regulatory 
documents. The trust and relationships created and sustained between Delegates is 
generative of regulatory work and the associations between these Delegates contribute 
to the process of regulating. While the Chairmen are Consensus-builders, the Delegates 
are Consensus-negotiators. They must strive for Consensus and yet they must also 
forward the interests of their own Delegations and work for a favourable outcome. 
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Thus, as they negotiate, they enact and perform Consensus, an idea that was revisited 
and unpacked in Chapter 7 with regards to the entire assemblage. 
 
Within the MEPC, time was found to be a key actant, particularly when managed and 
mobilized by the Chairman. Break times and margin times in particular had largely 
facilitative effects on the development of regulation by the MEPC network. Break times 
support the role of the IMO HQ. They allow for the collective to talk outwith the 
conventions of formal discussion and to gain understanding of national positions, 
industry views and develop new ideas. In a sense, time and space associate together 
during the MEPC to ease the communication of the network and the progress of 
negotiations. Equally, time could be a pressurizing actor in the network, both by the 
withdrawal of breaks and by the passing of time overall. Splinter groups in the 
discussions were also assembled into the explanation of the MEPC as procedural actants 
due to their effect on the negotiations. Again, they facilitated and eased the work of 
other actors in the network and stimulated progress when mobilized.  
 
The technology of the IMO is mundane (Woolgar & Neyland 2013) and yet when 
associated, audio-visual systems, laptops, programs and an online database all mobilize 
into an infrastructure that is responsible for the visibility and comprehension of the 
discussions themselves.  
 
Text documents were found to be integral actors in the MEPC and indeed the wider 
IMO network. They performed a variety of actions and changed roles at different stages 
of the process. They were found to report, submit, propose, request, represent, inform 
and comment. They are association-makers, circulating between actors and throughout 
the network that constitutes the MEPC and IMO. They were able to connect the IMO to 
associated organisations, for example the E.U. and its own umbrella organisation, the 
U.N. They also displaced and drew in external events, information and research, 
embedding these in the process. The reports that are created during the meetings 
summarise the discussion and agreements, capturing and archiving the Consensus level 
achieved and connecting meetings across time. Submissions capture, and stabilize an 
idea. They are a snapshot of an idea and a network. Proposals in submissions are in a 
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state of flux but have been temporarily captured for viewing and discussion by the texts. 
Submissions provided a focal point to view and discuss regulatory proposals before they 
were reshaped by Consensus and moved forward by the report.  
 
8.2.1 Key Contribution: Textual Agency 
Chapter 5 began to describe the network that controls the international shipping 
industry. The detailing of the roles of actors such as Delegates, Chairmen, Secretariat, 
space, time, technology and texts contributes empirically to the existing literature on the 
IMO, which has not yet examined these roles individually and collectively when 
seeking to explain the making of control. It is particularly useful to understand 
Chairmen as Consensus builders, rather than simply intermediaries (Latour 2005); 
Delegates, Submissions and Reports as spokesmen (Law & Callon 1992; Callon & 
Latour 1981; Latour 1983; Callon 1986a); the Secretariat as boundary actors (Eden 
2009; Star & Griesemer 1989); Space as an enactor of principles; time as a catalytic 
actant and technology as vital facilitator. Each distillation of core agency in the 
network represents a novel offering to the understanding of an international governance 
process, however the key contribution of the chapter is the extension of textual agency.  
 
Exploring the work done by text documents became vital to the explanation of how the 
MEPC functions. Texts in the MEPC, have a variety of roles which can change as a text 
moves through the process. Text submissions linked sub-networks of co-sponsors, 
acting as a boundary object (Star & Griesemer 1989) around which the storm of 
translations (Callon 1986a) could begin in advance of the meeting. Like the fashion 
model’s portfolio in Entwistle and Slater (2014), submissions are moved and changed 
through network interaction and like the computer screen in Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 
(2002) they also gather up dispersed market activity ‘out-there’ and make it possible for 
participants to interact with. Submissions, therefore, are ‘appresentational devices’ 
(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002; Entwistle & Slater 2014). Additionally, submissions 
acted as temporary Delegates until time (meeting) and space (Headquarters) allowed the 
Delegates to take up their full representative role in the meeting. Submissions captured 
and stabilized proposals for review in advance of meetings. During the meeting, these 
proposals were displaced from the text into the negotiations before the results were once 
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again stabilized by another text, the meeting report.  
 
While submissions stabilize proposals and positions or individual or sub-networks of 
the MEPC, meeting reports capture and stabilize the discussions and decisions of the 
collective. Documents, in general, act as conduits to past agreements at past meetings 
(reports), to agreements and outcomes of other international bodies and, to research and 
innovation in the industry itself. They are able to feed essential information into the 
discussions that can be used to form new regulatory instruments. Reports are 
constitutive of the moving assemblage that is regulation (Entwistle & Slater 2014). 
 
In ANT literature, many inscriptions (texts) have been constructed as agential actors 
(Latour & Woolgar 1986; Law 1986b). Indeed the seminal work of ANT, Laboratory 
Life, examined the construction of facts and sought to explain how scientific activity is 
embedded into textual outputs (Latour & Woolgar 1979). In essence their work captured 
the heterogeneous assemblage that create a text, rather than capturing what texts do in 
heterogeneous assemblages. The question of what texts do in organisations was 
answered by (Cooren 2004) who found that texts have multiple roles in organisations 
and detailed these different functions. The empirical insights gained in this thesis show, 
not only what texts do in the MEPC but that texts are capable of facilitating and 
capturing the socio-politico-legal agencements of international regulation (Cloatre & 
Dingwall 2013). Ultimately MEPC documents are foundational to the formation of 
regulation. 
 
Notably Chapter 5 not only examined what texts do, but also what they don’t. Thus, it 
contributes two limitations of the agency of text in such settings. Texts cannot capture 
the relationships between Delegates in the MEPC. While Delegates noted that trust, 
trust-building and relationship maintaining was important for their work, indeed even 
generative of the work, none of these human-to-human relationships were captured in 
the texts. The documents in the IMO MEPC are of a formal, impersonal and concise 
nature. Neither the trust held or lost between Delegates nor the form of relationship 
between them was captured in official texts. Submissions could only show connection 
though co-sponsorship. Thus they were unable to capture the extent and shape of 
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Delegate-to-Delegate relationships.  
 
Furthermore, regulatory texts were unable to capture the shape of practice. The IMO 
Convention, rules of procedure and guidelines for work were extensively detailed yet 
they did not mention the concept of Consensus, though this concept was found to be 
core to the processes of the Organization. Indeed, the Basic Document contains 
information on voting procedures while in practice the assemblage works to avoid these 
procedures. This paradoxical relationship between Consensus, Voting and the 
establishing texts of the IMO was explored in Chapter 7. Ultimately, that which was 
visible in the text was invisible in practice and vice versa. 
 
In summary, texts have an integral role in organizational functioning and further, they 
provide durability (Latour 1990), consistency and structure across time. Chapter 5 
therefore contributes understanding of textual agency not only in an organisation, but in 
a regulatory process. In addition, the limitations of texts were also identified. They were 
unable to capture two elements of the organizational functioning; trust and relationships 
between and among Delegates and the shape of practice in the MEPC. 
 
Future work considering the agency of texts must ask what they do, but also what they 
do not or cannot do. This would account for the strength and limitations of textual 
agency and the disparity between the reality laid out by organizationally constitutive 
texts, such as rules of procedure, and the reality of practice.  
 
After exploring the role of texts, the thesis moved on to follow the processes of the 
Organization that had been highlighted by the movement and circulation of 
submissions. This became the basis for Chapter 6, which will be discussed next. 
 
8.3 Revisiting the Data: Translation and Treason 
Chapter 6 sought to trace the processes by which the MEPC constructs regulation. 
These were identified to consist predominantly of creating submissions (i.e. proposals); 
discussion; network convergence and report writing. As acknowledged in Chapter 4, 
‘following the actors’ (Venturini 2009; Latour 2005) seems simple in principle but is 
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more difficult in practice. In both the fieldwork and the construction of data into a 
narrative, this methodological suggestion involved making choices. The submission by 
the Marshall Islands at MEPC68, was chosen to anchor the story, since this submission 
proposed a discussion of new and further regulation to reduce GHG emissions. This text 
generated discussion at subsequent meetings and was constructive with respect to the 
Roadmap created at MEPC70. With the actor-text chosen, the process was traced and 
the data ‘mess’ (Law 2004; Law 2007b) was organised by framing moments of 
translation (Callon 1986a) and treason (Galis & Lee 2013). The three MEPC meetings 
were treated as mini-cases. The aligning of interests, building of networks of agreement 
and opposition was then observed and deconstructed during each mini-case. The actors 
were identified as supporters, modifiers and resisters as attempts to mobilize (Callon 
1986a) or distort (Galis & Lee 2013) were observed. At the conclusion of each meeting, 
the Committee coalesces, compromising individual positions into a decision and report 
and ultimately into regulation.  
 
8.3.1 Key Contribution: Understanding a Network Convergence  
ANT is both theory and methodological approach (Brown & Capdevila 1999; 
Jóhannesson 2005; Rydin 2012; Dalsgaard 2013). Accordingly, Chapter 6 represents a 
methodological contribution by applying the vocabulary of translation (Callon 1986a) 
alongside its shadow companion: treason (Galis & Lee 2013) to follow the negotiations 
that brought the MEPC network to a decision. These concepts had been intended for use 
together to further the symmetry of analysis (Galis & Lee 2013), however they have 
only been used separately in existing works (Callon 1986a; Galis & Lee 2013). 
Applying them in conjunction allowed a new account of international organizational 
discussion and interest alignment to be created.  
 
The vocabularies of translation and treason were applied when following processes 
submission and discussion, particularly when framing the transitional moments in the 
discussion during which the interests of the network were either brought together or 
diverged. Data presented in Chapter 6 showed that actors held together in a network can 
have divergent and conflicting interests in practice, but equally, that these diverging 
interests can be brought into alignment through repeated translations. Translation and 
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treason were effective when combined to unpack the construction of positions in 
international negotiations. Lastly the chapter showed all actors, from the Chairmen and 
Delegates to Consensus and Member Equality, were working to bring the network into 
alignment.  
 
Chapter 3 explained that translation explains network-construction and the ability of 
certain actors to mobilize others to their will and in so doing gain a networked position 
of control (Callon 1986a), while treason explains how actors can be constructed as 
weak and rejected from a network (Galis & Lee 2013). The cases are extreme with one 
showing a network construction falling apart (Callon 1986a) and the other showing the 
triumph of one group over another (Galis & Lee 2013). Chapter 6, on the other hand, 
depicted a more mundane (Woolgar & Neyland 2013), yet important facet of 
organizational life; cooperation and compromise. In the MEPC cases, neither 
unravelling nor ostracism occurred. Rather, the MEPC network is held durably together 
and yet the actors within are often divergent in their needs and agendas.  
 
Translation and treason vocabularies were used to give a balanced account, which 
traced the discussions showing that the divergent network was negotiated to a point of 
compromise. Therefore the thesis offers insight into what brings a network together, 
rather than how networks lock actors out (Galis & Lee 2013) compete (Callon 1980; 
Callon & Latour 1981) or unravel (Egan 2014; Law & Callon 1992; Jollands et al. 
2015; Callon 1986a). The application of translation and treason, not only provided 
insight into the discussion process but also pointed to a question: What makes divergent 
interests align in a network that is already held together by an infrastructure? In 
answering this question, the third part of the network was assembled, the new ‘missing 
masses’ (Latour 1992) were accounted for and Chapter 7 was created to explain the 
actors that bring interests together (see Section 8.4 for further discussion).  
 
In the MEPC Member States are not able to individually, or collectively, form durable 
positions of power and influence over others. This is due to the principle of Equality 
between Member States and the practice of Consensus. Thus, influence and power in 
the Organization can be tempered by the rules and values held by the Organization. This 
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chapter therefore contributes to the understandings of heterogeneous control in 
contemporary organisations.  
 
The IMO is held together, inter alia, by the Convention Text, Rules of Procedure, 
Funding, Delegations, Headquarters, Secretariat and its technological infrastructure. 
The issue faced by the IMO is not that it, as a network, will break apart or that certain 
Delegations could be pushed out. Instead, this thesis illustrates the difficulty faced is 
aligning the interests of up to 174 Member States and Consulting Organisations. The 
three cases highlighted that this process is time consuming and thus Chapter 6 
contributes to understanding the slow speed of regulation (Kopela 2014; Shi 2016; Wan 
et al. 2018). 
 
Appling translation and treason vocabularies in combination is a useful methodological 
tool for scholars of organisations to create a fuller and more balanced picture of 
everyday networks in organisations. When applied in isolation they can result in a 
dramatic and one-sided account which details more extraordinary network events, i.e. 
the unravelling of a network, or the triumphing of one group over another and actors 
being locked out of networks. We need to be able to apply these vocabularies to 
understand the daily, mundane push and pull of actors that are held together in an 
organisation (network) but are not always in alignment. As such, this approach should 
be taken further into other empirical settings, particularly in arenas of substantial actor 
discussions whereby networks undergo trial by negotiation. The following section 
reintroduces key data from Chapter 7 before discussing its contribution.  
 
8.4 Revisiting the Data: Meta-actors 
The third and final data chapter presented three actors that were grouped under the title 
Meta-actors to highlight their particular characteristics and influence. The commitment 
to symmetry necessitated by ANT allowed for the identification of Consensus, 
Regulatory Principles and the Paris COP21 and Agreement as actors and, after 
examination, their categorization of Meta-actors.  
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After the first observation of an intercessional working group meeting in September 
2015 and the preliminary interviews it was clear that Consensus was an important 
concept to unpack. After examining the IMO Convention and Rules of Procedure and in 
221 pages not finding Consensus mentioned once, it was imperative to understand how 
this concept could achieve a durable influence and indeed to understand it as an actor 
itself. From there, Consensus was followed in the data in order to deduce what it was 
and how it acted. This was done by examining its description during interviews and 
observing its enactment in the MEPC69 in April 2016 and MEPC70 in October 2017. 
 
From observing the MEPC submissions and discussions and in conversations both at the 
meetings and in interviews, Regulatory Principles were identified as influential actors. 
Many experts discussed the conflict between the regulatory principles of Non-
Discrimination, which is applied in the IMO, and the principle of CBDR, which is part 
of external international governance frameworks. Indeed, the tension was often 
positioned as one of the big questions of the time; ‘how are these two conflicting 
principles going to be harmonized?’ When traced, these principles were enacted in 
different ways. CBDR was particularly impactful when enacted, often stalling the 
discussions and delaying attempts to achieve progress in the face of tight time 
constraints while Non-Discrimination, was mobilized to challenge and prevent the 
enactment of the external principle CBDR. Hence, the regulatory principles were 
agential in the discussions.  
 
Another actor that was identified in a similar way was the Paris COP21 and the later 
Paris Agreement. Whilst the roles of the Delegations, space, Chairman, Secretariat, 
texts and technology remained consistent across the meetings, this actor’s role and 
influence changed from meeting to meeting. It was first noted in the data due to pure 
repetition in the submissions, discussions and conversations at the meeting. By 
deconstructing its influence, Paris was found to act in different ways at different points 
in time and in different meetings. In MEPC68 it mobilized for the network of 
opposition to the discussions of emissions targets for shipping, strengthening the 
translation of postponement. In MEPC69 however it mobilized for the network in 
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support of opening discussions on fair shares and determined contributions and 
influenced the establishment of a WG tasked with taking these discussions forward.  
 
By MEPC70 the Paris Agreement had reached the required signatories to enter into 
force and had successfully pressured all sub-networks (support and opposition) to agree 
that they must find a way to respond to the aim of the Paris Agreement to limit climate 
change. The discussion in the MEPC moved from whether a WG should be established 
to what new CO2 reduction measures should look like and the creation of a timeline to 
develop and implement them. 
 
8.4.1 Key Contribution: Meta-Actors and Modern Agency 
By following the actors and processes identified in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, a 
question arose: What influenced divergent interests to be brought together? The answer 
to this question lay in the conceptual actors, enlivened by the practices of the 
Organization. These actors were Consensus, Regulatory Principles and COP21 and the 
Paris Agreement. Their emergence and their characteristics allowed for the creation of 
the terminology Meta-actor. Equally, although they were individually grouped their 
shared features were distilled into a typology. Meta-actors are non-physical, enacted by 
a collective, beyond the control of individuals and influential in a network. They can be 
identified and deconstructed ‘post-hoc’ from the data (Law & Mol 2008). The 
terminology and typology extends the application of ANT symmetry and understanding 
of networks of control.  
 
In Chapter 3, the work of Entwistle and Slater (2014) was discussed as a recent 
furthering of the principle of symmetry. Finding that ‘culture’, a seemingly realist 
invocation of actors was actually agential in the production of a model’s look, they insist 
that such slippery concepts can, and should be, assembled into the definition of the 
Social. Building on this work, Chapter 7 assembled together a group of abstract 
influencers and followed their agency though the MEPC network. Much in the same 
way as the actors in Entwistle and Slater’s account sought to simultaneously capture and 
produce culture through the visual positioning of the model, the actors in the MEPC aim 
to achieve Consensus while simultaneously constructing it. Thus, Consensus is the 
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culture of the IMO MEPC. It is something produced by the actors, beyond individual 
control and influential in the process (Entwistle & Slater 2014). To employ a shipping 
metaphor, Consensus is the destination, the engine and the voyage itself all at once.  
 
The regulatory principles and the Paris COP were equally abstract in the network, 
however, once enacted they became discursive actors capable of either catalysing 
agreement or stalling it, depending on their mobilization. As such, these abstract entities 
act to influence the network and become entangled in the production of regulation 
(Entwistle & Slater 2014).  Furthermore, the MEPC is a nexus in which the conflicting 
regulatory concepts of Non-Discrimination and CBDR were mobilized. CBDR was 
found to stall progress towards MBMs for the control of CO2 emissions (Strong 2018). 
Echoing the work of Jollands & Quinn (2017), the agency of CBDR as a conceptual 
enrolment from one realm into another was found to be problematic for the achievement 
of progress on an environmental issue.  
 
The focus on identifying and following Meta-actors also builds on the work of Jollands 
et al. (2015). In their study, the authors employ the vocabulary of translation in order to 
follow the construction of sustainability as a core organizational value and a network to 
hold it durably in place. Unfortunately, due to a series of events, the network does not 
translate ‘sustainability’ into a position of durable influence within the organisation. 
Instead it unravels in the face of internal and external change and profitability concerns 
(ibid). The authors demonstrate the ability of a concept to form a network around itself 
(at least temporarily) and thus emphasize conceptual agency. This thesis followed three 
conceptual actors but rather than following the construction of a network around them, 
their enactment in the pre-established MEPC network was traced and their influence 
explained. Hence, this thesis contributes the description of how durable concepts (or 
values) mobilize in practice, which adds to the understanding of the influence of 
abstract actors (Entwistle & Slater 2014; Jollands et al. 2015; Jollands & Quinn 2017). 
 
This contribution therefore confirms and extends modern conceptualizations of agency. 
By acknowledging values, beliefs, concepts, principles and other such abstractions that 
are invoked by the physical network, the principle of symmetry is more sensitively 
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applied and the methodical approach of describing the network in full has been 
reinvigorated (Latour 2005; Venturini 2009). This thesis argues that regulation can be 
understood as a constructed, moving assemblage (Entwistle & Slater 2014), shaped and 
progressed by a socio-technical-conceptual network. The contribution of Meta-actors 
offers a new method for ANT scholars to identify and follow abstract 
conceptualizations as actors, and to trace their influence networks. In doing so it 
encourages ANT scholars to engage more effectively with alternative sources of agency 
in networks.  
 
In identifying and characterizing Meta-Actors the explanation of the development of 
regulatory control by the MEPC network was made whole (Latour 2005) and a link 
between collective influence and vulnerability emerged. This leads to the next section, 
which discusses the overall contributions of the thesis to understandings of control. 
 
8.5 Contributing to Understandings of Control  
This account of the development of regulation in the MEPC contributes both to 
empirical and theoretical understandings of control making. Empirically this thesis 
responds to an absence of in-depth examination in the literature as discussed in Chapter 
2. The thesis details the actors, associations and processes involved in developing 
regulation. Additionally, the depth of this ethnographic explanation of the MEPC at 
work sheds light on the complexity of the manufacture of regulation and responds to 
critiques over the speed of regulating (Kopela 2014; Shi 2016; Wan et al. 2018). At 
every meeting a divergent heterogeneous network must converge to a point of 
agreement. In order to do so proposals must be diluted and reshaped and positions must 
be compromised. Understanding the agency of Consensus and CBDR provides insight 
as to why there are no MBMs as yet in Shipping. Regulation is tied to the conditions 
and associations through which it was created (Entwistle & Slater 2014). In other 
words, by explaining the Organization and its processes and by following the 
negotiations ethnographically, the regulatory outputs can be more deeply understood.  
 
This study contributes to the relatively small corpus of ANT literature dedicated to 
demystifying control. Regulation as a form of control is the output of a heterogeneous 
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assemblage with the conditions for its development grounded in socio-technical-
conceptual mobilizations. Furthermore, while traditional views of power and control in 
ANT see it as only in existence when enacted (Callon & Latour 1981; Callon 1986a; 
Latour 1986; Law 1986a; Law 1986b; Law 1991a; Law 1991b; Law 1992) and more 
specifically as the effect of a mobilized heterogeneous network (Callon 1986a; Law 
1986b), this thesis suggests that there are two interdependent networks in the 
construction of control. The first stage is the creation of a device for control, i.e. the 
regulation itself by a construction network. The second stage, and the realization of 
control, is when this device is circulated through implementation network(s) (for 
example Flag states, Port Authorities, Classification Societies, Ship Management 
Companies, Crews etc.). At the same time, it must be recognized that any work done in 
one network will be influenced and shaped by the work of the other. Thus, Mol’s 
conceptualization of realities can be applied to understanding control; networks of 
construction and implementation ‘don’t simply co-exist side by side, but are also found 
inside one another’ (Mol 1999, p85). In the context of Shipping, for example, the 
problem of flag switching is one for the network of implementation, however the 
MEPC, as constructors, respond to the practical issue by adopting the principle of Non-
Discrimination in their work. 
 
Understanding control as not only collective (Latour 1986; Law 1986b) but as multiple 
(Mol 1999) allows it to be untangled into stages, forms and networks and represents a 
nuanced approach for ANT scholars to take forward. This framing may have particular 
relevance to ANT scholars of markets. Regulation itself can be seen as a market 
(controlling) device (Harrison 2014; Callon et al. 2007) and following its construction 
contributes to the understanding of the markets it seeks to control. In the MEPC, the 
principles and practices for developing regulation were considered essential for 
successful implementation. As such, the device for control is shaped by that which is it 
is shaped to control. To understand regulation is therefore to understand (in part) the 
market itself. 
 
Additionally, separating studies of control into studies of construction and studies of 
implementation allows us to perceive the balance of attention in the literature, or what 
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Latour might term, (scholarly) matters of concern (Latour 2004b). In the context of 
Shipping, the literature focuses heavily on implementation and outputs rather than 
construction as a matter of concern (ibid). Chapter 2 demonstrated that the existing 
Shipping literature is focused more heavily on the implementation of regulation rather 
than its construction. Scholars in a number of different environmental and regulatory 
contexts may find purchase in framing control as multiple in order to perceive the 
existing balance of attention between networks of construction and networks of 
implementation (Mol 1999). Thus under-researched networks can be more easily 
identified.  
 
On another level, this thesis contributes to the theoretical understanding of power 
through networked control. The Meta-actors were found to be influential over the 
assemblage however, they were also dependent on that same assemblage for their 
existence (Jollands et al. 2015). Thus, we can begin to understand that while a durable 
heterogeneous network may result in a powerful position, it simultaneously creates 
dependency. The construction of networked control is therefore simultaneously the 
construction of networked vulnerability. In this way, Law's definition of control (1986b) 
is harmoniously entangled with Callon's explanation of power construction (1986) and 
Galis & Lee's  appreciation of weakness (2013). This paradoxical link between power 
and vulnerability merits further elucidation in other regulatory contexts and studies of 
governance organisations.  
 
In conclusion, the thesis offers these two theoretical notions to enhance ANT 
understandings of power and control: (i) control is the multiple result of interdependent 
heterogeneous networks of construction and implementation and (ii) any actor that 
achieves a level of influence through a relational network simultaneously assumed a 
position of vulnerability. The chapter will now move on to acknowledge the limitations 
of the study showing how these are opportunities for further research in this area before 
moving on to discuss opportunities for future research in this highly complex industry.  
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8.6 Limitations of the Study as Opportunities for Further Research  
It is generally accepted that with every piece of research undertaken there are 
limitations as to what can be done practically. This section will acknowledge and reflect 
on this project’s limitations recognising that each can, and indeed should be, seen as an 
opportunity for future research.   
 
In Chapter 5, the proposal from the Marshall Islands was taken as the genesis of a 
regulation and was followed over the next 18 months spanning three meetings. 
However, only an agreement of the Roadmap to create regulation had been reached by 
the end of the fieldwork period. According to the Road Map created in MEPC70, a 
revised IMO Strategy including ‘short-, mid- and long-term further measure(s), as 
required, with implementation schedules’ is planned for MEPC80 in Spring 2023 
(MEPC70/18/Add1: Annex 11, p2). Furthermore, it can be a long time before a drafted 
text reaches the required signatories for enforcement. The regulation on the treatment of 
Ballast Water took 13 years from adoption by the Committee to reach entry into force90. 
The need for further regulation has been, for the most part, agreed by the Committee, 
however the exact form this regulation should take is still undecided and will not be 
fully settled for years to come. 
 
Given that the timeline for the development of a regulation to entry into force is both 
long and unpredictable, it would not have been possible to follow the development of a 
regulation in its entirety within the context of this doctoral research. The limitation, 
however, opens up the opportunity to conduct a longitudinal study following one 
regulation throughout the process. Direct observation of the process would likely yield 
rich data, based on the findings in this thesis, regarding the translation of ideas into 
accepted regulations. Such a study would allow for comparison of the first proposal 
                                                
90 The Ballast Water Management Convention was adopted in 2004 with three phase-in dates, 2009, 2012 
and 2016 however the convention ‘stipulated that it would enter into force 12 months after ratification by 
a minimum of 30 States, representing 35% of world merchant shipping tonnage’ (IMO n.d., p6). Those 
criteria were only reached on 8th September 2016, and so the regulation entered into force on 8th 
September 2017.  
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with the final result and thus demonstrate the difference that multiple translations make 
to the essence of an idea.  
 
The thesis set out to understand the MEPC as a network involved in the creation of 
control over emissions from Shipping. In assembling an account of the actors and 
associations of the MEPC the first stage of control has been explored. However, as 
ANT has shown, power does not lie within an actor, it lies with those who choose to 
submit to durable mobilization (Latour 1986; Law 1986b; Jollands et al. 2015). As such, 
the second stage of control can only be explained by the network of implementation and 
the reactions of the industry. Regulation, therefore, can be understood as a device aimed 
to produce control upon implementation. A further network of actors mobilizes this 
device in a network of implementation. Therefore, we now need to better understand the 
journey of a regulation through different networks from adoption to implementation. 
Although there have been studies on the impact and effectiveness of current regulations 
(EEDI and SEEMP) as discussed in Chapter 2, there is a need to understand the network 
of enforcement in the shipping industry. Future work could apply ANT to trace and 
deconstruct the assemblage in the shipping industry that enforces regulation, i.e. the 
Flag States, Port Authorities, Classification Societies, Captain, crew and the various 
non-humans, for example the sea itself, which also factor into any of the applications of 
regulation. A possible avenue to open up networks of implementation is to explore the 
new IMO Member State Audit Scheme and Implementation Support (IMSAS) which 
became mandatory on the 1st January 2016 and aims to assess and assist implementation 
of IMO conventions by Member States (IMO 2017a; IMO 2017b). In carrying out this 
work, understanding of control over Shipping emissions would be further enriched. 
 
It became apparent during the data collection and write up that the work done by text 
submissions was vitally important and that they are key actors in the process. 
Accordingly the process of creating submissions was explored in interviews with 
Delegates, which illustrated that this process is undertaken outwith, and in advance of 
the meetings. Therefore, texts are created by actors communicating across the world in 
email, phone calls and occasionally at in-person meetings (see Chapter 4 for more on 
this). Although the process was recreated in this thesis through interviews, being able to 
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directly observe this process would preferable. Further work to address this could 
follow the progress of a submission, punctuating the stages of problematization, 
interessement and enrolment (Callon 1986a) of co-sponsors with in-depth interviews 
with the co-sponsors themselves. Alternatively, a collaborative team could undertake 
observation of selected Member Delegates see for example Campbell, Corson, et al. 
(2014); Campbell, Hagerman, et al. (2014); and Gray et al. (2014). Rather than 
following the events, future individual or collaborative work could follow the delegates 
themselves as they carry out their work in their home countries and at international 
negotiations. 
 
A more minor limitation was the presentation of data weighed against the need to 
comply with the confidentiality rules of the Organization. The MEPC meetings are held 
in private91. Although there is no shortage of data in this thesis, from observation notes, 
vignettes, photographs, text excerpts and interview quotes, it would have been 
preferable to include direct quotes from Member States’ interventions in the Plenary 
WGs discussions. Future scholars should be aware of these issues when studying the 
IMO. Although presented here as a limitation, this thesis offers a variety of data and the 
researcher maintained a level of confidentiality in line with the Organization’s own 
rules and standards.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to assemble an explanatory network. As such, the amount of 
focus that could be given to any single actor had to be carefully balanced against the 
need to reassemble the whole (Latour 2005). Future research could shadow one 
Delegation and observe it alone in more detail. This may allow a researcher to be privy 
to the conversations that occur in the margins of the MEPC meeting and to the 
preparatory Delegation meetings that occur in advance of the MEPC. The relationships 
between Delegates were noted to have both a generative quality and a facilitative role in 
the work. It would be helpful to study these more specifically. Equally, further research 
                                                
91 The MEPC Rules of Procedure (as well as the MSC Rules of Procedure) state: ‘The Committee may 
decide to hold meetings in private or public. In the absence of a decision to hold meetings in public, they 
shall be held in private.’ (IMO Basic Document 2010, Rules of Procedure of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee, Rule 9, p109) 
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could focus on the rhetorical strategies used to interesse actors into networks for the 
support of an agenda during creation of submissions and the meeting negotiations.  
 
Time was clearly a factor in the MEPC, but tracing its effects to identify it as an actor 
was difficult. Future research should explore if and how time affects discussions, 
agreements and compromise and indeed how time is a regulatory construct, practised in 
a specific way by the Organization. During the fieldwork, it was noted that Delegates 
were beginning to question whether four days was sufficient for complex environmental 
regulatory discussions.  
 
The final limitation of this thesis was imposed on it by the theory chosen. ANT has 
been noted for its lack of critique (Whittle & Spicer 2008) and although ANT studies 
provide rich and detailed explanations, open black boxes, appreciate novel agentive 
qualities, and consider the construction of control, they do not tend to produce policy 
recommendations. ANT is about understanding rather than improving. As such, 
although this thesis produces an account of attempts to regulate emissions at sea and a 
deeper empirical understanding of the process, it does not suggest alterations, 
improvements or additions. When conducting fieldwork, most practitioners were keen 
to engage with the research and were open to insights about their work. Future research 
could aim for a more collaborative, active participation approach and engagement with 
practitioners. Considering that ANT is often seen as partly methodological (Brown & 
Capdevila 1999; Rydin 2012; Dalsgaard 2013) and partly terminological (Callon 
1986a), new approaches to the study of organisations could apply ANT in conjunction 
with another theory in a companioned approach. Recent work suggests that while ANT 
offers the capacity to explore taken for granted issues by identifying and opening black 
boxes, if combined with Interventionist Research, scholars would gain a deeper level of 
understanding of organizational processes and produce outputs which would be more 
engaging for practitioners (Lukka & Vinnari 2017).  
 
Although this section has explained the limitations of this work and positioned them as 
future research opportunities there are even more areas in need of exploration. The next 
section will outline these before the concluding thoughts are presented.  
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8.7 Future Research Opportunities 
The shipping industry offers a unique and currently under-researched area that warrants 
further enquiry. As noted above, future work could build on this study by following 
regulation from inception to adoption, unpacking the network that uses the device for 
control and increasing understanding of the creation of the impactful submissions. In 
addition, there are other possible avenues to contribute to our understanding of shipping 
and regulatory issues. This section lays out future research opportunities and categorizes 
these by various themes: interest representation; market complexities and calculative 
schemes; inhumanities at sea, and geographical controversies.   
 
8.7.1 Capturing and Representing Interests 
The issue of representation developed during data analysis with reference to the 
variability in the membership, constitution, authority and size of Delegations at the 
IMO. Industry experts sit on Member State delegations as consulting experts while 
there are also Industry Associations present and able to contribute to the discussions in 
the CO Delegations. Additionally, during data collection some participants voiced 
issues of inconsistent representation of countries’ interests across different international 
fora and noted lobbying is a continued issue in this area (InfluenceMap 2017). There is 
an opportunity to treat Delegations themselves as networks and to unpack the 
responsibility and practice of representation, applying the growing field of political CSR 
to identify regulatory stakeholders and understand how their interests are captured and 
represented by Delegates (Scherer & Palazzo 2011; Whelan 2012; Néron 2016; Scherer 
et al. 2016). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, an offshoot of ANT literature is the work of market studies 
(Callon 1998a; Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002; Callon et al. 2007; Helgesson & 
Kjellberg 2013; MacKenzie 2009a). Based on the translations followed in Chapter 6, 
future work in the IMO could frame the meeting as a market itself in which the 
delegates and delegations trade in support and compromise. This would allow a greater 
understanding of market-like activity in legal-political spaces. 
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There is a need to understand the two manifestations of the EU in government-
governance organisations. It is both a cohesive bloc and an assemblage of individual 
actors and it functions in these organisations in this dualistic manner. Some work has 
been done here (see Gulbrandsen 2013) and yet we must go further. Applying 
multiplicity (Law & Mol 2011; McDougall et al. 2016; Mol 1999; Law & Mol 2008) as 
a framing may give insight into the multi-experience of the EU through other 
international organisations and provide a contemporary explanation of how many states 
can act, both individually and collectively (Callon & Latour 1981).  
 
Finally, the UK’s exit from the EU, planned for March 2019, and the withdrawal of the 
U.S. from the Paris Agreement, initiated in June 2017, provide an opportunity to study 
how Member States adapt and reconfigure their positions and rhetoric in the wake of 
political, environmental and economic developments.  
 
8.7.2 Market Complexities and Calculative Schemes 
International shipping and the production and reduction of emissions is characterized by 
complexity (Smith et al. 2014). Issues of split incentives between owners and operators 
persist and stall the uptake of environmental technology (Rehmatulla & Smith 2015a). 
The dynamics of the Shipping market would benefit from investigation. Not only are 
cartels part of the mode of operating for Shipping (Sjostrom 2004), Shipping has been 
undergoing change as a result of the global economic downturn (Barua & Mittal 2017). 
As a result of these conditions, multiple mergers of shipping companies have occurred 
since commencement of this research project and it has been estimated that 9 of the top 
20 shipping firms will disappear through consolidation by the end of 2018 (World 
Maritime News 2018). As such, the container market may become disproportioned with 
a handful of shipping companies moving the majority of world trade. This effect has 
already been observed in the international fishing industry whereby a very small 
percentage of the companies are disproportionately responsible for a large percentage of 
industry activity (Osterblom et al. 2015). These keystone actors dominate and control 
global production in their sector, and ‘influence global governance processes and 
institutions’ (Osterblom et al. 2015, p11). Identifying keystone actors and their 
proportions of control is an approach that should be applied to the container shipping 
 268 
industry in order to provide a contemporary understanding of the network and power 
dynamics of this sector.  
 
Leading on from understanding the industry’s market dynamics and from the known 
difficulties regulating such an international borderless environment, there is an 
opportunity to study the creation and implementation of voluntary initiatives in the 
shipping industry. These are on the rise in the industry and stem from a variety of areas, 
from in-house company initiatives, company to company partnerships and groups such 
as the Cleaner Cargo Working Group92, The Trident Alliance93 and the Sustainable 
Shipping Initiative94 are three such arrangements. Current research focused on these 
NGO initiatives suggest they are lacking in transparency and rigor (Scott et al. 2017; 
Poulsen et al. 2018).  ANT has been used to unpack the networks that practise similar 
land-based initiatives (Eden 2009) and the same should undertaken for the sea-based 
activity, particularly as a way to observe the construction of new networks in real time 
rather than exploring pre-existing networks.  
 
In addition, NGO initiatives are on the rise (Lister 2015). Examples include projects 
such as GLOMEEP, a project that aims to support the uptake and implementation of 
energy efficiency measures in shipping 95 , DNVGL’s EEDI calculator 96  and 
BetterFleet97, an information portal in development to indicate vessel’s operational 
efficiency. Such initiatives often involve the creation and use of calculative and ranking 
measures. Even the core of current regulations revolved around the construction of ships 
to meet an Energy Efficiency Design Index. How the shipping industry responds to the 
calculative schemes in terms of pragmatic environmental initiatives should be a focus 
for scholars. For example, does the focus on Energy Efficiency (i.e. fuel efficiency) 
pigeon-hole industry activity towards marginal fuel saving efforts such as hull 
                                                
92 https://www.bsr.org/collaboration/groups/clean-cargo-working-group 
93 http://www.tridentalliance.org 
94 http://www.ssi2040.org 
95 http://glomeep.imo.org 
96 https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/mydnvgl-service-overview/EEDI-calculator.html 
97 http://www.shippingefficiency.org/betterfleet (in beta phase testing at time of writing) 
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optimization and slow steaming and steer them away from more radical technologies 
such as Flettner Rotors and fuel cells? While work has considered rating and ranking 
schemes and the performative behaviours that can ensue from the application of these 
arrangements (see for example Espeland & Sauder 2007). Similar schemes and 
calculative devices could be studied in Shipping combining work on ratings and 
rankings (Shore & Wright 2015; Espeland & Sauder 2007), commensurability of 
emissions (Callon 2009; MacKenzie 2009; Dalsgaard 2013) and acts of valuation 
(Ehrenstein & Muniesa 2013; Helgesson & Muniesa 2013; Kjellberg et al. 2013; 
Muniesa & Helgesson 2013; Vatin 2013). The shipping industry provides unique 
context in which to explore these themes and a potentially unique opportunity to follow 
the real-time construction and implementation of governance networks and calculative 
market devices.  
 
8.7.3 Inhumanity at Sea: Applying ANT to the Plight of Animals 
One specific empirical context that requires investigation is live animal exports. 
Livestock shipping is an under-researched context with issues of animal welfare, 
pollution and safety (see for example Jiang 2017; Simpson 2017a; Simpson 2017b). The 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority recently banned livestock carrier Al Messilah 
from operating in the country due to defects found during inspections (Jiang 2017) and 
on a voyage in 2016, 3000 animals of the 69,322 aboard perished due to conditions 
aboard this ship (ibid). Research could draw on the work done by Law and Mol to 
understand the socio-technical experience of animals and how the perception of these 
animals by different actors can produce and enact multiple realities (Law & Mol 2011; 
Law & Mol 2008). ANT perspectives are useful here through the foregrounding of 
animals as non-human actors and may enable exploration of their environment aboard 
the ship from a more symmetrical and open standpoint. Such research could respond to 
criticisms by some that ANT, though focused on non-humans, has failed to engage with 
sentient animals as agents for study (Vinnari et al. 2018; Baxter & Chua 2018).The 
shipping of livestock is a black box that remains an empirical unknown, largely 
unopened in academic literatures.  
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8.7.4 Geographical and Jurisdictional Issues: Exploring Controversy  
The Artic is often considered a pristine environment and yet the melting of the ice as a 
result of climate change is opening up the possibility of an arctic shipping route 
(Borgerson 2008; Emmerson & Lahn 2014; Lister 2015). Although there are ships that 
currently sail through the Arctic, the melting ice means that there will be less and less 
need for these ships to have ice-breaking capabilities (Maritime Knowledge Centre 
2012). Indeed last August (2017) marked the first time that a tanker was able to sail the 
Northern Route without the assistance of an Ice-Breaker (McGrath 2017). The Arctic 
Route is considered advantageous in Shipping as a way to cut journey times (Borgerson 
2008). Accordingly, the Arctic route has presented as a way to reduce voyage 
emissions, though at the same time there is concern about black carbon emissions from 
ships accelerating ice melt (Azzara 2013). With the increasing accessibility of this route 
ship traffic levels could escalate and in return the need for regulation increases 
(Maritime Knowledge Centre 2012). While there has been some work to understand the 
intersection of Shipping with this environment and the local society (Kürner et al. 2015) 
this area is likely to grow in contention and would be an effective context in which to 
contribute to the understanding controversies within ANT literature (Venturini 2009).  
 
Shipping, and indeed the oceans in general, is a context where jurisdiction, 
responsibilities and ‘stakeholdership’ is not fully understood or even stabilized. Future 
work should consider Ports as a physical manifestation of Obligatory Passage Points 
(Fox 2000; Callon 1986a; Cloatre & Dingwall 2013) and explore their role in control 
making. This is an opportune time to explore the role of Ports considering their 
jurisdiction and influence is growing (Molenaar 2006). They now engage in 
environmental initiatives and incentive schemes (Acciaro et al. 2014; Gibbs et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, although Ports were traditionally owned by the country in which they are 
located, there has been an increase of countries buying and owning other countries’ 
ports (Kynge 2017) which is the global equivalent of your neighbour owning and 
controlling your doorstep and potentially the flow of goods through it. This oddity of 
international activity and relations needs to be explored. Furthermore, China has been 
building artificial islands in the South China Sea (Connor 2018), the environmental 
consequences of which are yet unknown. Clearly such activity demands scholarly 
 271 
engagement on a number of levels. Scholars need to approach the shipping industry and 
the oceans from multidisciplinary angles, combining management, international 
relations, law and sustainability to examine some of the political-environmental-legal 
developments of the modern oceans. The sea, therefore, is a place where philosophical 
questions are raised in practical circumstances: a blue frontier for research.  
 
8.8 Concluding Thoughts 
This chapter has highlighted the insights and contributions of this thesis, discussed them 
in relation to current literatures and suggested how they can be useful for future 
scholars. The thesis set out to examine and explain the MEPC as a network responsible 
for regulating CO2 emissions in the shipping industry. Guided by the questions, ‘What 
is the MEPC?’ and ‘How does it work?’ the thesis explained the actors and processes 
that both constitute the MEPC network, and allow the construction of regulation aimed 
at controlling CO2 emissions from ships. Applying the fundamental principles of ANT 
to collect and analyse multiple data types allowed the creation of a detailed and 
descriptive narrative and through this the thesis presents an ethnography of regulation in 
the MEPC and an explanation of control. There are four main contributions of this 
thesis: 
 
1. This thesis extends conceptions of international networked control into a modern 
environmental context. There are two inter-dependent and symbiotic stages of 
producing eventual control. This thesis represents an account of the actors and 
associations that assemble around the first stage: the production of regulation. 
Furthermore, this thesis added a rich ethnography of regulation and deep 
examination of the processes of the MEPC. In doing so, this research adds to the 
scarce literature on the IMO and indeed on regulatory governance of shipping in 
general.  
2. Empirical insight into the work of texts in organisations is offered. The agency 
of texts in a socio-legal-political environment was detailed (Cooren 2004; 
Cloatre & Dingwall 2013)(Cooren 2004; Cloatre & Dingwall 2013). Texts 
provided durability (Latour 1990), stability and were appresentational devices 
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(Knorr Cetina & Bruegger 2002; Entwistle & Slater 2014). In addition to what 
texts do and how they act, the limitations of texts were also discussed. 
3. The complimentary sociological vocabularies of translation (Callon 1986a) and 
treason (Galis & Lee 2013)were used in conjunction to present a full and 
balanced narrative of the discursive tensions, commonalities and agreements. 
Using these concepts together showed their applicability for explaining how 
disparate interests in a durable network can be continually aligned in practice. 
Rather than breaking apart or pushing divergent actor-groups out of the network 
entirely, the MEPC grew more aligned as result of translation while treason was 
constrained by the agency of organizational principles.  
4. After detailing spaces, people, things and processes, this thesis sought to account 
for the missing masses (Latour 1992). Three constructs were identified as 
producing and produced by the network. These were discussed as a new actor-
category and the term and typology of Meta-actors is offered to future ANT 
scholars to account for non-physical actors that have an agency separate to any 
one actor and yet are also enacted through physical actors. Meta-actors also 
illustrated the link between networked influence and dependency, highlighting 
that control in ANT is a position of power and vulnerability.  
 
From the contributions this chapter then examined the limitations of the research, 
casting these as opportunities for future research to build directly on this work and also 
presented the wider opportunities for scholarly engagement in the shipping industry. 
This section now concludes with a reflection on the aim of the research and the thesis as 
an output. 
 
When I set out to study this area I aimed to provide the eventual reader of my thesis 
with a theorized explanation of the actor-constituents of the MEPC and the processes by 
which it functions. In doing this, the thesis presents an ethnographic study of network 
control making and sheds light on a significant context and a world-important lynchpin 
organisation. My research questions and the application of ANT as a ‘theory-method’ 
allowed me to construct a rich account of creating regulatory control.  
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This thesis offers up empirical originality and theoretical insights, but it has also 
highlighted the need to look at both international regulatory control and Shipping as a 
major area for environmental research. In my experience, Shipping is a very complex 
and under-appreciated industry. Though responsible for large parts of our comfortable, 
globalised lives, it is often overlooked into invisibility (Mitropoulos 2005; George 
2013; Lister 2015). Thus, there remains a paradox between the size and influence of the 
international shipping industry and its low visibility, not only in society but also in 
academic communities focused on environmental study. The thesis began with a review 
of the small amount of qualitative literature dedicated to the regulation and 
environmental impacts of this industry and now returns to this point. The shipping 
industry deserves praise and criticism in equal measure but more than anything; it 
deserves to be acknowledged. The world is 70 per cent ocean (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration 2017). The seas are embedded in our history and will be 
part of our future. It is my hope that scholars begin to cast their eyes out to sea in the 
future. In the words of Jacques Yves Cousteau: 
 
‘The sea, the great unifier, is man's only hope. Now, as never before, the old phrase has 
a literal meaning: we are all in the same boat.’  
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Appendix 1: Core Themes for Interviews 
 
All 
 
• Details on the interviewee’s organisation/Delegation 
• Details on interviewee’s role in organisation/Delegation 
• Interviewee’s experience 
 
IMO Delegate 
 
 
External Organisation 
MEPC Process: 
• Creating Submissions 
• Capturing and representing 
interests 
• Outreach Process 
• Preparation for meeting 
• Activities during meeting 
• Effective contributions to the 
process 
• Negotiation Strategies 
• The role of the Chairman 
• Conflicting regulatory principles 
• The EU in the process 
• Opinions on the outcomes of the 
recent MEPCs (68,69,70) 
• Key parts of the regulatory process 
• Difficulties/improving the process 
 
Perspectives on the IMO MEPC: 
• Thoughts on the regulatory outputs 
• Regulation in practice  
• Implementation process 
• Are your interests represented in 
the IMO? 
• Difficulties/improving the process 
• Interactions with the IMO/MEPC 
• Interactions with Delegates 
• Organisations role in reducing 
carbon emissions, efforts, 
measures, initiatives etc. 
External Influences: 
• Regional regulations (e.g. EU 
MRV) 
• CBDR 
• Paris COP21 and Agreement  
• Self Governance efforts from the 
industry  
External Influences: 
• Regional regulations (e.g. EU 
MRV) 
• CBDR 
• Paris COP21 and Agreement  
• Self Governance efforts from the 
industry 
 
 
This table represents the themes that were generally explored. Questions were adapted 
to the individual interviewee in advance of and during the interview.  
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Appendix 3: Statements by China and the Cook Islands  
 
(Source text: MEPC69/21/Add.1 Annex 17, pp7-8) 
 
Statement by the Delegation of China 
 
"We note with great regret an article published yesterday on the website of Seas at Risk. 
The article covered in an extremely irresponsible way what the Organization is doing to 
reduce GHG emission from international shipping. That article did not mention the 
significant progress in establishing a mandatory data collection scheme which is soon to 
be adopted in this Organization. Instead, the article smears and slanders the Member 
States in their efforts in scientifically and effectively carrying out the work of GHG 
reduction. 
 
Seas at Risk is a subsidiary organ annexed to CSC. CSC, as a NGO with consultative 
status with this Organization, fully participated in the discussion of this session of the 
MEPC.  
 
It is very regrettable that we have to point out that CSC misplaced and failed the trust 
we as Member States accord to it and abused the rights to attend IMO meetings.  
 
We are here to call upon fellow Member States and organizations with consultative 
status with this Organization, to cherish the spirit of cooperation that our Organization 
has been thriving upon to safeguard this Organization's credibility. We also kindly 
request the Secretariat to take effective measures to clear up the glaring influence 
caused by that slandering article."  
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Statement by the Delegation of the Cook Islands 
 
"It is with considerable reluctance that we comment on this matter, however as one of 
two Parties singled out for special attention by an NGO present here in this room we 
have to say that we share the concerns raised by China.  
 
Indeed, we note that there was a twitter feed running during yesterday's sessions which 
was giving a running commentary on discussions, taking comments out of context, 
misrepresenting country positions and all this before the group had even found 
resolution on some of the more contentious matters. We do consider this a clear abuse 
of the privilege that has been extended to particular groups and individuals to participate 
in such important sessions of the IMO MEPC.  
 
Turning to the published article which has so grossly misreported our position and our 
contribution to the work of this Organisation, we find this extremely disappointing, as 
people here know we were supporting a significant proportion of members in this room 
in finding a workable solution to the challenge of assessing and responding to GHG 
emissions in the shipping sector. 
 
It is disappointing also because it diminishes what we consider to be a landmark 
decision taken by the membership on a mandatory data collection system which needs 
to be celebrated and not scorned.  
 
Of course we absolutely support the freedoms of all groups participating here in our 
sessions, but this must extend to the members as well – we need to feel free to express 
our views without the threat of others reporting these live out on the worldwide web and 
as I say, taken out of context and misrepresented.  
 
We will leave it there, but wish to register this concern with your Committee and the 
Secretariat, and of course my delegation absolutely refutes the claims made in such 
articles and twitter feeds. We reserve the right, if needed, to come back to this issue at 
appropriate future sessions of IMO." 
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Appendix 4: Photographs 
 
Photo 1: External façade of IMO (Official IMO Photograph). 
 
 
Photo 2: Close-up of ship feature of external façade (Official IMO Photograph). 
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Photo 3: Greco-Roman Figurehead. 
 
 
Photo 4: Gift from the Federal Government of Nigeria: Representation of Queen Amina 
during her 16th Century reign 
 
[A United Arab Shipping Company container ship is shown in the background] 
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Photo 5: Gift from the Ministry of Transport of the State of Qatar: A model LNG 
carrier. 
 
 
Photo 6: Gifts from the Republic of Cyprus: ‘A Cyprus-Greek Merchant ship (top) and 
a Cyrpus-Mycenaean ship’ (bottom). 
 
[The plaques explain that the top ship is a model of the Kyrenia Ship from the ‘latter 
third of the 4th century B.C. and that the lower ship is a model of a late Bronze Age ship 
circa 1450-1225 B.C. Both ships were merchant vessels.] 
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Photo 7: Three model ships in open space used at break times. 
 
 
Photo 8: Model ships line a corridor. 
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Photo 9: Gift from the Government of Kuwait: a camel saddle and caparison. 
 
 
Photo 10: Gift from the Government of the Republic of Gabon: A statuette in bois de 
fer. 
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Photo 11: Gift from Trinity House: a lighthouse optic from Orfordness lighthouse. 
 
 
Photo 12: A gift from the Kingdom of Morocco: an ornate fountain. 
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Photo 13: Plenary room, empty at end of day. About a third of the room is captured in 
this photo. 
 
 
Photo 14: Chairman’s position at the front of plenary. 
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Photo 15: Plenary room full (Official IMO Photograph). 
 
 
Photo 16: Committee Room 11-13. 
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Appendix 5: The Three-Step Approach 
 
(Information adapted from: Hughes, E: 'Recent developments at IMO to address GHG 
emissions from ships' Presented at a Side Event COP22 in November 2016) 
 
At MEPC68 (May 2015) the Committee agreed the Three-Step Approach under Agenda 
Item: Further Technical and Operational Measures For Enhancing Energy Efficiency of 
International Shipping 
 
The three-step approach is aimed to increase energy efficiency of ships and in doing so 
reduce CO2. Its steps include: 
1. Data Collection 
2. Data Analysis 
3. Decision Making on what further measures, if any, are required. 
 
The data collection during step 1 ‘will provide the basis for an objective, transparent 
and inclusive policy debate in the MEPC’ (ibid). The details of steps 2 and 3 have yet to 
be determined. The MEPC have agreed on a Data Collection System for Fuel Oil 
Consumption (DCS) to fulfil step 1.  
 
Ships of 5,000 GT and above will be required to submit to their Administration annual 
reports on fuel oil consumption and transport work parameters, via a methodology 
included in the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). Administrations 
are expected to submit aggregated data to IMO, which will maintain an anonymised 
IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database. January 1st 2019 marks the first data 
“calendar year” for collection.  
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Appendix 6: Timeline Comparisons 
 
 
MEPC 70/7/6 
Annex, page 1 
 
 
https://edocs.imo.org/Final Documents/English/MEPC 70-7-6 (E).docx 
ANNEX 
 
POTENTIAL TIMELINE FOR FAIR SHARE AND ITS FIT TO THE THREE-STEP APPROACH 
 
Timeline Fair share  Three-step approach 
(to develop further technical and 
operational measures for enhancing the 
energy efficiency and address GHG 
emissions from international shipping) 
October 2016  
(MEPC 70) 
1. Discussion of the concept of 
"International shipping's fair 
share" 
2. Establish intersessional work 
plan 
 
 Phase 1: Data collection  
Adoption of Data Collection System  
 
    
May 2017 
(MEPC 71) 
3. Exploration and evaluation of all 
possible methods to define the 
"fair share"  
4. Discussion of time horizon 
(reference years, annual or 
aggregated objectives) 
5. Discussion of scope (GHGs to 
be considered)  
6. Intersessional work: Application 
of the methodology to define 
provisional shipping's fair share 
 
   28/08/2017: Tacit acceptance to establish 
a data collection system 
  
 
 February 2018: Potential entry into force 
of Data Collection System 
April 2018  
(MEPC 72) 
7. Selection of method 
8. Identification of a provisional fair 
share and discussion of any 
further work/steps that this 
implies 
  
October 2018  
(MEPC 73) 
9. Preparation of a 
report/statement to the 
facilitative dialogue on UNFCCC 
stock take 
  
  
 
 1st January 2019: Ships starting to collect 
data  
2019 (MEPC 74) 
and later 
 
 
 
  
2021-2022 10. Revision or updating of any 
estimated fair share, pending 
data collected in the three-step 
approach. 
 
 Phase 2: Analysis   
20XX   Timeline to be continued, including 
Phase 3 
 
___________ 
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MEPC 70/18/Add.1 
Annex 11, page 1 
 
 
https://edocs.imo.org/Final Documents/English/MEPC 70-18-ADD.1 (E).docx 
ANNEX 11 
 
ROADMAP FOR DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE IMO STRATEGY ON  
REDUCTION OF GHG EMISSIONS FROM SHIPS  
 
 
In order to build upon, and bring together, the various streams of activity that have already 
been taking place in IMO in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions from international 
shipping, including the technical and operational measures (EEDI and SEEMP) in force 
since 2013, the adoption of the data collection system at MEPC 70 and various technical 
cooperation activities and major projects, the MEPC approved the Roadmap for developing a 
comprehensive IMO strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, set out below. 
 
October 2016 
(MEPC 70) 
- Adoption of Data Collection System (DCS) 
- Voluntary data collection and submission begins 
- Approval of Roadmap 
Week before 
MEPC 71 
- Intersessional meeting to start discussions on a comprehensive IMO 
strategy on reduction of GHG emissions from ships, taking into account 
inputs such as: (1) Third IMO GHG Study; (2) submissions on the 
elements below and on existing activities related to GHG emissions 
reductions by States and stakeholders; and (3) a technical paper by the 
Secretariat compiling a list of existing IMO activity related to reducing 
GHG emissions in the shipping sector. The discussions should include 
but not be limited to the elements below: 
x Levels of ambition and guiding principles for the strategy; 
x Emissions scenarios;  
x Assessment of the projected future demand for shipping; 
x Parameters/indicators on energy efficiency of ships (current status 
and long-term potential); 
x Emission reduction opportunities (near-, mid- and long-term 
actions), including alternative fuels; 
x Costs and benefits; 
x Capacity building and technical cooperation; 
x Barriers to emissions reductions and how to overcome them; 
x Priority areas for R&D, including in relation to technology; 
x Impact of EEDI; 
x Impacts on States, taking into account the HLAP (resolution 
A.1098(29)); and 
x Impacts of other regulations on GHG emissions 
May 2017 
(MEPC 71) 
- Discussion continues1 
September 2017 - Intersessional meeting 
Week before 
MEPC 72 
- Intersessional meeting 
Spring 2018 
(MEPC 72) 
- Adoption of initial IMO Strategy2, including, inter alia, a list of 
candidate short-, mid- and long term further measures with possible 
timelines, to be revised as appropriate as additional information 
becomes available 
January 2019 - Start of Phase 1: Data collection (Ships to collect data) 
                                               
1  Modality of further intersessional work after MEPC 71 to be considered based on written submissions. 
2  Initial IMO Strategy is subject to revision based on DCS data during 2019-2021 and does not prejudge any 
specific further measures that may be implemented in phase 3 of the 3-step approach. 
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https://edocs.imo.org/Final Documents/English/MEPC 70-18-ADD.1 (E).docx 
Spring 2019 
(MEPC 74) 
- Discussion continues 
- Initiation of Fourth IMO GHG Study using data from 2012-2018 
Summer 2020 - Data for 2019 to be reported to IMO 
Autumn 2020 
(MEPC 76) 
- Start of Phase 2: data analysis (no later than autumn 2020) 
- Discussion continues 
- Publication of Fourth IMO GHG Study for consideration by 
MEPC 763 
Spring 2021 
(MEPC 77) 
- Initiation of work for adjustments on Initial IMO Strategy, based on 
DCS data 
- Secretariat report summarizing the 2019 data pursuant to 
regulation 22A.10 
Summer 2021 - Data for 2020 to be reported to IMO 
Spring 2022 
(MEPC 78) 
 
- Phase 3: Decision step 
- Discussion continues 
- Secretariat report summarizing the 2020 data pursuant to 
regulation 22A.10 
Summer 2022 - Data for 2021 to be reported to IMO 
Spring 2023 
(MEPC 80) 
- Adoption of Revised IMO Strategy, including short-, mid- and long-
term further measure(s), as required, with implementation schedules 
- Secretariat report summarizing the 2021 data pursuant to 
regulation 22A.10 
 
 
*** 
  
                                               
3  Every five (5) years, to publish updated IMO GHG study, as to be decided by the Committee, and to review 
Strategy (including further measures). 
